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I’ve been worried, for a while, about the motivations for action when one’s consequences are minimal.  Why vote or recycle or go veggie or give £5 to Oxfam if your teeny contribution can have no serious effects?  I had a short conversation with someone about charitable acts, and it has me thinking.

He spent some time over Christmas working at a shelter for the homeless, and I asked about his motivation.  I expected an answer I could file under various philosophical headings — the mention of good consequences or principles or virtues or the like.  What I got was something else entirely.  He said he tries to help others because he’s hopeful.  Ah ha, I said, you hope to make a difference to someone; you hope to bring about good consequences.  Not at all, he said.  Making a difference to someone was nowhere near the crux of things for him.  He went on a bit about the importance of doing hopeful things whether or not those hopeful things mattered to anyone or did any good.  All the little things he did — sweeping up, carrying boxes, filling tea urns, etc — were ways of hoping.  I tried various paraphrases, to see if I took his meaning, and mostly I didn’t, until I asked if it was like gardening.  Nearly, he said.  It was as close as I got.

Without going all Zen or bothering Voltaire, you can at least take the point that there can be something about a practice which makes it worthwhile, quite apart from the outcome of that practice.  You can find value in fishing and never catch a fish.  Catching a fish might even ruin it for you.  Gardeners can go on about the value of tending to plants over time — sometimes they talk about being in tune with nature, with cycles, with something, anyway, that doesn’t have much to do with getting a salad out of it in the end.  There’s a reason in here, in these thoughts about the value of a practice, for helping other people.  And the reason isn’t a moral one.  It’s detached from consequences too.  I’m still not sure what it is.

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As Israel continues ground operations in Gaza, the casualties continue to grow. Not surprisingly, the civilians are suffering the most. As Thucydides wrote, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Of course, the suffering is not all on one side. Hamas continues to launch random rocket attacks into Israel and there will no doubt be more deaths among Israeli forces.

Having followed events in the news, I have noticed that a common talking point among those critical of Israel is the notion of proportionality. The view generally expressed by such critics is that Israel is not responding in a proportional manner to Hamas. While the news does not go into depth (depth is the bane of TV news) I infer that they are using the concept in the usual moral sense. Put a bit simply, the idea is that a response to a harmful or provocative action should be in proportion to that action. To go beyond that in doing harm would be unjust. For example, suppose someone gets angry at my political views, hits me with a small rock and thus bruises my arm. If I break his arm, then I have acted in a disproportionate way. As such, my action would be wrong. In the case of Israel, the critics say that Israel’s air strikes and ground invasion is not proportional to the random rocket attacks and hence is wrong.

On one hand, the critics do have a reasonable point. By the numbers, the rockets have killed and injured only a few people and the airstrikes and invasion have killed and injured many. As such, Israel seems to be acting wrongly be responding in such an extreme way.

On the other hand, it can be argued that Israel is acting in a just manner. While it is clear that Israel is killing far more people than Hamas’ rocket strikes, there is also the matter of considering what is required to stop the rocket strikes. Going back to my example above, if I shoot someone for brusing my arm with a rock, then I have clearly over reacted. However, there is the question of what my response should be. If I react in a way that is exactly proportional and throw a rock at him, then I will most likely just create a cycle of rock throwing. Each response will be proportional (a rock for a rock) but this would hardly be a desirable solution. It would be better to put an end to the rock throwing altogether.

In the case of Israel and Hamas, if Israel fired comparable rockets randomly into Gaza, then they would have an exactly proportional response. However, this would create an ongoing cycle of random deaths and injury. This hardly seems desirable (although a utilitarian argument could be made that an ongoing rocket exchange with few deaths would be better than an invasion that end up killing many people).

Perhaps there is a way for Israel to stop the rockets without killing and injuring a disproportionate number of people. If so, that would be the morally preferable approach. Unfortunately, Israel seems left with few options. Air strikes against the rockets will do more damage than the rockets do to Israel. Further, they will not stop the rocket attacks without inflicting massive destruction. Precision special forces operations could destroy some rocket launchers with minimal deaths, but such operations cannot be extensive enough to solve the problem. As such, the military way to stop the rockets would seem to be to use ground forces to defeat Hamas in the area. This will no doubt prove both difficult and costly. However, if such operations are the only way to stop the rocket attacks, then they would seem morally justified. Assuming, of course, that it is wrong for Hamas to fire rockets at Israel.

Going back to my example, if the person who hit me with a rock will not stop throwing rocks at me unless I break his arm, then I would be justified in doing that. This assumes, of course, that he should not be throwing rocks at me. If I deserve to be hit with rocks, then I would have no moral right to break his arm. But if I do not deserve to be hit by rocks and only a broken arm will stop him, then I would be right to break his arm.

As always, it would be better if a peaceful solution could be reached. However, history shows that this is not likely. We can expect more death, injury and suffering before this current situation comes to an end.

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Over at a blog called Shiraz Socialist (which actually is a lot saner a place than many of the ’socialist’ blogs), a fella called John Game, who is something to do with the Socialist Workers Party (a very small British Trotskyist party), makes this claim:

Israel has no right to self defence so long as the Palestinian question remains unresolved. Period.

He doesn’t argue for this position - it’s just an assertion - but it is nevertheless a commonly held view. I’m sceptical about this view - though I wouldn’t couch my scepticism in terms of rights - and I’ve written about it before.

Anyway, here’s a new thing, which may, or may not, shed some light on the issue of self-defence. (This is quite complex, and it only works if you keep going right to the end. Also, I’ve only spent a couple of minutes thinking about it, so apologies if it is a mess.)

Suppose the Palestinians find themselves in a situation where they have two options:

Option A: The goal of liberation from the yoke of Israeli oppression can reasonably be expected to be achieved at the cost of 1000 Israeli lives;

Option B: The goal of liberation from the yoke of Israeli oppression can reasonably be expected to be achieved at the cost of 10,000 Israeli lives;

These options are identical in every respect except in terms of the numbers of lives they will cost. (Okay I can see that there is an objection that the difference in the number of lives lost here is bound to make some difference to the outcome for the Palestinians. I’m not sure that this is necessarily the case, but if you think that it is, then feel free to reduce the number of lives lost in Option B until you’re content that it is reasonable to suppose that it won’t make any discernible difference to the outcome for the Palestinians - though obviously the number of lives lost in B needs to be higher than in A.)

The question then is given these two choices would it be immoral for the Palestinian commanders to choose Option B rather than Option A? (At this point, we have to imagine ourselves inside the heads of the likes of John Game, since we’re assuming that the goal of ‘liberation’ justifies at least Option A. I’m making no claim here about the real world situation.)

I think most people would claim that it would be immoral - given this choice - to pick Option B. Certainly if you’re a utilitarian, then that’s what you’re going to argue. So let’s grant this  - that it would be immoral (though feel free to dispute it in the comments section if you wish, though I’m not guaranteeing to engage with the dispute, sorry!).

The question then becomes: if the Palestinian commanders choose Option B, which we’ve accepted is a clear wrong, do the Israelis behave immorally if they defend themselves against the action?

If I were to argue that they do behave immorally in so defending themselves (though, even given the terms of this thought experiment, probably I wouldn’t), then I’d argue something like that although the Palestinian commanders are morally wrong to choose Option B rather than Option A, the continued subordination of the Palestinians is a greater moral wrong than the carrying out of Option B, so one has to hope that Option B will succeed (given the choice between the success of Option B and the continued subordination of the Palestinians). So the Israelis would be wrong in defending themselves, even though the Palestinian commanders have behaved immorally by choosing a less than optimal course of action. So it’s a straight utilitarian argument. (One can imagine making this kind of argument about the bombing of Dresden, for example.)

So let’s tweak the thought experiment.

Suppose rather than choosing between Option A and Option B, the Palestinian commanders decide to pursue both strategies so as to maximise the chances of success. The Israelis can only prevent one of the two Options from occurring. In this situation, do they have the right to defend themselves against Option B, even if by doing so they kill x number of Palestinians (where x is some number less than the number of Israelis who would be killed if Option B occurs)?

I would argue that it is extremely difficult to make the case that in this situation they would be immoral to defend themselves against Option B. It seems here they have at least a limited right to self defence (as I said above, I don’t like talk of rights, but I’ve allowed myself the indulgence of briefly shifting into Game’s terminology.)

If this is right, does it have real world implications? Yes it does, actually. Though likely I won’t get around to explaining why!

(Note carefully: This isn’t just about Israel and Palestine. The only reason I’ve used the current dispute here is because people will simply assume that’s what I’m talking about. However, this thought experiment works, or doesn’t work, for any situation involving an oppressor and the oppressed. Note again, I am not making the claim that this is the real world situation with the Israelis and the Palestinians. I have no public view on that.)

Edit: I just made myself some toast, and it occurred to me there is a complication with the simultaneous Option A, Option B bit at the end. I haven’t decided whether it alters the moral calculus (probably it moves the thought experiment nearer to my previous ‘In Defence of Evil’ thought experiment), but just in case - assume that the success of Option A is not conditional upon Option B also being put into action.

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The weight of belief is heavier than most of us know. Belief chains us to patterns of thought and behavior. Despite lacking knowledge, we cling to our beliefs in the attempt to give stability and security to our inner lives. I am not talking about believing where you parked your car, what you mother’s name is, or the existence of global warming. For all these things we have common or scientific ways of coming to a reasonable set of beliefs. In some matters it is hard to know how one could be wrong, for example, in believing that 2+2=4, that my name is Jeff Mason, or that humans live on the planet earth. In other cases, our beliefs are not so certain. To hold the former with conviction is reasonable, and the latter with a lesser degree of certainty. After that, there are many other things about which our beliefs are less and less certain.

One of the main features of our beliefs is that they aim at the truth, and we hold our beliefs to express true opinions. As pointed out long ago, it would be very odd to say that one believes something, but not that it is true. So belief implicates truth, without necessarily grasping it in particular cases. What beliefs do, however, is to stick the mind to ideas as if they were true, and in such a way as to render them inert. Questioning things takes mental effort and discombobulates people who simply want to get on with their lives without thinking too much. Indeed, if our minds were not so fastened to a set of stable beliefs, it would be hard to navigate the world. We might end up like the great ancient skeptic Pyrrho, who, it is said, avoided cliffs and charging chariots only through the offices of his not-so-skeptical disciples.

Beliefs, then, are ideas about what is considered true that remain relatively stable through time and provide a compass for our lives. We act on our beliefs just as surely as knowledge. Subjectively there is very little difference between them, but, of course, it remains true that beliefs might not turn out to be true. Nevertheless, we often forgot this, and confuse belief with knowledge. People act on their beliefs as if they were certainly true, and indeed, as if believing something strongly enough makes it true.

The sources of belief are multiple, and not all of them are terribly respectable. We are in the dependent position of coming into the world as babies, waiting to be impressed by the sights, sounds, and, most importantly, by the people who guide and protect us. Not being born with beliefs, but with a capacity, and even a necessity to form them, we unquestioningly accept what others tell us. As little children, we trust our elders because we have no choice. We are praised or punished for our behavior according to the beliefs of the very local culture into which, and out of which, we emerge.

So what has this to do with skepticism and freedom? Skepticism, as we know, has a bad reputation in many quarters. Habits of questioning cause discomfort in those who have set opinions. Their attitude is one of “I know what I believe, and I will stick to that no matter what.” Furthermore, to such people, the skeptic appears as a threat to settled patterns of thought, action and attitude. More to the point, skepticism allows and even demands the questioning of all authorities, and authorities do not like such questioning. If everyone started making up their own minds about everything, it is not clear how any authority could maintain the uniformity of thought that it desires.

My view is that the many beliefs that people hold without questioning are so many shackles of the mind. Our beliefs hold us captive, and we do not even know it. This is why the cultivation of a skeptical attitude is so important for the advance of freedom in the world. The skeptic mind is a free mind. I am not speaking of radical skepticism about the unreality of the world, our bodies, or even the truths of mathematics. These ‘doubts’ are a strategic maneuver designed to sharpen a theory of knowledge. Reasonable skepticism concerns the opinions people hold with a strength that is not warranted by the evidence.

One of the main obstacles to freeing the mind from its shackles of belief is the desire for certainty. Give up this desire and it is possible to explore the universe with an open mind. This is particularly true with religious and political beliefs that are more a matter of sheer conviction than fact. Belief is a choice, and a choice that rules out alternative views and ways of thinking. Possessing too many beliefs prevents people from thinking outside the box, and it is just this sort of thinking that skepticism encourages. No wonder, then, that Dante, who was working with the closed mind of the Middle Ages, provides skeptics with their own special place in Hell.

However, when one gives up the desire for certainty and opens the mind to questioning and inquiry, then one feels the exhilaration described by J.L.Austin when he spoke of the thrill we experience feeling the firm ground of prejudice slipping away beneath our feet. Skeptic freedom is a freedom of the mind to explore an open-ended and inexhaustible universe without prejudice and blinkers. It may not always be comfortable, and it may not always bring happiness, but, then, neither does the straight jacket of belief.

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While the Russians have claimed that Hamas is willing to talk peace, rockets continue to rain down on Israel.

On the face of it, firing rockets into populated areas seems like a clearly immoral action. However, I have had enough debates about such matters to know that some people regard such tactics as morally acceptable. Outside of academic types, clearly the people who are involved with firing the rockets find their behavior acceptable. Either that or they are somehow overcoming any moral reluctance they might feel. It is worth considering what arguments might be used to morally justify such acts.

One main argument is that the rockets are being fired in retaliation for Israeli wrong doings. As such, the rockets are intended as punishment. In general, punishing people for their misdeeds is morally acceptable and can be argued for in terms of deterrence and retribution (see John Locke’s arguments as good examples of this).

To counter this, punishment is something that should be directed at the guilty party and not randomly inflicted. After all, to punish the innocent would simply be to commit a crime against them and would not be an act of justice.

It might be replied that the people hurt by the rockets are (usually) Israelis and hence they are not innocent. However, being and Israeli seems to be a rather weak basis for justifying such attacks. To use a analogy, imagine that professor Sally is fired from her job at Big University so that the university President can give her boyfriend Sally’s job. Now suppose that, in revenge, Sally started randomly slashing the tires of students’ cars because they happened to be students of the university. While the students are associated with Big U, they hardly deserve her wrath. Likewise for the innocent civilians.

It could be argued that being a citizen comes with moral accountability such that each citizen is responsible for all that his/her nation does. So, the rocket attacks would be justified retaliation provided they killed only Israeli citizens (or other “guilty” people).

In reply, while citizens (at least in democracies) do bear some responsibility for the actions of their nation, such random attacks fail to take into account important distinctions. To be specific, surely not every citizen bears the guilt of every misdeed (or perceived misdeed) of a nation. For example, a random rocket attack could kill an Israeli who has worked for the good of the people of Gaza or it could kill a child. Surely such people do not deserve death.

Obviously, it could be argued that collective guilt somehow overrides all other normally relevant aspects (such as past actions). However, the burden of proof seems to be on those who would make this claim. On the face of it, such distinctions seem very important everywhere else. Why should this situation be different?

In light of these arguments, such random rocket attacks (and similar acts of terror) can not be justified as legitimate retaliation or punishment.

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Just back from our annual trip to Atlanta to celebrate various holidays with various relatives…I have a lovely pile of new books.   I’ve been alternating for the last week between Michael Gazzaniga’s new book on what makes humans unique (Human) and Mark Rowlands’ book on the same subject (The Philosopher and the Wolf).

The traditional rules of this subject require any answer to be flattering to humans.  You’re suppose to ooh and ahh about language, not observe  that humans are capable of mass murder.  Gazzaniga plays by the rules, while Rowlands rejects them.

I confess I’ve spent much more time with Rowlands’ book and that’s owing to its philosophy-plus-memoir structure.  You can’t beat a good story, and Rowlands is a great storyteller. The book is a memoir of a turbulent decade of Rowlands’ life when he lived his life with a wolf named “Brenin”.  What Rowlands is really, really great at is blending together storytelling and philosophy.

When we got home it was nice to find two articles about Rowlands in the latest issue of TPM.  Jenny Bunker’s generally appreciative review errs, I must say, in calling the book a “paean to a departed pet” and a “philosophy primer”   This is a book that captures a much more profound relationship than “owner” to “pet.”  As the primatologist Frans de Waal writes on the back cover, the book “reads like a tormented love affair with its animal star.”  It really does, and it grips you like a love story.  Philosophy primer? Not really.  The issues it explores are not from Philosophy 101.

TPM’s reviewer is put off by Rowlands’ misanthropy, but I find it intriguing.  What’s most human about us, he says, is our power to deceive, connive, manipulate.  It’s our inner ape that defines us, and when you place the ape next to a wolf, it’s the wolf that impresses with his loyalty and guilelessness.

Ophelia Benson also talks about Rowlands in her “Threads” column, picking up on a very interesting discussion about humanism at www.secularphilosophy.com.  There, Rowlands rejects a kind of humanism (and there are other kinds) that involves a lot of blasting of trumpets about humanity. This is the kind of humanism you find in Gazzaniga’s book.  It’s the view that there is some sort of extra special importance and potential to human life. This is an attitude that tends to go hand in hand with dismissal of animals.

I don’t care for this sort of humanism any more than Rowlands’ does, but I disagree with him about the reason why it’s problematic.  He rejects the whole idea of comparing species (even though he seems to admire wolves much more than apes):  “If living with Brenin taught me one thing, it is that superiority is always superiority in one or another respect.  More than that, superiority in one respect is likely to show up as a deficiency elsewhere.”  So we can’t attach more value to wolves than humans, or humans than wolves.

I don’t think animal advocates have to reject value comparisons.  We just shouldn’t make them on a narrow basis, or approach them with obvious bias, or exaggerate them, or draw the wrong conclusions from them.  In fact, deep down I very much doubt Mark Rowlands truly abjures such comparisons. There’s an episode in the book where Brenin attacks a man outside his house in Ireland, and Rowlands’ pulls Brenin away. He is instantly gripped by the enormity of the situation.  But then there are scenes in which Rowlands lets Brenin kill rats or rabbits.

Killing humans is intolerable.  Killing rats and rabbits is permitted.  Why?  It surely has to do with differences of value. My own book about animals (coming out in about a year, and still lacking a title) deals with the different value of animal and human lives, and how, in spite of the differences, we still owe significant regard to animals.

But the disagreements made no difference.  The Philosopher and the Wolf is a deep and beautiful book.

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Okay, so here’s a thing.

Suppose an 18 year old fella takes some photographs of his 17 year old girlfriend in various states of undress. Not pornographic, but not artistic (so we’re talking mild readers’ wives type stuff). She is not coerced in any way, has no objections to him possessing the photographs, and he will never show them to anybody else.

They split up a few years later. She’s happy for him to keep the photographs. Fast forward 25 years. He still possesses the photographs. He’s now in his mid-40s, and he hasn’t been in touch with his old girlfriend for some 20 years, so he has no idea whether she’d mind that he still has the photos (of course, he recognises that she might mind).

So various questions arise:

1. Is it morally wrong for a man in his mid-40s to be looking at naked photos of his 17 year old ex-girlfriend taken 25 years previously? (I’m not interested in whether it is ’sad’, ‘pathetic’, etc).

2. If it is morally wrong, was it wrong when he was 18?

3. If not, is it the age difference that makes it morally wrong? If it is the age difference, how old was he when he started to behave immorally?

4. If not (2 or 3), is it the fact that he can no longer assume her consent? If so, suppose he contacts her, and finds out that she doesn’t mind. Is it okay then?

5. If it still wrong, and it isn’t the age difference, is it because she is not now able to consent for her 17 year old self? (So the thought here is that her 17 year old self would not have consented to the 45 year old version of her boyfriend looking at the photos.)

Generally, what should he do with the photographs? Destroy them? (I’m not interested in the legal status of said photographs. Just the moral question.)

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The other day I saw a brief bit on CNN about Michael Vick’s rescued pit bulls. As most people know, Vick got into considerable trouble for his horrible treatment of dogs. He and some associates trained and fought them. The dogs that lacked the desire to fight were killed, often in rather brutal ways.

When the dogs were rescued from Vick, PETA and the Human Society took the position that the dogs were beyond rehabilitation and that it would be a poor use of resources to try to do so. The bit I saw yesterday showed a PETA spokeswoman restating that view: although the rehabilitation worked in some cases, the dogs should have been euthanized and the money should have been spent to help other animals.

While this view struck me as heartless, a case can be made for her position. She is, of course, presenting a standard utilitarian approach: the action that should be taken is the one that generates the most good. So, if the resources spent to help Vick’s pit bulls could have helped many more animals, then the money should have been spent on the other animals.

This approach does match the commonly accepted principle of triage. Put a bit simply, it is the principle that medical resources are to be spent saving the most lives. This can mean allowing some people to die, but this is justified because saving more lives is better than saving fewer lives. The situation with the dogs can be looked at as a form a triage: while it would be best to help all animals, if all cannot be saved, then we should save more animals even if these means that some are not saved. On this view, PETA is correct.

Of course, there are ways to take issue with PETA in this matter.

First, there is the fact that the PETA view is that the dogs should have been euthanized. As such, it is not a case of letting the dogs die in order to save more dogs. It would be a situation in which the dogs would be killed. In this sort of case, our moral intuitions tend to change. For example, consider a (possibly) similar situation: suppose you have five patients who need organ transplants immediately or they will die. You could kill a sixth person to save them, but most people would regard that as morally wrong. Perhaps the same is true in the case of the dogs.

Of course, it could be replied that the dog situation is a bit unusual. Unlike the organ case, the dogs would not being killed to take their organs to save other dogs. They would be killed because that would be regarded as more merciful than keeping them locked away. But, it could be replied that the two cases are alike. The pit bulls would be killed to take something from them that others need: the money and resources. As such, the cases seem alike in the relevant way. Intuitively, such killing seems wrong.

Second, there is the concern that acting in this way (euthanizing the dogs to free up resources) would have serious negative consequences. For example, to do so would (as Kant argued) tend to harden people’s hearts and make them more inclined to cruelty. Then again, perhaps it would not.

Third, there is the moral concern that the dogs are owed restitution for the wrong done to them. While the resources could have been used to help more dogs, Vick and his fellows wronged those dogs. As such, there is a debt that must be paid to those dogs and the evil done to them should be countered.

To use an analogy, imagine that a defect in a product maims dozens of people and that a law suit awards a large sum of money in damages. The money could probably do more good if it were spent to help other people. It could, perhaps, be used to fund preventative medicine. After all, it is far cheaper to help people avoid illness than it is to treat people who have been seriously maimed. By PETA’s principle, the money should not be wasted on the maimed people but spent so as to do the most good. This, however, seems wrong.

As such, to kill the dogs would have been one last crime against them. It would be analogous to murdering rescued survivors simply because it would be expensive to help them. That would be monstrous.

It might be replied that dogs lack moral status and hence cannot be wronged and cannot be owed a moral debt. Of course, this view would undercut the whole notion of treating animals ethically by making them morally irrelevant. As such, it would not seem to be a viable option for PETA.

From a practical standpoint, it seemed unwise of PETA to issue a statement saying that the dogs should have been euthanized. When I heard the PETA spokeswoman, my intellectual reaction was to consider the ethics of the matter. But, when I saw the photos of the rescued dogs with their families, my emotional reaction was to think “what a horrible thing she said” and I thought much less of PETA at that moment. Naturally, the news segment was calculated to do just that. I am sure other people felt as I did and that certainly does not help PETA.

Yes, the money could have probably done more good if it had been spent elsewhere. But here is some practical advice for PETA: never tell dog owners that it would have been better to kill a good dog. That does not go over well. Not well at all.

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This story is very interesting from an ethical point of view:

http://tinyurl.com/89nwm2

My view is that the prison sentence is absurd.

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I have been thinking about Leviticus for two reasons. The first is the ongoing debate about same sex marriage. The second is that my Dad sent me some Maine lobsters for Christmas.

Why the link between lobster and same sex marriage?

Interestingly, male homosexuality and shellfish (technically all aquatic creatures lacking fins and scales) are both abominations.

In regards to the lobsters: “Whatsoever hath no fins nor scales in the waters, that shall be an abomination unto you.” In regards to male homosexuality: “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination.” And, just to be complete, in regards to sex with lobsters: “Neither shalt thou lie with any beast to defile thyself therewith: neither shall any woman stand before a beast to lie down thereto: it is confusion.”

I have no inclination to have sex with other men or with lobsters. But, I am rather fond of eating lobsters and would prefer not to think of myself as being involved in an abomination as I dip that claw meat into the butter (no, that is not a euphemism-I am talking about lobsters and lobsters alone).

When the rules in Leviticus were written it would make sense to regard shellfish as unclean. After all, there are many health concerns with them. For example, red tide can transform shell fish from a tasty treat to a toxic feast. Given the rather limited understanding of biology back then, such a sweeping injunction could be quite sensible. Now, if that is the reason behind the rule, then the rule would not really apply today. After all, with our better understanding of biology and health issues, we can consume shellfish safely.

Of course, some people believe that the rule is a direct command from God to never eat such things ever. As such, the argument that the rule was reasonable then but is no longer needed does not carry any weight. The question then arises as to what grounds the claim that such aquatic creatures are unclean abominations.

One possibility is the obvious one: they can be unclean in a very literal sense-they can be contaminated with toxins or other nastiness (bacteria, etc.). Of course, if they are not so contaminated (like the lobster I cooked and ate), then they would not be unclean. This, obviously enough, takes us back to the argument I presented above.

A second possibility is that such aquatic lifeforms are intrinsically unclean abominations. However, if being unclean or an abomination are real qualities, they should be detectable in the biology or the genetics of such creatures. However, there seems to be no biological or genetic standards for what would be an abomination. As far as being unclean goes, that would seem to only mean that the creature is contaminated with substances harmful or unpleasant to humans. That could apply, but would take us back to the matter just considered.

A third possibility is that such aquatic lifeforms are metaphysically unclean or metaphysical abominations. That is, of course, to say that God made some nasty things. Of course, such metaphysical qualities seem to be undetectable. I’m a professional meta physician and I’ve eaten hundreds of lobsters. Yet, I have never discerned any metaphysical qualities relating to their being unclean or abominations. Then again, maybe that green stuff in them is the abomination or uncleanness. Naturally enough, if someone can show me the metaphysical uncleanness of a lobster, I’ll stop eating them. But, I’ve never even had a stomach ache from eating lobster-so,if they are unclean, most people seem immune to their uncleanness.

A fourth possibility is that they are unclean abominations just because someone says they are. In this case, being unclean or an abomination merely means being called that by whoever gets to label things in this manner. It is not that the creatures have any objective qualities that make them unclean or abominations. They are just those things because someone says so. This would be analogous to something being illegal because people in charge say it is so. For example, if I were to park in a reserved space at my university, I would be ticketed and my truck might be towed. This is not because the space has special qualities. Rather, this is because the people who tell the folks with the tickets and tow trucks say that is how it will be. Perhaps this is the same situation for lobster-everyone who has eaten such creatures will eventually get a ticket or something for breaking the rules.

What about same sex marriage? Well, I have no desire to be involved with that myself. But, some of what I said about lobster would probably apply to that as well.

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