I was listening to one of the SETI podcasts on Sunday, and there was an interesting interview with a scientist who has done extensive work with cockroaches, coming to the same conclusions (http://radio.seti.org/past-shows.php - March 15th, really interesting conversation with John Searle too).

This is why I’m ambiguous about describing myself as a humanist. Too often, humanism involves a denial of value to anything non-human, and it leads to this sort of thing:

1. Humans have property X which distinguishes us from all other animals (an immortal soul, consciousness, language, an understanding of causality…)
2. No non-human animals can have property X.
3. If we discover that non-human animals look as if they do have property X, they don’t really have it, because they can’t, because it’s unique to humans.
4. Either we have to explain away the facts by logic which would make a Jesuit blanch (the usual tactic, e.g. Lewis Wolpert’s dreadful “Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast”), or we shift to a new property X which animals can’t possibly have (to keep ourselves special).

Cool–I will listen. I can’t call myself a humanist either, and for exactly the same reason. Yes–that’s exactly how the reasoning goes, and it’s maddening.

>>> I can’t call myself a humanist either, and for exactly the same reason. Yes–that’s exactly how the reasoning goes, and it’s maddening.

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>>> I can’t call myself a humanist either, and for exactly the same reason. Yes–that’s exactly how the reasoning goes, and it’s maddening.

Really? How bizarre. One of the drivers for “my” humanism is that we’re *not* particularly special. I’ve genuinely never before come across the idea that “humanism involves a denial of value to anything non-human”. Quite the opposite, in fact.

“Really? How bizarre. One of the drivers for “my” humanism is that we’re *not* particularly special. I’ve genuinely never before come across the idea that “humanism involves a denial of value to anything non-human”. Quite the opposite, in fact.”

Not at all bizarre.

The humanist is very keen on living in the way that develops human potential, like the aspects of me that are “most human” are especially worthwhile. This leads to much blasting of trumpets about reason and the like, and a correlative sense that animals are “just animals.” And an effort to maintain that line.

In philosophy, the humanists do tend to be derogatory about animals (eg. Aristotle) and the animal supporters tend not to be humanists in any real sense (e.g. Mill & Singer).

There are people who are both humanists and animal supporters (e.g. Nussbaum), so it’s not impossible. Just not typical, and I have some problems with her “humanism.”

By his own definition, Descartes *wasn’t.*
No one can examine the life of any animal - pest or pet - without observing that its activities just for survival are skilled and vary according to the creature’s needs of the moment. The pets psychologically maneuver their owners; the pests play with eachother. Life appears to be often joyful, especially when humanists are not conniving the worthlessness of the unthinking creatures that may seem to them to be placed here solely for the use, disuse, and abuse of those whose superiority may or may not be associated with any higher image.

rtk

I concur that whatever it is that makes us have minds and ‘consciousness’ is also present in higher animals such as mammals to a large extent, and even present in a greatly attenuated sense in insects (I’m thinking of self-monitoring type information processing things here).

But I’ve always thought that if you keep going down levels of sophistication you essentially come to thermostats and similar devices. So there must be a degree to which the moral consideration due is proportional to the level of sophistication of this property, rather than its presence or absence.

I’m pretty sure Mary Midgley skewers the bad kind of humanism in Beast and Man using much the same argument as Jean gives above - it’s a fallacy to think that what makes humans unique (if there is any such thing) is therefore the most important thing about humans (is the ability to solve differential equations better than loving one’s children?). It’s possible to value humanity without having to dismiss the non-human world at the same time.

This is the insect brain man, by the way. Their neurons are much smaller than ours, apparently.

Jean K.:
One of the most reviled views (animals as automatons)? By whom? Mentioned as an oddity, yes, but reviled. How about the picture of humans as automatons of a highly elaborate sort proffered by Dennett? One thinks of Shakey or is it Sparkey in ‘Consciousness Explained’.

I remember a book called Artificial Life by Steven Levy in which it was stated that AI had got to the stage of bug AI. I doubt even that, worms and woodlice stay where they are because they are supremely successful in their niche.

PJ, if you go down levels of sophistication you get to worms, but then there’s a lot of assumptions before you can get to bacteria, let alone viruses and thermostats, I’d've thought… Incidentally, although worms look sad (all pink and naked in the cold mud after it’s been raining), but maybe they’re happy almost all the time; e.g. if pain and sadness exist to make us do stuff, then since worms can’t do much, they won’t have much pain or sadness in their lives (and fortunately, even if that were true it would only justify being insensitive towards worms and such)

Watching spiders on triangular webs outside a corner of my window, I noticed that whenever the weather was getting worse, before it got too bad the spiders would consume the middle of their webs, so that the web would not get blown away, like it was a sail. It seemed very smart of them, but presumably those spiders that didn’t react to such weather by getting peckish for a bit of web died out. Such behaviour must have seemed pretty irrational to begin with though!

Jean K: “The humanist is very keen on living in the way that develops human potential, like the aspects of me that are “most human” are especially worthwhile. This leads to much blasting of trumpets about reason and the like, and a correlative sense that animals are “just animals.” And an effort to maintain that line.”

Interesting. My humanism has mostly been triggered by a dismissal of religious/supernatural thinking. For me, humanism is the recognition that we’re all we’ve got, and no superhuman presence is going to put things right for us if we don’t do it ourselves. It’s not in any way predicated on us being “better” than animals, and I’ve not come across much humanist literature that would suggest otherwise.

I’m also quite pro-animal rights, and much of my thinking there has been informed by Singer’s writing. I don’t see a conflict between humanism and rights for animals.

Hmm. But then I’m not all that well-read on philosophical humanism, so perhaps I should just step back. No, that won’t do: you’ve piqued my interest now. Can you give me some pointers as to where I can learn more, with particular reference to humanist attitudes to animals?

Either way, thanks for giving me new things to think about!

Much interesting stuff above, especially that description of the sad pink worms.

Michael, Descartes was apparently reviled even in his time–people were shocked that anyone thought howling dogs were just like broken clocks. Of course now he’s reviled by animal rights people. We don’t seem to revile folks like Dennett–maybe because he doesn’t think we should ignore howling humans. There’s no upshot to his view, like there is to Descartes’.

Owen, “Humanism” could be used loosely for any non-theological ethics. But when it really has some specific meaning, it connotes the idea that our humanity (what makes us uniquely human) is something to value and develop. Martha Nussbaum’s book Frontiers of Justice is “humanist” in a substantive sense and has a good chapter on animals.

Maybe you really aren’t a humanist strictly speaking, but just attracted to non-theeological ethics. In that case, Singer’s a great choice. I’m a big fan.

I like Andrew’s example (loving kids vs. doing differential equations) It’s that kind of thing I’m thinking about when I say I’m not a humanist.

I’m more than happy to admit I have absolutely no idea what a “humanist’ is. I don’t particularly care: it sounds a bit like something that requires a visit to the Doctor. :-) (I’m sort of joking…)

I don’t know about insects: they do have different brain architectures to mammals, but I know that cats and dogs experience pain, happiness, loss and triumph much as we humans do. One of the problems with assuming that animals don’t have feelings is not so much that it denies the animal an emotional and physical legacy, as it denies the fact that homo sapiens are animals, too.

This is something that irritates quite a few, I know. But I do challenge anyone to find an essential physical difference between us humans and, say, a cat. Something profound, like the cat has a radically different architectural pattern. (No ribs, for instance…)

Insects have radically different architectures, and can be considered “different”. They also have brains, albeit tiny ones. (I’ve always been astounded by the really tiny brains dinosaurs had, too.)

I think Alec Baldwin’s script-writer (Walking with Cavemen) nailed it when he wrote that homo sapiens had the capacity to imagine. I don’t know if cats can imagine what would happen: my cats know to get out of the way if I’m carrying something heavy, or they’ve just done something they shouldn’t. My cats don’t do anything they shouldn’t… And I spotted a pink flying elephant, earlier today. :-) (Who am I kidding? It was really a pastel blue…)

Actually, my experience with cats leads me to conclude that they can actually imagine an outcome. That ability is fairly limited, but it’s there. They can plot the path of their prey, and they can act in a manner that doesn’t betray that knowledge. That, alone, seems to be an indicator of some fairly complex reasoning. (Cats will feint to the side, just like a boxer.)

We’re animals, and that alone should tell us something of the capabilities of all animals. And now to clean up after one of the cats took another look at their snack. Yuk. (And I’m sure you really didn’t need to know that…)

Carolyn Ann

I don’t think you should use crisp logic in saying that things either are something or aren’t. What we need is fuzzy logic. I think that insects are conscious but not to the same level that we are.

I was thinking about humans too. Consciousness is not something that just appears in us overnight as we are conceived or born. Consciousness seems to be something that grows as our brains grow.

I don’t know it all that well, but I think RD’s views about animals had to do with the fact that they don’t speak a language. Talking requires responding to as good as an infinite number of possible stimuli and that, for RD, requires something more than just mechanism. It demands a soul, or so he thought. Animals, which can’t keep up their end of the conversation, seemed a lot more like machines, automata without feeling. It wasn’t until Bentham that a serious philosophical figure noticed that the interests of animals should matter to us. Even Kant slipped up here, arguing that you shouldn’t rough up your horse only because it might incline you to rough up a person.

Alcock refers to levels of consciousness, suggesting that insects are on a lower level. Does consciousness include awareness? Does degree of awareness mean greater consciousness. An insect or animal, very in tune with the dangers around him, is visibly acutely aware. Get a really close look at a fly, or, more easily, at a chipmunk. That level of consciousness would be unbearably stressful to a human.

rtk

I was going to chime in with Robert Alcock about “less” consciousness in flies, but rtk makes a good point. The movie “The Fly” (was that the name?) agrees with him/her. Remember the unbearably intense consciousness of Jeff Goldblum as he starts becoming a fly? Not impossible! But then there’s a lot to be said for the idea that complexity of awareness correlates with complexity of brain.

(PJ up there said something about that and about levels of moral consideration…which I find very intuitive.)

James says RD’s argument is that animals can’t keep up their end of the conversation. Strange but true. It’s odd how philosophers can be so brilliant on one page….and not on another. This just seems to go into the bad argument hall of fame.

Re Animal Architects–it’s densely written but interesting.

I know that cats and dogs experience pain, happiness, loss and triumph much as we humans do.

Really? Is it even possible to know that? Is it even possible to know that humans experience those things as other humans do?

Your cat jumps off the couch and approaches his food because of signals in his brain, but without visual images or sensations of hunger. If it would give you pleasure to kick the cat, there’s no reason to hold back, so far as any feelings of pain are concerned.

I’m surprised that pain counts as a criterion for consciousness. Of course animals feel pain. Even spiders show pain behaviour. But that doesn’t make them conscious. (Maybe other things do.)
And if you think that pain is a bad thing that should be avoided of course you ought not to give pain to anyone or anything, may it be conscious or not.

OK, I checked the wikipedia entry and noticed that I mean consciousness as awareness of mental states, not only having mental states.

Carolyn’s description of her cat feinting to deceive prey makes me wonder about spiders’ awareness of mental states… when they interact, e.g. fight, or avoid fighting, an awareness of what the other spider might be thinking (so to speak), and of what one was oneself giving away, would be very advantageous… so maybe they are conscious (in an unsophisticated way), or maybe not… it’s so hard to tell. But maybe each species naturally regards (most) other species as “animals,” and by so-doing, and behaving accordingly, confirms that same opinion of itself (in the other species’ view).

“I’m surprised that pain counts as a criterion for consciousness. Of course animals feel pain. Even spiders show pain behaviour. But that doesn’t make them conscious.”

At this point my question is usually to ask ‘just what is this consciousness thing that spiders don’t have and we do, how do I recognise its presence and absence?’

I’m using the word “consciousness” in the way philosophy of mind standardly does. I mean “mere” awareness. Nothing more. Nothing fancy. Just what babies presumably have the moment they’re born, and before they start doing any sophisticated thinking about thinking…or what not.

Sometime when people talk about consciousness they seem to be thinking of something much more grand. The funny thing is that what’s really so mysterious (I think) is actually the most simple thing…mere awareness. What is it for the “lights to be on” in somebody’s head?

“How do I recognize its presence and absence”

Even if we know what we’re talking about (just awareness) that’s a hard question.

quote Ophelia:I know that cats and dogs experience pain, happiness, loss and triumph much as we humans do.

Does empathy count as a valid method for understanding animal minds? Or must the observation be calcuable? Every pet owner and even pest observer (I am both) will testify to the unfathomable intellectual and emotional acuities of our animals. And we can’t be denied. I used to own bassett hounds. Their eyes don’t lie. Yes, Ophelia: pain, happiness, even the sense of his own loss the morning of Andy’s death. It was palpable, terrible to witness.

rtk

rtk,

But that wasn’t my question, nor was it my implication. I’m not saying ‘cats and dogs have no emotions,’ I’m asking how Carolyn Ann knows that cats and dogs experience pain, happiness, loss and triumph much as we humans do. That’s a pair of very large claims, and I’m skeptical. As far as I know, no one knows that, and there are reasons to think it’s unlikely as stated.

Jean, do babies have awareness the minute they’re born? Does birth change their consciousness in some basic way? I thought their consciousness was a matter of development rather than of location - but perhaps that’s wrong? And isn’t there some doubt that they do have real awareness at birth? Isn’t it thought that that takes a little more time? I forget what the evidence is for that (if there is any, if I’m not wrong about it), but I think I’ve seen something…

Sorry, I confused the poster with the quote’s author. I didn’t mean Ophelia and should have said Carolyn Ann. Anyhow, I was agreeing with C.A., not O.

Ophelia, when I said babies are conscious just as soon as they’re born it was just to identify basic awareness as the topic of discussion. I didn’t mean to say anything about whether they have it or not before they are born. Their brains are certainly fully developed then. I suspect birth is a big jolt though…breathing air for the first time and getting to move your limbs. I’d put my money on some feeling before birth and an increase after.

Jean, ah right. I geddit.

Jean K: “Their brains are certainly fully developed then.”

Well, I don’t think so. The brain continues to grow for a year after birth (wikipedia: not necessarily a reliable source but this sounds reasonable).

And that is purely anatomical development, to say nothing of functional changes and development.

Jean K: “…babies are conscious just as soon as they’re born it was just to identify basic awareness as the topic of discussion.”

But the problem is that I don’t know what “basic awareness” is intended to mean in this context. There are certainly a whole lot of things that babies are NOT aware of.

Ophelia Benson: “That’s a pair of very large claims, and I’m skeptical. As far as I know, no one knows that, and there are reasons to think it’s unlikely as stated.”

I agree with Ophelia.

Jean K: “But the primatologist Franz DeWaal warns against the opposite tendency—anthropodenial.”

In my experience, anthropomorphism is by far the more common tendency (problem?), as many comments in this thread indicate. 8-)

A jellyfish can appear to be responding intelligently to pain (contracting, pulling away) but it has no brain at all.

The computer animated characters in an x-box game (Halo or The Sims, take your pick) appear to be acting intelligently but it is all code and there is no consciousness there at all (if there is, I am a mass murderer many times over).

The fact is, you can get an awful lot of behaviour that seems intelligent out of a fairly simple processor. An insect brain is a fairly simple processor BUT — and this is the important bit — it has had millions of years of evolutionary development to function successfully (those that didn’t, died).

“A jellyfish can appear to be responding intelligently to pain (contracting, pulling away) but it has no brain at all.”

How very vertebratecentric - jellyfish have a nervous system - who says it has to concentrate the nerves all together in one place to be ‘conscious’?

“The computer animated characters…appear to be acting intelligently but it is all code and there is no consciousness there at all ”

That is rather begging a big philosophical question is it not?

“The brain continues to grow for a year after birth”

It actually continues to develop up until adolescence, and even early adulthood (especially myelination, which takes place after birth in even early myelinated systems like vision) - but synaptic development is greatest in the early years of life (the total number of neurons is roughly fixed by birth).

Well, we wouldn’t want to descend to name-calling. “You’re anthropomorphizing!” “No, you’re anthropodenying!”

People do both. They anthropomorphize about pets…which doesn’t mean, of course, that dogs don’t have consciousness (of a doggy sort, of course). They get into anthropodenial when they’re swatting cockroaches, going fishing, trying to sound impressive to scientific colleagues, and patting themselves on the back for being human.

Microcosmos moved me into the “don’t know” column on the subject of insects, which I think is a good place to be. They have much less complicated nervous systems than we do, but that doesn’t prove anything. How much complexity does it take before basic awareness arises? We don’t know.

I’d be surprised if someone could watch the movie (or clip) and seriously be confident that the creatures have no awareness, no experience, whatever. They see nothing with their eyes, taste nothing with their mouths, feel nothing when they copulate, etc.

One of the interesting questions about consciousness is–what’s it for? If feeling (just feeling, remember–nothing fancy) helps us get around in the world, you’d think it would help insects too. That’s a nudge in the direction of saying they do see with their eyes, etc….but not enough to get me out of the “don’t know” column.

“How much complexity does it take before basic awareness arises? We don’t know.”

But we (or rather, neuroscientists etc) do have some idea, surely. It’s not the case that we (or rather, neuroscientists) have no idea. The subject isn’t just a black box. There is good reason to think that insects really don’t have the equipment for consciousness, isn’t there? That’s not just some random guess or bit of self-flattery, is it?

I think we really don’t know–as in, a room full of neuroscientists, animal scientists, and philosophers would be in conflict, with many saying “I don’t know.”

There’s a great PBS series called “Inside the Animal Mind.” One bee specialist in it says he thinks when bees are in their hives at the end of the day they actually rehearse the day’s travels. He thinks that must be true to explain how they remember their mental maps. Then there are equally-credentialed scientists who say that’s absurd.

I’d say–we know we have consciousness from first hand experience (never mind the problem of other minds). Almost everyone thinks dogs have it because of 101 reasons. But once you get out into the insect world you’d have to have a much more precise idea of what it is to go forward with any confidence…and we don’t.

Yes but we also know that we have less consciousness in various circumstances, and by report (never mind the problem of other minds) that other people do too. We know that anaesthesia reduces or eliminates consciousness, and also that brain damage does, and so on - which means that we do know that consciousness has some relationship to the equipment, even if it’s a mystery exactly how that works. So it’s not as if there’s no reason at all to think insects have little or no equipment to have consciousness with. It’s also not as if there’s no reason to think that it’s possible to have avoidant reflexes without experience of pain.

I certainly agree that I don’t know - but I think it’s quite likely that some people do know, and there are just other people who don’t agree with them. In that room full of neuroscientists, animal scientists, and philosophers who are in conflict, I think it’s likely that some of them are right and the others are wrong, in which case some people do know.

I think almost everyone agrees consciousness is related to the brain, but there are many ways to understand the relationship and many ideas about which aspects of the brain are crucial. It’s quite possible nobody in that room full of opinions has the right answer. This is a pretty cutting edge area of cognitive science.

“There is good reason to think that insects really don’t have the equipment for consciousness, isn’t there?”

This neuroscientist says no.

I’m not a bug lover. They don’t seem too intelligent to me. Have you ever had wasp enter a half-opened window and then try to get out without success, bumbing his head against the glass again and again, as you carefully, trying to avoid being stung, attempt to open the window completely? Moths aren’t too bright either. Now, I live in a neighborhood with lots of stray dogs, I’ve been bitten by one, so I have no special love for dogs, but out of the need for self-protection, I observe them closely. Dogs don’t score high on my intelligence tests. Remember the old W.C. Fields line: anyone who hates dogs and children can’t be all bad.

PJ: “How very vertebratecentric - ”

Not vertebratecentric at all: almost all invertebrates have concentrations of nerves. It is one of the first things to happen (evolutionarily) when animals become more active.

PJ: “jellyfish have a nervous system - who says it has to concentrate the nerves all together in one place to be ‘conscious’?”

No one says so: but their nervous system is so simple that consciousness seems very unlikely.

PJ: “That is rather begging a big philosophical question is it not?”

Which is?

Jean K: “I’d be surprised if someone could watch the movie (or clip) and seriously be confident that the creatures have no awareness, no experience, whatever. They see nothing with their eyes, taste nothing with their mouths, feel nothing when they copulate, etc.”

First, I would not be confident that they had no awareness BUT I would not (and do not) take their observed behaviour as convincing that they DO have awareness.

Second, much depends on what you mean by “see”, “taste” and “feel”. Insects certainly see, taste and feel (in the tactile sense). They obviously respond to stimuli of all three types. Sensory organs evolved because they provide animals with important information which can (greatly) increase their chances of surviving (and reproducing).

But machines (and programs) can also respond to stimuli. And (if properly designed and programmed) can do so in complex ways.

As a consequence, the observation of complex behavioural responses to stimuli is not sufficient evidence to prove, or require, “awareness”.

Keith, What I’m arguing against is confident rejection of insect awareness. What I mean by “see, “taste,” “feel” etc is consciousness, not mere information processing. And my verdict was–

“So are insects conscious? I can’t say no or yes.”

Obviously this is a far cry from saying the observed behavior proves consciousness.

Jean K: “So are insects conscious? I can’t say no or yes.
Obviously this is a far cry from saying the observed behavior proves consciousness.”

I agree but I think we can go further than yes or no and say “likely” or “unlikely”.

KM:”Not vertebratecentric at all…”

But essentially you are arguing backwards from higher vertebrates to say whether other animals do or do not have consciousness.

“their nervous system is so simple that consciousness seems very unlikely.”

I think you’d need to better define ‘consciousness’ to be able to make that claim.

“Which is?”

You assume, but do not establish, that things which _seem_ conscious but are in fact purely algorithmic _aren’t_ conscious.

I have felt for some time that it would be good to get rid of the word “consciousness” altogether, since conversations containing it often slip from one meaning to another. Off the top of my head, a taxonomy of consciousness might include

- the ability to notice and react to an external stimulus (which may be temporarily interrupted at least partially by “unconsciousness”)
- the ability to retain a memory of the past (perhaps a very fragmentary or brief memory)
- a feeling of “me” which is separate from “other stuff out there”
- the separation (not necessarily accurately) of “other stuff out there” into “inanimate stuff” and “other minds”
- the ability to imagine the future

How does this map to “something that there’s like to be an x”? I’m glad that PJ says (with more authority than I) that there is no good scientific reason to hypothesise that insects don’t have consciousness, since they certainly have the first two things on my list and the third thing is very hard to test.

I think the anti-anthropomorphism thing is important because it reminds us that whatever it’s like to be a bat (dog, ant, chimp), it’s not precisely the same as it’s like to be a human being. What it’s like to be a dog is to do with how dog social relations have evolved. We can be reasonably sure that, however anthropomorphic we are being about our dog, the dog is being just as caninomorphic about us.

potentilla,

I had it drilled into my head for many years, in many philosophy of mind seminars, that the question of consciousness is just about the simplest thing: is there any feeling at all in there, or isn’t there? All the other issues–memory, self, thoughts of future are standardly treated as being separate issues.

But definitely, outside of philosophy seminar rooms, “consciousness” is a vague word. I’ve got this great “Inside the Animal Mind” video series I show my animal rights class and the narrator will say things like “so maybe dogs have pain, but are they conscious?” To my ear, this is just nonsense. It’s like saying “so maybe he’s a bachelor, but is he unmarried?”

In any case,when I wonder “are insects conscious” I’m just wondering about that basic thing. Are they like plants (no feeling at all) or do they feel something? All the other questions are interesting too, but when it comes to insects I find it hard to get past square one.

“I’m glad that PJ says (with more authority than I) that there is no good scientific reason to hypothesise that insects don’t have consciousness”

That statement is driven rather more by the failure of philosophers to specify properly what ‘consciousness’ is, and thus what nervous machinery is necessary for it, rather than evidence that insects do in fact have such machinery.

“I had it drilled into my head for many years, in many philosophy of mind seminars, that the question of consciousness is just about the simplest thing: is there any feeling at all in there, or isn’t there?”

Me too. But I’ve never really been convinced that there is actually something to ask - I know we’re always told that ‘feeling’ is something different to information processing, that ‘qualia’ and ‘zombies’ make sense - but I just don’t buy it - no one has ever given me an answer that convinces me - while I am rather more impressed by Chalmers’s arguments that these qualia are at least functional, and Dennett’s that they are essentially superfluous constructs.

No wonder they call it the hard problem.

I’ve always wondered whether consciousness (in the strict philosophical sense) is just our name for the epiphenomenon produced by the way that life on this planet happens to have evolved the ability to sense and respond to external stimuli. If this is right, then there is “something it is like” to be a plant or a bacterium, but not a thermostat or a robot or an alien silcon-based life-form. Maybe any of them have something which approximately maps to consciousness, but we will never know.

I too have grave problems with philosophical zombies (here is an interesting post, btw).

and the narrator will say things like “so maybe dogs have pain, but are they conscious?” To my ear, this is just nonsense. It’s like saying “so maybe he’s a bachelor, but is he unmarried?”

But isn’t that how anaesthesia works? The subject has pain but isn’t conscious of it? Of course I’ve always found that confusing - what does it mean to have pain if you aren’t conscious of it? - but that’s the point, isn’t it? Because if it isn’t, then anaesthesia has been a terrible mistake all this time. Yet it hasn’t been - it’s been an enormous lifesaver. At least in the operating room, we really do think pain doesn’t matter if the owner of it doesn’t register it.

Potentilla & PJ, Aha–”the hard problem.” Exactly, that’s what I’m alluding to. Dave Chalmers is excellent at evoking just what the problem is and what does and doesn’t solve it.

I would say: Even if consciousess were an epiphenomenon, it would still be something real and in need of explanation. Being an epiphenomenon just means not causing anything.

Little autobiogaphical aside–I was studying philosophy of mind in graduate school before the consiousness “boom” of the last 10 years. I was more interested in “propositional attitudes” as they are called–what it is to have a belief. Many people at the time steered clear of the problem of consciousness, feeling it was just too hard…which was (and maybe is) my feeling too.

Ophelia: Well, maybe the bachelor/unmarried male analogy is too strong. What I was really talking about is the narrator acknowledging obvious pain in animals–y’know, howling dogs and the like. And then looking at those obviously pained dogs, and saying “are they conscious”? To me, that is absurd.

But if we can even have a discussion of whether unconscious people, under anesthesia, can feel pain, then I guess it’s not quite “analytic” that pain involves consciousness.

My sense, though, is that it does. The point of anesthesia is to prevent the pain the patient would have experienced without it. It’s not so people won’t notice the pain they’re in. People’s intuitions will vary on this, but I find most people think completely unnoticed “pain” is not actually pain.

If you do want to call a brain event pain even though it’s unexperienced, then the “hard problem” is about “felt pain.”

“The subject has pain but isn’t conscious of it?”

Would you say that the subject has ‘vision’ but isn’t conscious of it? Because I think you’re applying whole organism (or mind level) descriptions to lower level physiological systems (is that called the mereological fallacy?)

“I would say: Even if consciousess were an epiphenomenon, it would still be something real and in need of explanation. Being an epiphenomenon just means not causing anything.”

I think I’d say, as is often the case, that consciousness is either well defined (and thus information processing), or poorly defined and thus nonsense. So rather than an epiphenomenon my intuition would be that it isn’t anything.

“I too have grave problems with philosophical zombies”

I actually don’t think I agree with Chalmers re: property dualism, I just think his argument establishes that qualia, if they are anything, must be functional. I’m more with Dennett that they are nothing more or less than functional.

But, to be honest, I don’t really understand property dualism - as in that link you give - the distinction between consciousness being physically determined and being non-physically determined by some psycho-physical coupling is a bit too subtle for me.

So rather than an epiphenomenon my intuition would be that it isn’t anything. Yes, agreed; isn’t anything except for a thing that people intuit is something (like God? or perhaps free-will would be a better analogy).

I was using epiphenomenon in a non-techncial sense of a secondary phenomenon occuring alongside a primary phenomenom, possibly (but not necessarily) caused by the primary phenomenon. (I didn’t know it had a somehwat different technical meaning in philosophy of mind until I just looked it up).

The subjective feeling of pain is an epiphenomenon of the aversive brain reaction caused by certain sorts of environmental stimulus. I don’t think there can be unfelt pain.

Jean K: “The point of anesthesia is to prevent the pain the patient would have experienced without it. It’s not so people won’t notice the pain they’re in.”

What’s the difference?

Potentilla: “I don’t think there can be unfelt pain.”

I agree, for the reasons you gave.

PJ: “But essentially you are arguing backwards from higher vertebrates to say whether other animals do or do not have consciousness.”

Not entirely. I know I am conscious (to the extent that the term means anything). I do not (and perhaps cannot) know for certain what degree of nervous system complexity is required for consciousness but I doubt that insects have it. On the other hand, when it comes to the most intelligent invertebrate we know — the octopus — I’m not so sure. But that is an animal with a fairly complex nervous system.

PJ: “You assume, but do not establish, that things which _seem_ conscious but are in fact purely algorithmic _aren’t_ conscious.”

I realise that in fiction complex software sometimes becomes aware but I have no reason to think that is currently the case. I think you are asking me to prove a negative.

“Would you say that the subject has ‘vision’ but isn’t conscious of it?”

Seeing does seem to have a mere “information processing” meaning as well as an experiential one. The driver who isn’t paying attention is still seeing. It’s just a little weirder to separate pain from its ouchiness. I think this really may be just a semantic issue. Even if you wanted to talk about perceived and unperceived pain, you’d have to explain perceived pain…i.e. consciousness.

“I think I’d say, as is often the case, that consciousness is either well defined (and thus information processing), or poorly defined and thus nonsense. So rather than an epiphenomenon my intuition would be that it isn’t anything.”

I respect/enjoy counterintuitive views, and this is certainly tough-minded, but I just FEEL it can’t be true. (ha ha)

potentilla, yeah, an epiphenomenon is what you said (plus the idea of no causal impact). :-)

KM:”I do not…know for certain what degree of nervous system complexity is required for consciousness but I doubt that insects have it.”

Essentially you’re saying that nervous system complexity is the cause of consciousness (or a proxy marker) because you have a complex nervous system (which isn’t unreasonable) and then arguing back to say that insects don’t seem to have a very complex nervous system, therefore they’re probably not conscious.

” I think you are asking me to prove a negative.”

Not really - I doubt you actually think that the behaviour of computer game characters seems like they’re conscious - but that line of argument has been used (e.g. Searle) to rule out algorithmic consciousness a priori.

PJ: “Not really - I doubt you actually think that the behaviour of computer game characters seems like they’re conscious - but that line of argument has been used (e.g. Searle) to rule out algorithmic consciousness a priori.”

Actually, if you look back at my original remark, you will see that I actually used the word “intelligent”. I avoided using the word “conscious” because it had not (and may still not have) been adequately defined.

“It’s just a little weirder to separate pain from its ouchiness. ”

There are many good things in this thread, but it would have been worth reading for that sentence alone.