Category Archives: Books

For Better or Worse Reasoning in Print

For_Better_or_Worse__Cover_for_KindleWhy listen to  illogical diatribes when you can read them? I mean, read a rational examination of the arguments against same sex marriage.

This concise work is aimed at presenting a logical assessment of the stock arguments against same-sex marriage. While my position is in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage, I have made every effort to present a fair and rational assessment of the stock arguments against it. The work itself is divided into distinct sections. The first section provides some background material regarding arguments. The second section focuses on the common fallacious arguments used to argue against same-sex marriage. The third section examines standard moral arguments against same-sex marriage and this is followed by a brief look at the procreation argument. The work closes, appropriately enough, with a few modest proposals regarding marriage.

Amazon (US)

Amazon (UK)

 

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A Six-Gun for Socrates in Print

A_Six-Gun_for_Socrat_Cover_for_Kindle

This short book presents a series of philosophical essays written in response to gun violence in the United States. While the matters of guns, violence and rights are often met with emotional responses, my approach has been to consider these matters from a philosophical standpoint. This does not involve looking at them without emotion. Rather, it involves considering them in a rational way and this requires considering how our emotions affect our views of these vital matters.

Available via Amazon.

76 Fallacies in Print

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76 Fallacies is now available in print from Amazon and other fine sellers of books.

In addition to combining the content of my 42 Fallacies and 30 More Fallacies, this book features some revisions as well as a new section on common formal fallacies.

As the title indicates, this book presents seventy six fallacies. The focus is on providing the reader with definitions and examples of these common fallacies rather than being a handbook on winning arguments or general logic.

The book presents the following 73 informal fallacies:

Accent, Fallacy of
Accident, Fallacy of
Ad Hominem
Ad Hominem Tu Quoque
Amphiboly, Fallacy of
Anecdotal Evidence, Fallacy Of
Appeal to the Consequences of a Belief
Appeal to Authority, Fallacious
Appeal to Belief
Appeal to Common Practice
Appeal to Emotion
Appeal to Envy
Appeal to Fear
Appeal to Flattery
Appeal to Group Identity
Appeal to Guilt
Appeal to Novelty
Appeal to Pity
Appeal to Popularity
Appeal to Ridicule
Appeal to Spite
Appeal to Tradition
Appeal to Silence
Appeal to Vanity
Argumentum ad Hitlerum
Begging the Question
Biased Generalization
Burden of Proof
Complex Question
Composition, Fallacy of
Confusing Cause and Effect
Confusing Explanations and Excuses
Circumstantial Ad Hominem
Cum Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc
Division, Fallacy of
Equivocation, Fallacy of
Fallacious Example
Fallacy Fallacy
False Dilemma
Gambler’s Fallacy
Genetic Fallacy
Guilt by Association
Hasty Generalization
Historian’s Fallacy
Illicit Conversion
Ignoring a Common Cause
Incomplete Evidence
Middle Ground
Misleading Vividness
Moving the Goal Posts
Oversimplified Cause
Overconfident Inference from Unknown Statistics
Pathetic Fallacy
Peer Pressure
Personal Attack
Poisoning the Well
Positive Ad Hominem
Post Hoc
Proving X, Concluding Y
Psychologist’s fallacy
Questionable Cause
Rationalization
Red HerringReification, Fallacy of
Relativist Fallacy
Slippery Slope
Special Pleading
Spotlight
Straw Man
Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy
Two Wrongs Make a Right
Victim Fallacy
Weak Analogy

The book contains the following three formal (deductive) fallacies:

Affirming the Consequent
Denying the Antecedent
Undistributed Middle

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42 Fallacies in Print

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My first Kindle book, 42 Fallacies, has been manifested in the physical world.

Available now as a paperback on Amazon.

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The Transhumanist Reader

the-transhumanist-readerThe Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, edited by pioneer transhumanist thinkers (philosopher) Max More and (artist/culture theorist) Natasha Vita-More, is now available for order on Amazon – with an announced publication date of 29 April 2013.

Before I go on, allow me to give the disclaimer that I am one of the authors to have contributed a chapter, in this case entitled “The Great Transition: Ideas and Anxieties.” This is my most concerted attempt to date to explicate the central ideas of transhumanism and suggest how we might best respond to them.

You can click on the image of the cover where it appears on Amazon’s site if you’d like to sample the contents, including the full contents pages. Or it should work if you click here to find the table of contents.

The authors are something of a who’s who of thinkers who have contributed in one capacity or another to the transhumanist movement or to discussion of emerging technologies and human enhancement in general. Many of these people would be widely regarded as coming from different factions or schools of thought, and some may not even like each other all that much, so this is going to be a diverse book. Contributing authors, apart from the two editors (and myself, obviously) include Nick Bostrom, Anders Sandberg, Martine Rothblatt, James Hughes, Laura Beloff, Aubrey de Grey, Ray Kurzweil, Damien Broderick… and many others of similar calibre, with claims to be intellectual leaders in this area.

I have not read the whole book – though I’ve read some of the reprinted material in earlier forms – so I can’t give it anything like an actual review. Also, at this stage it’s not possible to review it on Amazon, so you won’t find much guidance there (if you pay a lot of attention to Amazon reviews). But I’ve read a prospectus as well as the ToC, and I’m confident that this will be a very authoritative book, showing the depth of historical and current thinking in the field. If you’re interested in transhumanist thought, or more generally in debates over emerging technologies and the prospects of human enhancement, this is a volume that you probably should get your hands on.

A Six-Gun for Socrates

Six-Gun for Socrates - Michael LaBossiereThis short book presents a series of philosophical essays written in response to gun violence in the United States. While the matters of guns, violence and rights are often met with emotional responses, my approach has been to consider these matters from a philosophical standpoint. This does not involve looking at them without emotion. Rather, it involves considering them in a rational way and this requires considering how our emotions affect our views of these vital matters.

The book contains the following essays:

    • Gun Control
    • Costas & Guns
    • When is it Time to Discuss Gun Violence?
    • High Capacity, High Powered Semi-Automatic
    • Mental Illness, Violence & Liberty
    • God and Sandy Hook
    • Mental Illness or Evil?
    • Video Games, Movies & Violence
    • Background Checks
    • Dr. King & Guns
    • Gun Rights & Tyranny
    • Is the denial of gun rights, in and of itself, a tyranny?
    • Is there an Obligation of Self-Defense?
    • On Not Being Ant-Gun
    • The Founders, the Future, the First & the Second
    • Are Cars Analogous to Guns?
    • Conclusion

Available now on Amazon.

My Amazon Author Page.

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Rolling out some announcements

Blackford rev 5It’s been a busy couple of months at my end, and indeed a busy couple of years – but I have some announcements about the pay-off (back before Christmas I was talking on my personal blog about a roll-out of announcements on the way; well, here’s some of the roll-out). This will enable the world (if it, or some small component of it, is interested) to catch up with my doings.

The biggest news is that my co-authored book with Udo Schuklenk, 50 Great Myths About Atheism, is now complete and in the pipeline for publication in September. We’ve gone through the initial copyedit and have even settled on a cover (which we both love) with the good folks at Wiley-Blackwell. The book explores many libels, lies, half-truths, and distortions that relate to atheism and atheists, trying to give them their due whenever we spot a grain of truth or an aspect that is plausible. Udo and I also provide a long chapter about the rise of atheism and why we think it is now the most plausible answer to the God question.

Meanwhile, I have delivered the manuscript for Humanity Enhanced to MIT Press, where it is under contract. Stay tuned for more about this. I can’t, for example, as yet give you a planned date of publication. The book deals with the ethical and (more particularly) legal/political issues surrounding the emerging technologies of genetic choice. In doing so, it examines in detail many of the misgivings about these technologies based on such ideas as harms to autonomy, violations of the natural order, problems of distributive justice, and much, much more.

I am at earlier stages with a couple of other books, though it looks like I’ll soon be signing a contract for at least one of them. In both cases, much of the work is done, but there’s also a lot more to go (and let’s face it, many a slip so I won’t say more about that for now).

Over the (southern hemisphere) summer I’ve also had new pieces published in The Philosophers’ Magazine and Free Inquiry. Currently I’m working on a long book chapter about religion and politics, plus acting as one of the jurors for the Norma K. Hemming Award.

Upcoming speaking engagements include a couple (one already announced, one to be announced soon) at the forthcoming inaugural Newcastle Writers’ Festival (in which I am also somewhat involved in my role as chair of the Hunter Writers Centre)… and, hot off the presses, a talk at The Amazing Meeting 2013 in July.

The line-up of speakers for The Amazing Meeting has only just been announced, but from my viewpoint it looks fantastic. I say a bit more about it over here.

Joel Marks on aesthetics wars

I’ve been reading Ethics without Morals: In Defense of Amorality by Joel Marks (Routledge 2013). I’ve written a sort of review for Free Inquiry, and expect it to be published a month or two down the track. I also have some (rather different) initial observations over here at The Hellfire Club. In summary:

This book deserves a larger audience than it is likely to find in the rather expensive academic edition published by Routledge. Though Marks is an academic philosopher, there is little or no technical verbiage, and the text should be accessible to general educated readers. I suspect that a very similar book from a trade press, written by an author with more of a profile with the general public, could be a big seller in the mode of the most recent books from Sam Harris, but this one will probably find only a niche audience.

Meanwhile, there’s plenty of scope to discuss small aspects of this rather nice little book. Marks is a (de?)converted moral sceptic. He denies that any “metaphysical morality” exists, while thinking that many people actually do believe in such an elusive thing. This puts him on the path to being an error theorist, believing that huge numbers of moral judgments are ipso facto untrue simply because they contain terms that don’t refer to anything in the real world (“morally wrong”, etc.). For Marks, our judgments of what is right or wrong are ultimately grounded in subjectivity – what we actually care about, find admirable, or distasteful, or whatever – and there is no ultimate truth about what, for example, we should care about. Contrary to what is widely believed or assumed, Marks thinks, morality eventually rests on various subjective responses.

This is all fairly standard stuff from error theorists, moral sceptics, relativists, and the like. But Marks goes a step further and argues the case for moral abolitionism. He’d like us to stop using moral language such as “morally wrong”, or just “wrong”, much as non-religious people have largely abandoned talk of “sin” (and we have abandoned talk of “witches” in the literal sense of women with magical powers, etc.). Not only does all moral language fail to refer to anything in the real world, Marks thinks; he considers it positively harmful. Read Chapter 4, where he sets out his case for this position. Oh, and of course Marks is aware that some language with a subjective element needs to be used if we are to communicate at all. E.g. he has not expunged the word “desirable” from his vocabulary, though he acknowledges that nothing is objectively desirable.

Which leads me to one of the book’s long endnotes. Here, Marks discusses the fact that most of us now accept the subjectivity in judgments about beauty, artistic merit, and the like. So why not give up saying that “Movie X is good”, or “Y style of art is superior to Z style”, or that a specific joke is funny, or that certain people were great composers? I might add such judgments as that certain Hollywood stars are “sexy” or “beautiful” (they might not appear so to an intelligent warthog-like creature from a neighbouring galaxy!).

Marks is pragmatic:

However, were the heated arguments [about these issues]… to become a basis of universal discord, rampant persecution, and armed conflict, then, because so much suffering were caused by our mistaking something subjective for something objective, I might very well want to urge that we eliminate the aesthetic way of speaking that lent itself to this abuse.

Fair enough, I think, although there is a further question as to how we are able to have arguments that are often not heated, but calm and rational, about aesthetic issues such as Marks describes. Is it all like abstruse and vacuous theological talk (as Marks tends to think of moral debate), or is something more rational happening here? I think the latter, although I agree that, strictly speaking, aesthetic claims have an irreducible subjective element. They may depend on a shared subjectivity among the people in the conversation, but they do depend on subjectivity. I suggest that a further exercise for philosophers is to try to unpack how we are able to talk as sensibly and coherently as we do (so it seems to me) about these aesthetic issues, and also about issues relating to such “moral” matters as people’s “good” or “bad” characters.

Gaukroger, religion, and the rise of science

I have been reading two huge and detailed books on the rise of modern science: Stephen Gaukroger’s The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210-1685 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Gaukroger’s The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1680-1760 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). These are the first two volumes (the only ones so far) in an ongoing series by Gaukroger examining the advance of science.

I started on this exercise in response to an anonymous reviewer for Wiley-Blackwell, which will be publishing my co-authored book with Udo Schuklenk, 50 Great Myths About Atheism. The idea put to us by the reviewer was that Gaukroger has demonstrated the vital role of Christian theology in assisting the consolidation of science in early modern Europe. I must say that I’m not totally convinced.

As its title implies, the first volume covers European intellectual history from the rise of neo-Aristotelian natural philosophy in the 13th century, through developments in the 16th and early 17th centuries, involving Copernicus, Galileo, Hobbes, Gassendi, Kepler, Descartes, and others, to the spectacular flowering of science in the work of Sir Isaac Newton, Robert Hooke, and many others in the late 17th century.

Obviously, all these men appeared in cultures that gave them the intellectual and other resources for their work, but when you trace through the detail of what motivated them, how they influenced each other, and so on, not much of that has to do with Christianity. What most comes across is their fascination with experiments, thought experiments, and each other’s ideas, and in many cases their joy-cum-obsession with the new tools that had become available to them in the form of scientific instruments, precision crafted experimental apparatus, and increasingly powerful kinds of mathematics.

Gaukroger sees his central question as being why a large-scale, successfully legitimating consolidation of science took place in Europe in the 17th century (and thereafter) – when science tends to be fragmented and stop-start, with long periods of stagnation, whenever it has appeared in a promising form in other times, places, and cultures. He answers that the natural philosophy of the Scientific Revolution was attractive to many thinkers in the 17th and 18th centuries precisely because it appeared to have promise for the renewal of natural theology.

There may be something in this, although before I go on let’s pause to note it is very different from saying that there was something about Christianity that made it inherently pro-science in the first place. Gaukroger does not appear to maintain any such thesis (and nor, as far as I know, does the anonymous reviewer that I mentioned).

Indeed, Gaukroger notes that there was a considerable tradition within ancient and medieval Christianity of opposition to natural philosophy (and hence anything resembling science), seeing it as distracting or even idolatrous. Nothing in his books seems to give late medieval scholasticism much credit for the rise of science (it appears that whatever science it produced in the 13th and 14th centuries was not fruitful, and stagnated much like in other cultures that showed promising beginnings in scientific thought, such as China and medieval Islam). Indeed, even Aristotle’s form of natural philosophy was initially resisted by the 13th-century Church, although the synthesis produced by Aquinas was later given the Church’s endorsement.

Renaissance natural theology was largely an attempt to reconcile Aristotelianism with theology, which may well have been intellectually fruitful in some ways, but the Church was harsh to anyone who drew conclusions that strayed beyond orthodoxy. If anything, Christianity seems to have acted more as a hindrance than otherwise to free inquiry into the phenomena of the natural world (though, of course, even resistance can sometimes be inspiring).

Late in The Emergence of a Scientific Culture, Gaukroger discusses the (largely British) phenomenon of physico-theology: the attempts by some theologians, scientists (as we’d now call them), and philosophers to reconcile theology with what was emerging from science, or even to use scientific findings to support or revitalise theology. He writes interestingly of thinkers, such as Ralph Cudworth, who embraced a version of the atomist view of the natural world that had become popular within science, while attempting at the same time to modify it and to include it in their metaphysical systems. Gaukroger then deals at some length with others who attempted to reconcile scientific theories of the formation of the Earth with the Genesis account of creation and the biblical chronology of history. He puts an impressive enough case that in the 1680s and 1690s, especially in the UK, there was a widespread view that natural philosophy could be used as a source of evidence for God.

But none of shows that the successful consolidation of science in the 17th and 18th centuries had much to with Christianity. On the face of it, I’d have thought that the successful consolidation of science at this point in history owed more simply to its unprecedented theoretical successes, the causes of which were contingent and complicated – perhaps having to do with some of the personalities involved, perhaps with non-religious aspects of European culture, perhaps with breakthroughs in mathematics and scientific instrumentation. And perhaps with other things. I don’t see any densely argued case for giving much credit to religion.

About the most that could be said with any confidence is that, back in, say, 1600, orthodox theology might have looked like a very formidable barrier for science to overcome. After all, as Gaukroger says in The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility, “Christianity … had traditionally laid claim to universal competence in all matters of understanding the world and our place in it, most notably in its Augustinean version”, but as he immediately adds this claim was decisively weakened during the seventeenth century. Despite the terrible execution of Giordano Bruno in 1600, for a mix of sins in the eyes of the Church, and the persecution of Galileo not long after, Christianity did not do all that much to block the rise of science in the second half of the century.

Given Christianity’s longstanding claims to universal epistemic competence, it is no wonder that it came into conflict with Aristotelian natural philosophy and later with early modern science, personified by Galileo. These stood to draw their own conclusions and to challenge theology’s authority.

Thus, Gaukroger is doubtless correct when he makes much of the issue of the relationship between the epistemic authority of Christianity and that of natural philosophy (or science). He says, I think justly, that the issue of the relationship between “the kind of understanding of the world that natural philosophy provides, and that provided by Christian revelation and natural theology” was a pressing one in Christian Europe from the beginning of the 13th century, when Aristotelian texts and doctrines were introduced into the intellectual culture.

Given the intellectual hegemony of Christianity, it can be argued that the ability of science to consolidate itself depended on its relationship with Christian thought. On this hinged the ability of science to establish itself in the late 17th and early 18th centuries “as a permanent and integral feature of Western intellectual life” (The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility).

During this period, as Gaukroger reminds us, it was widely understood as a requirement for natural philosophy that its theories be compatible with shared assumptions in Europe about morality, our place in the world, and religious thinking in general. In the upshot, science conformed – to some extent, it avoided heresy by carefully defining its field of inquiry as the natural world (while drawing a sharp boundary with the supernatural world), and to some extent it produced theories that ultimately appealed to the actions of God, as we find in the work of Newton.

All this, however, is not so much Christian theology nurturing science as simply not proving to be such a formidable barrier as first appeared. To some extent, it was a matter of science accommodating itself to Christianity. To some extent, it may, indeed, have been certain theologians welcoming the findings of science as a resource for theology. But to some extent it may simply be that Christianity had lost much of its intellectual hegemony for totally different reasons – partly, perhaps, because of the disastrous Thirty Years’ War, and partly because of extensive contact with other cultures in the New World and the Far East, which also tended to undermine absolutism and certainty.

Despite Gaukroger’s extensive scholarship, there’s still a story to research and tell here – a story about how Christianity increasingly lost its intellectual authority, and why it was, perhaps, increasingly less in a position to hinder the rise of science and competition from other epistemic rivals.

I’m glad I had my attention drawn to these books. I began reading them to see what they have to say about the interaction between early science and Christian theology. But, although that is a recurring theme, it does not dominate the discussion by any means, and much of the fascination is simply in getting a consolidated and detailed account of how science developed, hypothesis by hypothesis, contributor by contributor, step by step, in its early centuries, and how it interacted with much else, such as the broader literary and intellectual culture of Europe. Taken together, The Emergence of a Scientific Culture and The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility form an extraordinarily scholarly and exhaustive account of what was going on during a crucial period in intellectual history, as high medieval culture gave way to early modernity, and then the Enlightenment era.

[This post is based on a series of posts over on my personal blog.]

[Pssst: Check out my books at Amazon. Not least Freedom of Religion and the Secular State.]

Brian Leiter – “Should we respect religion?”

In Chapter IV of Why Tolerate Religion? Brian Leiter asks whether/why we should respect religion. The point here is to consider whether religion might merit something more than mere toleration, i.e. putting up with something that you don’t (necessarily) approve of.

At an earlier stage of the book, Leiter has argued that both Kantians and utilitarians have reasons to tolerate religious views and practices that they disapprove of. So far, so good – although Kantian and utilitarian moral theories are controversial, and I’d be looking for a rather different basis for toleration myself (I actually ground it in what I think many people, including many religious people, can see as the point or role of the institution of the state … but let’s skip over that).

Very well, let’s stipulate that there is some moral basis for tolerating religion, particularly in the sense of not bringing organised political power to bear (with fire, swords, police cars, jails, and so on) in an attempt to suppress it, even if we’re talking about a form of religion that we dislike. But Leiter wants to know whether we should be doing more than that, perhaps based on a claim that religion merits respect in some strong sense.

Here he offers what seems to me a useful discussion of respect. He leans on some terminology from Stephen Darwall, distinguishing between recognition respect and appraisal respect. Recognition respect is what I would simply call “respect” – i.e. recognising something’s properties that ought to be taken into account in some way, and moulding your behaviour so that you actually do take them into account in whatever is the appropriate way. Appraisal respect is more like deciding that something is worthy of esteem. (I’ve made a similar distinction many times, without being aware of Darwall’s 1977 article that Leiter refers to. I’m not the only one, as, irrespective of terminology, these different conceptions of respect are frequently discussed in one way or another. In an endnote, Leiter observes that Darwall’s views have changed since the 1977 article, but that need not detain us.)

Let’s all concede that religion has certain properties that we’d better take into account in some way, perhaps by not making it a political issue whether a particular religion ought to be imposed by the power of the state or whether certain religions ought to be suppressed by state power. Thus, we could agree that we ought to give religion recognition respect, which will then make us circumscribe our behaviour in certain ways. These ways might be important if they make the difference between whether or not we live in a society with bloody religious persecutions. All the same, the effect on our behaviour as individuals may be slight. The appropriate level of recognition may not be demanding in how it constrains our behaviour, at least for most of us.

It does not follow that religion per se merits any esteem, or anything similar that might motivate us to treat it with special deference or solicitude. Does religion (again, religion per se, not some particular, especially “nice” religion) merit appraisal respect, i.e. we ought to appraise it as meritorious, worthy of esteem, and so on? I don’t see why, and neither does Leiter. Religion may have its good side, but it also has a dark side. Taken as a whole, it is not obviously something that is worthy of our esteem, or even something that is all to the good.

For Leiter, it follows that there is no requirement, above and beyond his basic argument for toleration, to give religion any special rights. It is in the same boat as other matters of individual conscience, deserving no more (though no less) deference by the state. Although I argue for religious toleration from a different philosophical viewpoint, I think Leiter is clearly right on the basic issue here.

[Pssst my Amazon author’s page, and the link to Freedom of Religion and the Secular State.)