I think I experienced a counter example this weekend. Nothing painful. No unusual neurosurgery, just the experience of having knowledge without justified true belief. I think. I’m not sure.
The thought that knowledge is JTB is as old as Plato, but a number of thought experiments formulated by Gettier seem to show that JTB is not sufficient for knowledge. I might look at a clock which just happens to have stopped exactly 24 hours ago. Perhaps this gives me the JTB that it’s 4 pm. Probably I don’t really know that it’s 4pm, the story goes, so JTB is not enough for knowledge.
What might be considerably more weird are cases where JTB is not even necessary for knowledge, instances in which someone has knowledge but only two of the three conditions are in place. There’s the example of the boy who studies all weekend for a history exam. He’s under a lot of pressure, sweating feverishly, and when he’s asked, ‘When was the Battle of Hastings?’ he blurts out ‘1066!’, even though he doesn’t really believe it. Still, maybe he knows that the Battle of Hastings happened in 1066 — all that studying is a good justification, and the claim is certainly true, but perhaps he lacks belief. He knows p but does not believe p. Weird.
People have different intuitions about these examples, and maybe I’ve never really been convinced by those which purport to show that JTB is not necessary for knowledge. Until now. I’m sitting in a darkened bar, listening to an ancient pianist bouncing jazz from a piano. He plays something unfamiliar and sings, ‘Oop bop sh’bam’ and inclines his ear to the audience, encouraging us in the coolest possible way to join in. ‘A klugle mop’ or something very much like that came unbidden from my lips. I am profoundly uncool, never listen to jazz, and I have no idea where that came from, but if ‘Oop bop sh’bam’ were a question, ‘A klugle mop’ is undoubtedly the answer. I knew it, I think, but I blurted it out with no conviction.
I have since looked all of this up, and while you think about whether or not it counts as a proper counter example, I invite you to dig the Diz.
The stuff about knowledge being justified true belief doesn’t take into account all the unconscious knowledge that one has, but denies or refuses to admit that one has: for example, that I know, but refuse to accept that I know that X doesn’t really like me.
There are different kinds of knowledge that are, or could be, experienced here. Knowing the date of the Battle of Hastings is culturally shared factual information that is passed on and not an actual experience. No one currently existing was there. Other kinds of knowledge in response to the singer could be of three kinds. A superficial response from something that was once heard but not assimilated. Or it could be an honest reaction from a life experience of the ego identity, which is the culture internalized. Thirdly, depending on the affect of the singer’s ‘Oop bop sh’bam’, it could be a shattering of the ego or pseudo identity resuting in the question being asked - who am I? If not gender, nationality, life experience -then what?
Matter, elements, forces, light, time-space — all One.
‘A klugle mop’ –!!
Is a klugle mop a counter example of knowledge as JTB? It is certainly justified because it is jazz, and jazz gives the player and the listener the freedom to do and say what he wants. You wanted to say a klugle mop. It fits. Is a klugle mop true? Sure, because it is jazz. Did you believe it? Did you doubt that this is a right answer? I would say that if, after blurting it out, you sat back and thought, “Wow. Whoops, not what he wanted” then I would say that you didn’t believe it. In that case, a klugle mop is a great counter example to knowledge as JTB. However, I would not be satisfied if your only response on reflection was doubt. If you do not believe that there is another answer, but that this is just not it, that would not be enough for me to call that disbelief. To me, doubt is, itself, a kind of belief. If that were the case, a klugle mop would sadly not be a counter example.
In my opinion
This is a variation of the hectoring schoolmaster example, in which a boy so terror stricken, looses all confidence that he can correctly reply to a question, which under normal circumstances would give him no difficulty. As in James Garvey’s example the boy replies correctly. Such a boy is temporally not in his right mind and to compare him with a previous situation, where he read a date and verified it was correct by the fact that it appeared in a history book is not to compare like with like. To claim that somebody knows something but does not believe it seems to me somewhat curious. Would it be right therefore to say that he does not know that he knows? If as is claimed somebody knows a fact then presumably he/she would be prepared to wager their life that is is the case. Whilst belief can be true or false Knowledge is surely by definition unassailable truth. In point of fact I can think of no circumstance where anybody would be prepared to suggest such a wager. This must surely conspire against the concept of truth. It is quite common to forget previously justified true beliefs and I do not understand why we should be assumed to have knowledge in instances where all we do is to dredge up from the depths of our minds a long forgotten fact and tentatively tender it as a reply to a question. In any case the fact may have become adulterated with other similar facts over a long period of time, but still have the appearance of being the correct reply. As Dr Garvey says (‘A klugle mop’ is undoubtedly the answer. I knew it, I think, but I blurted it out with no conviction). Surely this cannot be regarded as knowledge in any philosophical sense of the word? Words like Truth Falsity etc serve us very well in the social routines of life but when we seek a thoroughgoing definition of them we are confronted with great problems e.g. The philosophical assault on the Tripartite Theory of Knowledge. Far better is it to adopt a pragmatic approach; how likely/unlikely is something to be the case, but never adopt a stance of certainty, or absolute disbelief concerning something. It seems to me that We have these ideas of Truth and Belief the origin of which is in metaphysics, and then spend the rest of human existence trying in vain to find examples in the real world to substantiate what our metaphysical ideas suggested. Much of Philosophy is taken up with this never ending occupation.
I’m sorry if anyone is offended by this piece of self advertising, but this post set me thinking, and as a result I posted something on my blog:
http://kyles-first-blog.blogspot.com/2009/08/knowledge-without-belief.html
Interesting stuff, Kyle. I wonder where you stand on chicken sexers. (A sentence I didn’t think I’d write when I woke up this morning.)
Personally, I like a good chicken sexer.
Regarding whether they know or not. I think they do have knowledge, and that is because I take it that they believe, although perhaps weakly in some cases, but do not have reflective assurance. Reflective assurance would come from being able to see why one’s belief is knowledge.