If theology is generally composed of false claims, then it could be studied, not for what it tells us about the universe, but for its historical interest, as part of the history of ideas, for example. Studying Christian theology would thus be like studying Greek mythology. I suppose that the study of Greek mythology could be an academic discipline and a fascinating one.

it seems as though dawkins is hopelessly clinging to his own memes about the absurdity of the first cauuse. how absurd, he constructed memes yet he is clinging to these “viruses of the mind”.

“Dawkins operates a sort of positivism with respect to theology: not only does he take its claims to be false he also suggests that it is meaningless to think of it as being an academic discipline at all. It is not clear how, even given the former view, one might arrive at the latter one.”

It is not clear how, given the former sentence, you arrive at the latter. What, in your mind, is the status of other supposed discplines that are riddled with both nonsense and demonstrable falsehoods, such as astrology or homeopathy?

Newtonian physics, by contrast, is a perfectly valid system for describing systems on an everyday, macroscopic scale, and has an excellent history of experimental verification.

Dawkins presumably also operates a sort of positivism with respect to the study of Santa Claus: not only does he take its claims to be false he also suggests that it is meaningless to think of it as being an academic discipline at all.

The problem with astrology is that it is NOT riddled with “demonstrable falsehoods”: its lack of suscpetibility to falsification is what differentiates it from proper science (so Popper tells us). Theology does not dress itself in the idiom of science in the same way: that is the point. It is only those such as Dawkins that treat it so. I am interested to know which theological claim would count as “demonstrably” false…

There are countless religious claims about past events, e.g. Noah’s Ark; about matters of science e.g. evolution/creationism, and about actual day-to-day occurrences e.g. the power of prayer; it seems absurd to say that none of these are falsiable. Evidence for evolution falsifies creationist claims. Randomised controlled trials can be and have been done on the healing effects of prayer.

Are statements about the past genuinely and necessarily “scientific”? Do they carry the predictive force that seems part of the character of (genuine) science? The elision of the factual with the scientific is another flaw in God Delusion.

“Evidence for evolution falsifies creationist claims.” Why is this so? Roger Scruton, writing in sort of Spinozistic fashion has written that: “From a philosophical perspective it is very strange that people should think that the psalmist and the scientist are mutually opposed. We are natural beings, part of the biological order. Natural beings exist in time and therefore change over time. That we should evolve is inevitable. If we ask the question how we humans came to be as we are, then any conceivable answer will refer to the unfolding of a process- and processes take time. The surprising fact is not that we should have evolved from the humble chemistry of the oceans, but that it should have taken so long to discover this.”

Statements about the past are perhaps not “scientific”, no, but they are still factual and - sometimes - verifiable. I must confess I have not actually read The God Delusion, being one of the converted who does not need preaching to, so I don’t know how much scientism Dawkins is actually guilty of - but denying that theology is scientific still doesn’t put it beyond the bounds of rational or emprical examination.

Every time I read or hear Scruton I lose yet more respect for him. I’m glad that evolution is so obvious to him, but he might like to consult his dictionary to find a difference betweem “evolution” as a general term for change, and “evolution” as a specific and by no means trivial scientific theory that is still not fully understood 150 years after its (remarkable, not obvious) discovery.

Creationism, in its guise as intelligent design, makes specific claims that certain things (from bacterial flagella to whole species, depending on what flavour of ID one is examining) cannot evolve. One could not find a clearer example of falsification, than evidence for said evolution.

Sigh. The same ol’ talking points from Dawkin’s fan club in the comment section here.

When you argue that God and santa claus are on par, not only do you fail to understand the cognitive modeling that would lead one to be so deeply committed to one and not the other (willy-nilly you Dawkin’s club goers must think), you also aren’t making an argument for God not existing: you are making an argument for what sort of God an existing god would be.

Can we please stop talking about memes: Dawkins and Dennett are about the last pseudoscientists to take the theory seriously at any level.

The Courtier’s reply is a shameful; if I made it about biology, Dawkins et al would have a fit and label it as ignorance. Shoe, foot.

Decent little post, Walsh. I’ll have to give some of your ideas a little more thought.

I think it’s pretty well agreed among the philosophical cognoscenti at least that Dawkins is not a very skillful philosopher, and I don’t think he claims to be one. I think it was probably a mistake for him to try to do some original philosophy in his book. Relaying the solid arguments against religious beliefs that real philosophers have made to a wider audience would have been enough.

In any case, religion is certainly a worthy subject for academic study, even though it is entirely a creation of human imagination (in my view). Art is also such a creation, and it has also been studied since Aristotle for what it reveals about the human mind. Theology reveals a great deal on that subject; more so, I would say, than subjects like fairies, Santa Claus, or even astrology. A lot of interesting work is being done these days by psychologists and other scientists working on the field of the intriguing quirks of Homo sapiens.

As for the possibility of a knock-down argument for the non-existence of the Abrahamic God: perhaps one can’t give such an argument, but I’ve yet to see a persuasive argument for the *existence* of this entity, so I don’t see why I have to believe in it. Those who want to so believe, fine; go ahead. But don’t be surprised if the rest of us decline.

Theology and astrology are equivalent. They both make claims that are either unverifiable or false yet persist in claiming that they are true. Neither should be taken seriously as an academic description. Art, literature etc are made up of personal opinions: those involved may say their opinions are more right but seldom that they are absolutely true.

Tom,

Can you give us an example of the Courtier’s reply that’s “about biology”?

“The Courtier’s reply is a shameful; if I made it about biology, Dawkins et al would have a fit and label it as ignorance. Shoe, foot.”

Curiously, biology doesn’t have the problem of failing to convince large numbers of people - philosophers as well as scientists - that its discourse is even meaningful.

The claim that theological propositions are false is quite separate from (and inconsistent with) the claim that they are meaningless. What theory of meaning supplies the latter rather than the former claim? (All I ask is that the theory is meaningful in its own terms -with all due respect to the Oxford school and all that :-) )

When discussing theology, it seems a good idea to be clear on what we are talking about. “Theology” has (at least) two meanings: (1) the study of religion and its role in society, and (2) the study of god, the nature of god, god’s will and so on. I am pretty sure the sort Dawkins (and PZ Myers, in his courtier’s reply argument) criticizes is (2). Several commenters here seem to be busy defending (1), which as far as I know is not under attack.

And, while on the subject of the meaning of words: What does Andy Walsh mean by “elision”? I can’t make sense of his use of the word under any of the dictionary definitions I have been able to find.

Harald: “conflation” means much the same thing in this context.

Theology is taught in universities because first of all, it’s a tradition and second, because it offers career possibilities. It’s a bit innocent to expect that everything that is taught in universities be true. The real question is not whether theology should be taught in universities or not, but whether it is a discipline which is analogous to
biology or sociology or for that matter, history. I think not.

“The claim that theological propositions are false is quite separate from (and inconsistent with) the claim that they are meaningless.”

Oh come on, all theological propositions are not alike. Some can be meaningful, some meaningless.

I’m afraid I don’t have any grand theories of meaning to back up that latter bold claim. But the ultimate retreat, to talk of “ineffable transcendence” and claim that the whole thing is as much of a mystery to believers, contributes nothing useful to the debate that I can see.

“Oh come on, all theological propositions are not alike. Some can be meaningful, some meaningless.”

….it has the character of science in that regard.

Ironically enough, the Catholic Church can be taken to be slightly sceptical about theology. It speaks of a division between faith and reason, which can and should nevertheless be in harmony each with the other. Reason cannot be inconsistent with faith nor faith with reason. But when we reason properly we abstract from those truths that faith supplies and what we are doing becomes philosophy or science. If we fail in this abstraction we are doing not philosophy but theology, which is a form of confusion for the Church.

Maybe Dawkins could have made his point more perspicuously had he borrowed from the previous Pope’s “Faith and Reason”…

Tea,

You said:
Can you give us an example of the Courtier’s reply that’s “about biology”?

Easy: Let’s say I am a creationist who reads the bible literally even despite the myth-status of many of it’s stories, I say, “Biology is like astrology, studying random processes that magically give rise to the complex meaningful and intelligent situations of our lives. This is akin to believing that a tornado could make a car out of scrap metal. Therefore, I can’t be bothered to read anything about biology, its obviously nonsense. Should I have to read up on the nuances of fairies to know that they are a bunch of BS too?”

Delmot,

I said:
“The Courtier’s reply is a shameful; if I made it about biology, Dawkins et al would have a fit and label it as ignorance. Shoe, foot.”

You said:
Curiously, biology doesn’t have the problem of failing to convince large numbers of people - philosophers as well as scientists - that its discourse is even meaningful.

Now I respond: Curiously, religion doesn’t have the problem of failing to convince large numbers of people - more than all the philosophers and scientists put together - that its discourse is overwhelmingly interesting and meaningful.

The lack of sophistication in your argument is staggering.

———————-

The issue with the C. Reply is that there is no mechanism to stop one from applying it to any subject one doesn’t like, literally. I view it as the most unsophisticated piece of propaganda I have ever seen. It is a rhetorical strategy for getting lazy thinkers off the hook while misaligning things they don’t like.

Listen, you don’t have to agree or like religion, but if the best you’ve got is “you’re crazy, santa claus, etc. etc.”, you shouldn’t be taken any more seriously in the public sphere than any other layman who professes that they know something that they don’t know anything about. It’s odd that Dawkins is pissed about people making false claims about things they don’t know anything about, but he is totally willing to do it about religions, either as a product of culture or as some doctrine of beliefs.

To call Dawkins an embarrassment to science and the intellectual life is an understatement.

The difference between the cases is I think that a biologist could quite easily demolish the tornado analogy, given a reasonably intelligent and willing opponent. The creationist position can only really be maintained through wilful ignorance, because it’s making demonstrable claims about the real world. Theology on the other hand simply does not have the same simple appeal to reason and, ultimately, empirical evidence that science does. It’s more like a philosophical disagreement, and surely people, philosophers included, legitimately hold all sorts of philosophical positions without really delving into the intricacies of any given field.

Tom,

It doesn’t seem that you understand the point of the Courtier’s reply. The point is that it’s useless to read tons of books on the characteristics and motives of an entity we have no reason to believe even exists in the first place. The point is that reading all those books does nothing to convince us that the entity exists - it just goes on listing and debating its characteristics and motives. Theology as such is devoted to studying the properties of a *completely* made up being. It not only fails to teach us anything about about an actual entity, it also fails to teach us anything about the world. (It does, on the other hand, teach us a lot about the way people think, about how group hierarchy and authority work, about how people have been changing their view of this entity through history as science kept progressing. But these seem fit subjects for other existing sciences, such as sociology of religion, for example.)

Creationists, on the other hand, can learn a lot from studying biology: they can learn about all the overwhelming evidence for evolution, and their “counterarguments” about watchmakers, tornado airplanes, and irreducible complexity are IN FACT addressed by biologists, and quite convincingly.

Your claim the the Courtier’s reply can be used on any other science only makes sense if you think theology holds convincing arguments about the existence of god.

Mr Tea

I think that Dawkins would benefit from reading (for example) Plantinga’s modal re-evaluation of the ontological proof. Hardly nonsense but a beautiful intellectual edifice constructed from the raw materials of the discipline he disparages. I’m assuming of course that he is capable of moving away from his village atheism and that he would understand it….

Thank you, Mrs. Andy.

So, is your point that reading theology can, in fact, convince us of the existence of god? (Not that Plantinga is really a theologian, but let’s leave that aside for the sake of the argument…)

No, he is an analytical theist. Would there be room for him in Dawkins’ Academy I wonder….

Even St Thomas did not claim that reason alone can demonstrate His existence (that is why it is properly the “Five Ways” rather than the “Five Proofs”). Similarly, the Catechism of the Catholic Church holds that God can be known via reason which is short of saying that He can be demonstrated by it….

My point (and it wasn’t meant to be the focus of the post although it’s become the focus of the subsequent discussion) is that it is not clear to me why Dawkins treats theology in the way that he does. To dismiss it on the grounds that it is like bad science is like taking your 12 year old brother to the pub and then complaining that he cannot hold his drink.

I don’t get that analogy at all.

Are you saying that it’s wrong to expect of theology to act like science, when it really doesn’t think of itself as a science in the first place?

Religion is not dismissed as bad science but as nonsense, ie non-sensical. Art History is not science but does need to make sense, as do other academic studies. Maybe we do occasionally get good philosophy or sociology out of theology but that is incidental. People objected to the teaching of ‘alternative’ medicine in universities because the underlying discipline is (mainly) nonsense: the same reasoning applies to theology.

Tea

What I’m suggesting is that Dawkins’ rejection of theology (to put it at its most measured) assumes that it shares the same form of explanation as science and that he does so because he ascribes all decent explanation to the scientific. Yet there is no rea\son to do this: he is naive not about theology, but abaout the nature of explanation.

Getting back to the core of the post:
“Dawkins assimilates all explanation to the scientific. The existence of consciousness is, for him a mere epiphenomenon: a causal product of the elaboration of the evolutionary story.”

I cannot see anything wrong with Dawkins’ position. We are conscious. We evolved from species which were not conscious. So, unless you want to introduce some supernatural intervention, clearly consciousness is ‘a causal product of the elaboration of the evolutionary story’. One can make this statement without being aware of all the ins and outs of phil. of consciousness.

As for “the forms of explanation which make reference to human beliefs and desires etc will never be displaced by science”: yes and no. I think the mechanisms will be explained by neuroscience but, personally, I think the exact tracking of one individual’s thought processes might be beyond science. Not because there is anything non-physical about them but simply because it happens on a scale that will forever be beyond exact measurement. How could we ever embed enough recording devices in a brain to get exact measurements without destroying that brain or subverting the processes? I suspect the ‘folk psychological’ will always be more useful just as Newtonian physics is best for calculating spacecraft trajectories.

And looking at Rorty et al, “it’s best to conclude that consciousness does not exist”: that too is a reasonable statement to make if you assume that most people take consciousness to be something beyond or outside the physical.

I’m still not sure what ‘point’ the article is trying to make apart from attempting to ridicule Dawkins, in which it clearly fails.

“And looking at Rorty et al, “it’s best to conclude that consciousness does not exist”: that too is a reasonable statement to make if you assume that most people take consciousness to be something beyond or outside the physical.”

Really? Personally, and unlike Rorty, Churchland(s) et al, if a completed physics finds the reduction of consciousness to itself to be problematic I’d conclude that this is a problem for physicalism; not for consciousness.

Has someone here hacked my Amazon preferences? I just got an email recommending a stack of ‘Jesus’ books - eek!

“if a completed physics finds the reduction of consciousness to itself to be problematic”
I don’t think *neuroscience* will find that to be problematic. It is more likely that believers in supernatural consciousness will keep shifting the boundaries of what consciousness is to try and keep it just beyond the physical: sound familiar?

To shift the boundaries of what consciousness simply in order to fit a theory would be disreputable indeed. Does THAT sound familiar?

Yep, sounds like theology to me. :)

To deny the irreducibility of the mental to the physical is not, in any case, to be committed to “supernaturalism” about the mental or about consciousness. Davidson is a physicalist and an anti-reductionist (due to the “constitutive” nature of physical laws). More recently you could look at the work of people like Colin McGinn or David Chalmers who develop versions of non-reductive physicalism in interesting ways.

The point is this: (1) Dawkins’ treatment of the God hypothesis assumes that explanation takes the scientific form; (2) explanations supplied by non-reductive versions of physicalism (and elsewhere) recognise that personal explanations and theories of agency need not take this form; therefore (3) Dawkins’ treatment is misconceived.

Andy: You yourself distinguished above between analytical theism and theology. You seem to have shown that there is a place for analytical theism in our ideal academy, but not one for theology.
Maybe Dawkins should have read some analytical theism before writing his book.

“(1) Dawkins’ treatment of the God hypothesis assumes that explanation takes the scientific form”
Science is the study of the physical world. In as much as religions make claims about the physical world, eg the impregnation of a woman by some supernatural being, the creation of food from nothing, etc, then those claims ought to be subjected to scientific analysis which concludes that they are patent nonsense. If religions were to deny all their supernatural fact claims then I’m sure Dawkins would be happy with that.

ergo, “3) Dawkins’ treatment is misconceived” is false.

@TonyL

Where in (1), (2) or (3) is religion even mentioned? You’re playing Bridge with chess pieces.

I’ll state it again. The objection to Dawkins is an objection to his conception of explanation. And the objection borrows not from theology but from contemporary (materialist) philosophy of mind.

Dawkins mainly discusses the concept of god as conceived by Abrahamic religions. He makes that very clear.

If the god hypothesis is that this thing exists but has not now nor has ever had any interaction with the physical world, then I don’t see why we’re even bothering to discuss it: it is irrelevant to any human discourse. But religions posit that this thing does have interactions with the physical so it doesn’t seem sensible to split the one from the other.

…for Davidson it is the case) that the sequence of mental events … are identical with physical events (synaptic firings etc) in Christopher’s brain. But it would, according to him, be a mistake to suggest that from this it follows that the mental and the physical are related in any law like way: not if by “law” we mean something with the character of a physical law.”

Sorry, but that just sounds like the afore-mentioned ‘god of the gaps’ type of statement: just because neuroscience has not yet got to the detailed explanation does not mean that there will be no explanation. If physical event X is always identical with mental event X1, Y with Y1, Z with Z1 etc then it seems daft to deny any relation between them. In fact, you’ve already said they are identical so what more relationship does Davidson want?

Davidson’s reasons are to do with whether or not reasons can also be causes. Pace Wittgenstein he believes that they can, because he believes that there are no “psychophysical” laws (mental concepts and physical concepts operate in such different ways that any way of relating them will not be law like). Thus he believes that at the level of event the mental and the physical are identical. Thus he is a materialist, but not a reductive one. Personal explanations and a theory of agency will not be threatened by a developed neuroscience.

Davidson’s methodology is third-personal: under what conditions can we ascribe mental concepts to an agent? Those conditions will not be of the same type as will govern the ascriptions of physical concepts.

It’s a thoroughgoing materialism minus the assumption of reducibility. And it is his assumption that the laws of physics are strict that urges this subtraction, and…..

…..no mention of theology :-)

I’ve said too much on this thread already and it’s getting near to the time when I take my baby son with me to Mass (as a form of benign indoctrination).

But I will say this. It never ceases to surprise me that people imply that it is only a certain type of causal relation (the mental-physical; or that which might obtain between God and the “material” world; or whatever) that is problematic. The causal relations assumed and expressed by physicalism are equally as mysterious. We just don’t know what causal laws are. They could be Hume’s habits of thought (what causes the habits?); or Berkeley’s divine conversation; or Kant’s necessary conditions of possible experience or their contemporary counterparts. We just don’t have a settled philosophical account.

To the extent that physics embeds causal laws it embeds also this mystery.

I’m well out of my depth here but, for a *personal* (but physically realised) opinion:

“under what conditions can we ascribe mental concepts to an agent? Those conditions will not be of the same type as will govern the ascriptions of physical concepts. ”

Don’t agree. If any agent experiences the same physical events within the same context (same brain structure, same body structure) then the agent must experience the same mental event. So, if we figure out the physical basis of consciousness, we can create non-human, conscious agents (but a long long time from now).

“Personal explanations and a theory of agency will not be threatened by a developed neuroscience.”

Do agree. Just as Newton’s laws were not threatened by quantum physics, nor is free will and consciousness threatened by neuroscience. Even if we fully understand how the physical brain brings about consciousness in its host, we will still use the concepts of free will, agency, consciousness (ie folk psychology) to explain personal and third party actions.

“no mention of theology”: Yay!! ;)

“It never ceases to surprise me that people imply that it is only a certain type of causal relation (the mental-physical; or that which might obtain between God and the “material” world; or whatever) that is problematic.”

No, the issue is that such relations do not exist. There are no gods and so there are no such relations. Physical relations may not be fully explicable but they are open to examination and logical explanation. Supernatural-natural relations are not. Relying on some type of explanation which is non-examinable and illogical is simply nonsense, by definition.

“If any agent experiences the same physical events within the same context (same brain structure, same body structure) then the agent must experience the same mental event. So, if we figure out the physical basis of consciousness, we can create non-human, conscious agents (but a long long time from now).”

….you need to be careful in specifying what the mental state is identical with. If it’s identical with the brain state then what you say is not true, since you’ll end up building beings that ARE (biologically) human. What you need is for the mental state to be functionally identical to the brain state…cf Putnam in his earler incarnation (see what I did there?).

“you’ll end up building beings that ARE (biologically) human”: good point. What I meant was that understanding the physical processes allied to consciousness would allow the building of a non-biological equivalent and the agent hosting this would be conscious. Or, I think that is more what I meant.

“cf Putnam in his earlier incarnation (see what I did there?)”: sorry, no. I’m pretty much an amateur with just enough training and (little) knowledge to think I can make sensible comments.

Andy: Before you leave us for mass, let me say that I hope that you’ll continue posting here. I think that you’re a sophist, but you’re very very good at it (and a gentleman) and it’s a pleasure to read what you write.

Is this representative of the supposedly sophisticated refutations of the arguments in TGD?

Let’s summarize the post:

Not so clever disparaging title - check.

Comical characterization of Dawkins - check.

Condescending and vague accusation of poor philosophising on Dawkins’ part - check.

Misunderstanding of exactly where and how Newtonian physics still fits in - check.

More condescension without support, more condescension without support… when is this fellow going to get to the meat of the argument… ah here he goes.. he’s going to talk about mind. Wait a second, how does this relate to the central thesis of TGD? We’re half-way through the article with no philosophy in site.. but let’s give him a chance…

Okay… he trots out an argument from authority - somebody or other can’t think of a way that “the mental” can be described with purely physical “laws” which seems to be an argument from personal incredulity. (and can somebody point me to the committee that decrees when scientific theories become laws?). He summarizes with a lot of “if we agree” and “we might conclude” which seems to be pretty shoddy, weak and unsupported reasoning.

But isn’t this a logical fallacy? Pointing out where the scientific method has so far failed to provide mechanisms for every phenomenon does not lend support to the notion of god.

Hmmm, but he doesn’t seem to be saying this directly - he seems to be arguing that since “science” (whatever that is - as opposed to using the scientific method to determine if a hypothesis is or is not consistent with the observable universe) doesn’t have a set of physical laws to explain the mind, then theologians don’t need to have an explanation for their god either (nyah, nyah, nyah!) - ignoring the fact that neuro-physicists (unlike theologians) do have a large set of testable hypothesis with which they will sally forth into the real world to try and figure out what consciousness really is.

So what he seems to be saying is: “leave theology alone until you have scientific ‘laws’ for every phenomenon out there”.

Or is it: “Theology’s explanations are just as good as scientific ones because God is immanent in the world just like the mind is immanent in the brain”.

Or is it: “Theology’s explanations are just as good as scientific ones because science can’t explain ‘mind’”

So which one is it Andy? Can you state your thesis in a clear unambiguous form, or will you continue to fail the Feynman criteria?

Oh… and he signs off citing the credentials of somebody he studied under… very classy.

- Zirrad once sat in a room with Paul Erdos to discuss some particularly nasty combinatorics problems and has an Erdos number of 2.

Zirrad

I probably should delete your post - be polite if you want to post here - but fyi:

Oh… and he signs off citing the credentials of somebody he studied under… very classy.

I posted Andy’s contribution; and I wrote the bit about his qualifications and experience (and I would do so again).

If you have any class, you’ll apololgise (to him). And don’t make assumptions…

Hey if I’d written the sign-off I’d have mentioned that I had Garry Kasparov’s autograph and that I once shared a gin and tonic with Freddie Mercury…

“I once shared a gin and tonic with Freddie Mercury…”

Now *that’s* what I call a qualification.

Try it this way. Dawkins seems to think that the thesis of God’s existence is used by theists as a sort of “add on”: a means of explaining the fact of, and character of, the empirical universe. And such a thesis lacks force given that it is (a) implausible and (b) unnecessary. But there is no reason to suppose that theists need treat of God’s existence in this sort of way. For the theist God’s existence is not a belief additional to the beliefs we have regarding the natural world. And to the extent that he uses God to explain anything he does not do so on the model of science but on the model of personal explanation. The question becomes then: is there a model of personal explanation which is neither “mere instrumentalism” nor reducible to a developed set of physical sciences? Indeed there is and can be constructed from materials supplied by contemporary materialist philosophies of mind: philosophies which need not assume any theistic content at all.

@ Admin (or Andy):
Will you be kind enough to tell me why my comment got erased?

Was it my addressing Andy as “Ms.”? This was my little way of pointing out that he shouldn’t have assumed I was a “Mr.” Was it my pretend-assuming that he was female that you found so offensive?

Or were you offended by my copy-pasting of some of the things Andy wrote about Dawkins?

It couldn’t have possibly been my request that he answers Zirrad’s questions?

I would really appreciate it if you would answer my comment instead of just erasing it.

Tea,

Nothing to do with me. My previous post was a reply to yours (I read it before it was erased).

Andy,

That’s what I thought - it sounded like you were replying to me, but I couldn’t be sure because my post was gone.

Anyway, pleasure discussing these things (I mean that) but it’s late (by my standards); so I’ll wish you all a good evening :-)

Good afternoon

Richard Dawkins is really interesting but when he teaches about memes I have difficulty following him. Perhaps I am too literal minded, being a new-age fundamentalist. Genes sound like something you can actually bit into, but memes are more ethereal.

How many TPM staff members consider the meme concept an important tool for philosophers?

best wishes from New Jersey

Try it this way. Dawkins seems to think that the thesis of God’s existence is used by theists as a sort of “add on”: a means of explaining the fact of, and character of, the empirical universe.

Isn’t this a straw man? My reading of TGD is that Dawkins thinks theists assume god’s existence and subsequently try to use that to explain aspects of existence without having to say anything more than “I don’t understand how this works so god did it”. Moreover, theists will grasp at any empirical evidence, however tenuous, to support their god hypothesis.

And such a thesis lacks force given that it is (a) implausible and (b) unnecessary. But there is no reason to suppose that theists need treat of God’s existence in this sort of way.

Are you denying that many theists do treat god that way? And for those that do, doesn’t Dawkins elucidate that the thesis both implausible and unecessary?

And to the extent that he (the theist) uses God to explain anything he does not do so on the model of science but on the model of personal explanation.

“God exists because I says so!” You aren’t seriously putting this forward as an argument are you?

The question becomes then: is there a model of personal explanation which is neither “mere instrumentalism” nor reducible to a developed set of physical sciences?

Again it seems you’re assuming your answer. You assume that a given example will not ever succumb to physical explanation.

[Or are saying that scientists exist that use personal explanation as justification and support for a hypothesis. There certainly are - at least in the discussion section of the paper. But personal explanation is never sufficient on its own for anything and will be the target of intense scrutiny and debate]

Indeed there is and can be constructed from materials supplied by contemporary materialist philosophies of mind: philosophies which need not assume any theistic content at all.

I must have missed that. Nowhere in your article do you show or quote or even present a testable hypothesis of a “mind” that cannot and will not succumb to being tested and measured.

If you are only saying it is only necessary for it to possible for this (an irreducible phenomenon) to exist for Dawkins arguments to collapse, we’re back to a god of the gaps and a thesis that is either a) implausible or b) unnecessary, and the rest of us will go back to doing real work until you come up with something concrete.

I think Dawkins’ position is that the existence of a Christian god (or any god that responds to and intervenes in people’s lives) is a scientific proposition. There will be an observable difference between a world with such a god, and a world without one. And, having scoured the supposed evidence, he concludes that such a god most probably does not exist.

He agrees that a deistic ‘clockmaker’ god who wound up the universe and lets it run, would be unobservable; and so its existence would not be a scientific proposal.

His favorite point is that evolution has made a god - the creative force in all religions - totally unnecessary.

” Nowhere in your article do you show or quote or even present a testable hypothesis of a “mind” that cannot and will not succumb to being tested and measured.”

Ah yes, by sleight of hand, we trade once again in “testable hypotheses”. I wasn’t aware that anybody denied that mental events were testable or measurable. What is denied (by Davidson and as discussed in the OP) is that the mental is reducible to the physical, a quite separate thing. I’m delighted that you, unlike Dawkins, is amenable to argument on this point. The most obvious examples of those mental phenomena that resist the reductionist zeitgeist are those that are sometimes called “qualia”; or the “phenomenal properties of consciousness”; or “contents presented experientially”.

I apologise for failing to condense the arguments of Kripke, Putnam, Jackson, Chalmers et al into a blogpost. I assumed a level of knowledge of the subject matter which was, in your case, quite unforgivable of me!

“And to the extent that he uses God to explain anything he does not do so on the model of science but on the model of personal explanation.”

So, God is just a figment of each individual’s imagination.

“constructed from materials supplied by contemporary materialist philosophies of mind”

I don’t suppose that any of those philosophies posit any connection between the mental processes of individuals. I don’t agree with those philosophies: I think the mental is reducible to the physical. But even so, for there to be some consistent god-thing, surely there would have to be some relation between individual mental concepts. It is even more the case for religion: why do you go to Mass if the god-thing is entirely in your own head. Or is religion just a way of forcing everyone to accept the same view of the god-thing (which is what most atheists would posit).

This approach also smacks of the ‘god of the gaps’ attempts to find a bolthole for the god-things in whatever piece of physics or philosophy that is currently in dispute.

And, getting back to your post, it is a bit mean to belittle Dawkins for not coming up with this view of god-things when it doesn’t seem that widely known (this is the first I’ve heard of it).

@Tony

“personal explanation” doesn’t mean that the explanation is self-generated: rather it is a form of explanation that exploits the language of the mental, rather than that of physics: it refers to actions as opposed to events; to agency; to decisions; to beliefs etc.

I keep hearing this expression “god of the gaps”. It is exactly because Davidson wants no such gaps that he takes the non-reductionist position. He believes that the laws of physics are strict; that they are “constitutive” rather than “regulative”. Like the rules of chess they define and exhaust their subject matter. His physicalism is impeccable here. And it is for this reason that he affirms that “laws” reducing the mental to the physical are in fact no such thing: they will be hedged about and qualified with ceteris paribus clauses, for example. With Davidson it is AVOIDANCE of gaps that makes him a physicalist MINUS the reductionism. His view of the strict (nomological) status of genuine laws is tighter than that of most empiricists.

Why do I go to Mass? Well last night I went to Mass so that this morning I could listen to the cricket. So catch you later….

Andy: You’ve done a good job of showing that there’s “something”, qualia, which cannot be reduced to physical events, at least not in the present state of scientific thought. I agree with you and while far from being an expert on the subject, I was disappointed when I read Dennett’s book on consciousness about 10 years ago.
However, the fact that qualia cannot be reduced to brain events in no way indicates that there is a God which cannot be explained in
“scientific” terms: it merely shows that not “everything” (quotation marks because qualia aren’t really things) can be explained scientifically. Sorry that I simply but I’m not a professional philosopher.

Amos: you are quite correct. Anti-reductionism with respect to the mind, if true, is perhaps a necessary though insufficient condition of theism (although I think it is a useful “raw material” for the theist -see the work of someone like Keith Ward, for example). But it IS sufficient to show that Dawkins’ atheism is, shall we say, underdescribed?

Three gripes–

“Were he ever to have displayed a sense of humour..”

Huh? TGD is hilarious. Lack of a sense of humor isn’t one of Richard Dawkins’ shortcomings.

“The existence of consciousness is, for him a mere epiphenomenon: a causal product of the elaboration of the evolutionary story…”

I see no reason whatever to attribute any specific philosophy of mind to Dawkins. He’s not a philosopher of mind. There’s no reason at all why he should adopt epiphenomenalism rather than one of the other materialist options available, if he did get involved in philosophy of mind. That’s a very specific (and peculiar) view.

“Dawkins assimilates all explanation to the scientific.”

Where? When? What about what he says in TGD about literature and art giving us understanding? At most, we can assume Dawkins thinks physical events must have physical causes…but that’s not at all to say he thinks we must look to science for every bit of our understanding of the world.

You’re right that he’s not an on-the-record epiphenomenalist in that sense. I’m not ascribing to him the view that brain mechanisms instantiate a unilateral causal process whose product is consciousness. But he is of the view that the fact of consciousness is in the end explicable in terms of the kind of evolutionary mechanisms he has long described. He is an epiphenomenalist in this coarser sense.

Perhaps I should have said that he lacks a sense of humour about himself…maybe that would be fairer. That said I’m not certain that his description of God as the most evil character in fiction (or something like that) is up there Series 3 of Curb Your Enthusiasm. His humour is more Aristotelian than ironic. There. That might be fairer.

“consciousness is in the end explicable in terms of the kind of evolutionary mechanisms”

How else would you describe it. Consciousness, of the sort we seem to be discussing, is a human phenomenon. Humans evolved from other species. So, either those species were conscious or humans became conscious during their later evolution. It seems sensible to assume consciousness is an evolved feature of humanity. How else would you say it came about?

And stepping back up the comments: “It is exactly because Davidson wants no such gaps that he takes the non-reductionist position”

I don’t agree. He sees a current gap in understanding neuroscience, such as why certain body/brain events feel the way they do, and tries to insert some non-physical mumbo-jumbo. Like the ‘god of the gaps’, the mumbo jumbo will likely move around as neuroscience advances. (Note: I don’t know Davidson but am just replying to your statements about what he says.)

I really do not get why people need this mumbo-jumbo. If I see a red apple, then I have the experience of seeing red. Why wouldn’t I have that experience? What is inexplicable about it? Certain neurons fire in the eye which fire other neurons around the brain and I have the experience of seeing red. There is a huge way to go before neuroscience can explain all of this but I just don’t understand why anyone would think there is some insoluble mystery.

And one more
(looking at SEP: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/#Anomalism )
“In fact, Davidson is explicit in claiming that there can be no strict laws that relate the mental and the physical in this way — there is no strict law that relates, for instance, wanting to read with a particular kind of brain activity.”

I just do not buy that. I agree that you probably cannot construct a strict law which determines how a single mental event relates to some later physical event (eg, in the SEP article, “wanting to read Tolstoy, for instance, leads me to take War and Peace from the shelf”) but that is simply because they are separated by a hugely complex set of physical processes in the brain of a single person. The brain of each person is uniquely organised: similar mental events will not have the same physical derivation. But the description of the processes themselves: the activity of neurons, firing potentials, how connections are made and destroyed etc; all these are governed by physical laws. The mental derives strictly from the physical.

I think that to see where he is coming from Tony you need to remember that is methhodology is third-personal (he is not taking a given mental state and looking for some way of identifying it with a brain state, rather he is looking at behaviour as the grounds for ascription of mental states -he studied with Quine and has inherited his, what you might call, ontological austerity with regard to mental categories -and everything else). He also assumes that we are rational: possibly quite a big ask.

Re:Posted by Dudley M. Jones | January 2, 2010, 5:05 pm

If you are not already familiar with it, I suggest you read.Susan Blackmore’s “The Meme Machine”, which is highly approved by Dawkins.

“he is looking at behaviour as the grounds for ascription of mental states”

Thanks, Andy. In a way, that seems even less sensible. It is like looking for a strict physical law to relate a pattern of clouds to the weather. You never will get such a thing. That you cannot do so means nothing, however. It doesn’t tell you anything about either clouds or weather.

Looks like someone else is trying to prove there is no strict law where no-one ever said there was one:
http://philosophyofbrains.com/2010/01/03/laws-of-selection.aspx

Ah yes, by sleight of hand, we trade once again in “testable hypotheses”.
I wasn’t aware that anybody denied that mental events were testable or measurable.

Oh that you could recognize that your blogpost is repleat with slights of hand where you finangle rather straightforward positions about the lack of evidence of god into an issue of a very hotly contested area of philosophy.

What is denied (by Davidson and as discussed in the OP) is that the mental is reducible to the physical, a quite separate thing.

Didn’t say you denied it, said you did not show any indication or evidence supporting the notion that physical processes cannot and will not be found. Note the difference.

I’m delighted that you, unlike Dawkins, is amenable to argument on this point.

Certainly, but aren’t you making a rather large assumption about Dawkins? You’ve met him personally to discuss these things have you? You’re making assumptions again - that leads to sloppy thinking.

… those that are sometimes called “qualia”; …

Finally, something concrete.

I apologise for failing to condense the arguments of Kripke, Putnam, Jackson, Chalmers et al into a blogpost.

While at the same time casually dismissing the arguments from a similiar august list of people who dispute those positions.

I assumed a level of knowledge of the subject matter which was, in your case, quite unforgivable of me!

Ah, condescension again. You’re an amateur at it. Wait till you’ve sat through a few thousand departmental meetings.

Shall we see if someone with a doctorate in philosophy of mind can explain themselves clearly and follow a logical argument?

Let’s try to agree on a straightforward characterization of your argument:

1) Dawkins disputes theology on the basis it rests on “personal explanation” because ultimately they are implausible and unnecessary

2) You contend that you only have to show an example of a non-theological “personal explanation” to say “look, science types do it too” and Dawkins criticism of theology falls apart.

3) Qualia is an example of this

4) QED

Now, this is only a rough characterization, laid out to emphasis the problems of justifying theological thought concerning a supernatural entity with scientific experimental work with physical entities such as the brain, and the slight of hand that takes the meaning of “personal explanation” when used by an individual describing their experience of god and “personal explanation” as philosophers of mind use it, and the difference between theological positions that, through the scientific method, have been shown to be implausible and unnecessary, and the state of the arguments for the non-physical aspects of “qualia” which you have shown to be plausible (to some but not all experts), but not yet necessary (and, I assume, cannot show to be necessary - otherwise you would have).

But, as an eminent thinker you should be able to summarize the core of your argument in about as many words and clearly lay out your assumptions and reasoning. Try for brevity and clarity.

Since the comments have moved on before I could get to them, I’m not going to continue talking about the courtier’s reply. However, I strongly suggest being deeply skeptical of it.

Tony L:

” It seems sensible to assume consciousness is an evolved feature of humanity. ”

Except not everything is an evolutionary adaption; some are byproducts. I side with the camp that thinks consciousness is a byproduct of evolution, not an evolved adaption.

@Dudley M. Jones and @Don Bird

“If you are not already familiar with it, I suggest you read.Susan Blackmore’s “The Meme Machine”, which is highly approved by Dawkins.”

Blackmore is nothing more than a pseudoscientist. No one except Dennett and Dawkins cling to meme theory (and we really have to ask to why they seem to like it so much). Survey the literature and you’ll see, the theory is a joke and has been largely discarded by science and the humanities.

“consciousness is a byproduct of evolution, not an evolved adaption”

I don’t suppose it matters. But it would be interesting to speculate how humans would have developed if our brains had evolved to the size and complexity that they are now while not being conscious. What does consciousness add to our behaviour?

As nobody seems to have mentioned ‘Non-overlapping magisteria’ in this discussion I suggest it may be of interest to look it up on Wikipedia, if not already familiar. It comes down to a kind if “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet” kind of situation. Dawkins does not think much of it incidentally.

This discussion amongst other things hits against the hard problem of consciousness so aptly described by T H Huxley in1866. “How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue,is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp”

I suspect that the hard problem will most likely go the way of Vitalism i.e. explained away by advances in science and/or maybe as Colin McGinn suggested, our cognitive powers are not up to the task currently. In 1967, Francis Crick the co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, stated “And so to those of you who may be vitalists I would make this prophecy: what everyone believed yesterday, and you believe today, only cranks will believe tomorrow.”

As I understand it Davidson suggests that Scientific explanation leaves untouched the phenomena of consciousness. I had occasion doing post grad philosophical work on animal cognition and thought processes to examine and explain Davidson’s philosophical work in this connection. It was not without interest, but I gained the impression that he had little or no experience of animals whatsoever. His views were all but obliterated by those cognitive scientists who knew what they were talking about. He did say once at interview “The consideration I adduce for the close connection between language and thought do not constitute anything like a demonstration or proof. They depend in part on what I think we know about creatures like us” I cannot currently find the source for this quotation.

I see no grounds to dispute Andy Walsh’s lucid exposition concerning the relevant ideas of Davidson. However it seems to me that in the due course of the passage of time different stances and viewpoints will arise in the light of further progress in science and the revision of theological viewpoints. (Theologians typically shift their ground when it becomes too hot for comfort). It may accordingly, well be that the forms of explanation which make reference to human beliefs and desires WILL, in the light of further knowledge and understanding, be displaced by science; whatever contribution Religion will give here, will I think, be minimal.

So far as Dawkins is concerned I am unable to understand why he persists fanatically in his quest against religion. For the greater part he is preaching to the converted and he will never shift those who deal in Faith rather than in truth and falsity. I am sure his talents such as they are, could be better employed directly in the biological sciences alone.

I agree with Amos that Dennett is disappointing and I also have found Chalmers “The Conscious mind” similar. The best modern book on the Hard problem of Consciousness in my opinion is Jeffrey Gray’s “Consciousness: creeping up on the hard problem” Not a Philosopher but a Psychologist Gray tackles the problem systematically without being bogged down by philosophical circumlocution. As as when necessary he also considers the philosophical issues involved which highlights how the two disciplines of Philosophy and Neuroscience hand in hand could make some progress in the solution of this so far intractable problem.

With the greatest respect and not really seriously, I hope that Andy Walsh also takes his child to the science museum in addition to Mass. The child will need something in due course to combat the ‘Mass Meme’ currently being installed.

Don Bird writes: “So far as Dawkins is concerned I am unable to understand why he persists fanatically in his quest against religion. For the greater part he is preaching to the converted and he will never shift those who deal in Faith rather than in truth and falsity.”

There are a great many closeted aitheists and doubters in quite repressive religious communities. I think Dawkins and the other “new” atheists are doing a great service simply by being outspoken about aitheism, letting these folks know that they are not alone. I obviously cannot speak for Dawkins, but personally it doesn’t bother me much that most of the faithful aren’t going to be converted. What does bother me a great deal, though, is the much too widespread notion that religion should not be criticized, that it is somehow offensive to do so.

My feelings as well, Harald.

[...] the TPM site rather than here. One long-running thread of comments to a guest blog by Andy Walsh is here, and an essay by Russell Blackford here. Both about Dawkins and the so-called New Atheism. All good [...]

@Tony L

“What does consciousness add to our behaviour?”

Probably a pedestrian point, but is it enough to say that consciousness has evolved so that actions can become unconscious? That is, our ‘aim’ is for our skilled actions to become unconscious and automatic.

High-level conscious control is necessary to begin developing new skills. However the micro-management which consciousness allows us would seriously impair the acquisition of speed and automaticity of those same skills, should it not gradually be made redundant.

@Paul Hutton: “High-level conscious control is necessary to begin developing new skills.”

Would you say chimps need conscious control to learn how to get termites out of a nest, or crows to get grups out of a tree hole, or rats to get to the end of a maze more quickly? Do those creatures have consciousness? Is consciousness an on/off thing or a continuum?

I don’t have the answers but I suspect conscious control is not necessary to learn new skills, just a process for learning and a process for remembering. You could program a robot to keep trying a given task until it finds an efficient way of performing the task and then have it wire that process into low level instructions that it could execute any time the task was called for. I don’t think anyone would call it conscious.

== NOTE: serious waffle alert ==
My own personal *guess* is that consciousness is a combination of processing prior to deep storage (memory) and dreaming. 1) Let’s suppose that there is a part of the mammalian brain which pre-processes sensory inputs to stick them into memory. 2) In other creatures we see a form of dreaming where the brain replays (with the body connections mostly switched off) actions that have happened or rehearses new actions, perhaps in order to reinforce those actions in memory (so enhancing learning). 3) Let’s suppose that the brain reuses the sensory pre-processor to get the dreaming messages into memory. 4) Maybe the increasing complexity of the human brain required that dreaming happen, not only when asleep, but while awake. 5) The human is now getting what seems to be sensory information but from inside its own head. 6) This leads to a concept of self, consciousness etc.
== END waffle ==

@Tony L

Ah, fair point. Let’s change that to high-level conscious control being necessary for the development of high-level complex skills (such as those skills displayed by human beings and other creatures.)

I’d probably go for a continuum of consciousness but with an apparent qualitative shift in most human beings, attributable to the development of language, thought and internal dialogue.

A robot that could use language and communicate with itself about itself in order to achieve it’s goals would, I dare say, exhibit a degree of consiousnes.

Linking the development of consciousness to the development of dreaming makes intuitive sense, but I’m still unsure what you believe the function of consciousness might be (if it has one) apart from helping us plan and execute complicated actions which allow us to achieve our individual goals?

@Paul: “what you believe the function of consciousness might be”

I’m not sure it has one. It developed and we’re stuck with it. It has its drawbacks (eg the feeling of pain) but, without knowing what it might be like to be as intelligent as we are without consciousness, I cannot really say what benefits there might be to it. What do you think?

“What does bother me a great deal, though, is the much too widespread notion that religion should not be criticized, that it is somehow offensive to do so.”

And I find it a shame that I’m not supposed to discuss politics at the table. Welcome to America (assuming ya’ll in the usa).

If anything, my religious community is the only community, literally, that has willingly encouraged and embraced my desire to ask hard questions or to be skeptical about all sorts of things. In nearly every other public sphere of life, I meet with suppression and censorship daily.

I think your comment is similar to Dawkins view, which allows him to posit, irrationally, that atheists are on average more rational, skeptical, or freethinking, despite there being no evidence of this conclusion; wishful thinking I guess.

Sorry, I just can’t let the oppression topic go:

I mean seriously, do we have to hear about oppression from 4 old white dudes who have had the best educations money can buy and who also hold some great positions in the public sphere while having always professed their beliefs in atheism?

I realize it’s hard for you atheists to get elected to public office, but I find it hard to understand why: the general public knows no way of quickly assessing your morality without using shared symbolic gestures… and so they are leary. I’m not saying I agree with this, nor do I practice it, but come on, oppression?

No one is making you sit in the back of the bus, or preventing you from getting an education, or holding 99.9% of jobs in the world, or hell, even getting a raise.

*dont find it hard to understand why

A bit more. Let’s imagine a creature which evolved from the same immediate ancestor as humans, so we have Homo Sapiens Precursor, our intelligent ancestor, Homo Sapiens Conscious, us, and Homo Sapiens Unconscious which is like us but is not conscious. For this latter, let’s imagine (referring to my waffle above) that their brains developed a non-sensory pre-memory processor and all dreaming and in-brain thinking goes through that in order to get shunted off to memory. Both later subspecies have evolved along similar lines and now have the same levels of intelligence.

We have two individuals, C (conscious) and U (unconscious). Both can use tools, read and write, use language etc. We ask both a load of factual questions and get the same answers. We then show both a red apple and ask what it is. Both give the same answer, ‘a red apple’. Both might wax lyrical about the taste of apples they’ve eaten, about reading Snow White and being scared of the witch; they might compare the redness of the apple to a rose and remember romantic poetry.

The only difference, I would guess, between the two is that, on seeing the red apple, C has a conscious experience of appleness and redness and U does not. U does have the experience of redness and appleness but, since it happens in a non-sensory part of the brain, is unaware of it. U is unconscious of everything except direct sensory input, just as C is unaware of the signals from the brain to the heart to tell it to beat, to the lungs to tell them to breathe etc.

If asked about the experience of seeing the apple, U can recall the redness and appleness since those experiences have been stored in memory but will be unaware of them until hearing itself speak them.

Well, that is an attempt at Homo Sapiens Unconscious: I’m not sure it makes any sense though (conscious or otherwise).

Tom: Good for you. I am glad to hear there are religious communities that allow open-minded discussion. I am afraid it is somewhat unusual, however.

Though you don’t say it openly, I take your second paragraph as supporting the stance that criticism of religion is in fact offensive. If so, well, I am offended too.

Re your final paragraph, I am currently surrounded by people who are both deeply religious and deeply irrational. I guess that colours my outlook somewhat.

I think we should cut this little discussion short, though. This is a philosophy blog after all, and this is hardly philosophy. You can have the last word if you wish.

Harald,

I’ve attended many religious communities of various types throughout my life; I’ve found some welcoming of rationality and some not welcoming. I imagine a good survey would reveal that religious communities are no more likely to to be irrational than any other.

You reading of my second paragraph was off: As a religious believer myself, I am the first to call for criticism of religion; I don’t see how else I could better my community than by calling for criticism of everything involved with that community. My point in the paragraph was this: Most people shut down skepticism and questioning in conversations the majority of the time with no preference to subject. This is an unfortunate aspect of public life in the west and has nothing to do with religion. Seriously, try bringing questioning the average american why they believe x (let x be anything: their last vote or their views on the economic collapse).

Toward your comment on being surrounded by the religious and irrational: I tend to surround myself with intellectual who mostly tend to be atheists; I don’t find that they are any less irrational than anyone else. Some firm research on the rationality of atheists would go a long way, but Dawkins decides to proclaim his side is the only rational, freethinking, skeptical side, despite having any firm evidence to confirm this wishful thinking.

I agree: philosophy blog might not be the right place for this discussion; though I am mostly interested in the propaganda/communication side of Dawkins’ rhetoric.

No need for last words, the conversation always continues in one place or another.

Tom: Sorry I misinterpreted you. But the brevity of that paragraph made it almost inevitable.

@Tom

I’m not sure what you mean by rationality? Do you mean believing things on the basis of reason and evidence?

If one accepts that mainstream religous beliefs are false (or at least are not based on good reasoning or evidence) then it does not seem rational to continue to hold them.

We can hold the meaning of ‘rationality’ to include things like Faith in a Christian God if you like. But then I would like to see another word created to refer to a way of thinking that relies on reason and evidence alone.

Perhaps you wish believers to be classified as rational because you recognise the word has value. The word will lose it’s value if we extend it to believing things that are not true.

I would agree with you that people with Faith are more or less rational. However rationality is not an all or nothing thing. You may agree with me that the extent to which people believe things that are not true correlates closely with the extent to which they may be judged irrational.

@Tom: “Dawkins decides to proclaim his side is the only rational, freethinking, skeptical side, despite having any firm evidence to confirm this wishful thinking.”

Religious beliefs are irrational by definition: belief in entities which do not and could not exist and events which did not and could not happen is certainly irrational. Atheists do not hold such beliefs. Assuming the same level of rationality about other beliefs, it is obvious that religious people will be, on the whole, more irrational than atheists. In essence, Dawkins is correct.

@Tom L

I don’t believe it would be possible for an unconscious human being to engage in the behaviour you describe (using tools, developing language, reading and writing) without having what we refer to as consciousness.

What does it mean for C to have a conscious experience of an apple and U to, presumably, have a consciousless experience? What is an experience if it is not conscious? If U did not have an experience of the apple then I am unclear how she/he could function in the same way as C.

If the creature we have classified as unconscious had exactly the same experiences or abilities as the one labelled conscious then why would the issue of consciousness even matter? If it does matter then we would come close to knowing the benefits of this phenomena called consciousness!

I’m rambling - apologies!

Harald,

No thang, chicken wang. I’m glad we understand each other’s positions a little more now.

Paul,

“I’m not sure what you mean by rationality?”

I meant by it whatever Dawkins means, which is admittedly hard to tell most times. If we go with your definition of holding evidence, I don’t see any indication that atheists are more likely to hold views, even on religion (eg dawkins on religion), with evidence than anyone else on average.

I don’t hold that religious beliefs are false (or even could be), but are only symbolic, pure, plain, simple.

“We can hold the meaning of ‘rationality’ to include things like Faith in a Christian God if you like. But then I would like to see another word created to refer to a way of thinking that relies on reason and evidence alone.”

The etymological roots, if you’re into that sort of thing, for “faith” is by definition rational: using the evidence to commit oneself to the future of something or someone. The term was originally a hebrew legal term for signing down on a seller’s contract.

“Perhaps you wish believers to be classified as rational because you recognise the word has value. The word will lose it’s value if we extend it to believing things that are not true.”

Of course I think the word have value, but lets not pretend that things like questions or symbolic gestures can be true or false in any tradition sense.

“I would agree with you that people with Faith are more or less rational. However rationality is not an all or nothing thing. You may agree with me that the extent to which people believe things that are not true correlates closely with the extent to which they may be judged irrational.”

We mostly agree, but I see no difference between the rationality on average or the irrationality on average between a religious believer and an atheist. I’m willing to bet money that research firmly shows this. I’d like Dawkins to stop pretending its NOT a sliding scale; he pretends he’s got a monopoly on rationality, even despite his frequent trips to irrationality land (see comment to Tony L below).

Tony L,

“Religious beliefs are irrational by definition: belief in entities which do not and could not exist and events which did not and could not happen is certainly irrational. Atheists do not hold such beliefs. Assuming the same level of rationality about other beliefs, it is obvious that religious people will be, on the whole, more irrational than atheists. In essence, Dawkins is correct.”

*New atheists don’t hold such beliefs? What about those magical, unscientific, bodiless, eternal, omnipresent little memes that no one can find yet?*

Religious belief is not irrational by definition, it merely isn’t strictly logical; there’s a big difference.

@Tom

If you’re claiming that religious claims are symbolic and not literally true AND, all other things being equal, that people who treat religious claims this way should be classified as being of equivalent rationality as atheists or sceptics, then I find myself in agreement!

If you’re claiming, however, that people who firmly believe in the literal truth of traditional religous claims are, all other things being equal, equally as rational as either of the two groups above I would disagree.

Although I believe most people in this group would meet normative standards of rationality, (especially given most people are pretty religious!) I do not think they are as rational (if we accept being rational involves not believing things that are false).

@Paul: “What does it mean for C to have a conscious experience of an apple and U to, presumably, have a consciousless experience? What is an experience if it is not conscious?”

Maybe experience is the wrong word, since it is typically related to sensory perception. But you will admit that things happen in your brain of which you are not conscious: all the bits that go to make up visual perception and recognition, all of the autonomic nervous system etc. Most of what happens in the brain is unconscious. In my view, experiencing redness is simply the recall of things associated with the colour red: this recall is (in my waffle schema) routed through the ’sensory pre-processor’ and so the person is conscious of the redness experience. For U, there is no such sensory pre-processor and the redness ‘experience’ is conveyed into memory alongside the apple ‘experience’ goes into memory separately.

“I’m rambling - apologies!”

Not as much as I am trying to make sense of a non-conscious human :)

Paul,

Interesting, this suggestion that being rational involves not believing things that are false.

Bertrand Russell argued for the greater part of his philsophical career that material objects were logical constructions of sense data. was he (a) correct or (b) irrational? And if (b) then might we expect his irrationality to be part of his wider philosophical perspective (his atheism for example)?

Tom: As to your original point about atheists not being oppressed, I’m an atheist and I do not considered myself oppressed. I don’t live in the U.S., but as far as I can see, atheists are only oppressed in those societies, generally Muslim societies, which oppress all non in-group beliefs, that is not only atheists, but also Jews, agnostics, pantheists, deists, Buddhists, neo-pagans, etc. Many people like to consider themselves to be members of an oppressed group: a mindset that began in the 60’s during which rich university students decided that they were the new Third World and read Fanon and Che Guevara and studied guerrilla warfare. However, are the four big guns of oppressed atheism really “old”, as you claim? Oldish or mature, I would say.

@Andy

Touché! I should have stated that in more qualified terms as I originally tried to do.

At the risk of setting myself up for more falls, I certainly think false beliefs are correlated with judgements of irrationality, rightly or wrongly. Perhaps this is because false beliefs are more likely to arise when people are less inclined to make judgements on the basis of available evidence and reason, and more inclined to make their judgements on the basis of Faith in the traditional Christian God (for example)?

Perhaps we do need some new terms to describe judgements made on evidence and reason and judgements made on evidence, reason and Faith. Surely there is a difference, for better or worse, between the reasoning of those who refuse to let Faith enter their judgements and those who base their lives on it?

Paul,

“that people who firmly believe in the literal truth of traditional religous claims are”

People think they know the status of all sorts of things they believe (ie that their beliefs are literally). When it comes down to it, I don’t subscribe to any literal/symbolic distinction per se (something more akin to a spectrum). Some scientific research fleshes out the “symbolic” or “non-logical” nature of religious beliefs; believing in memes also fits the bill, in my opinion.

In the end, we are mostly in agreement. Yet, I’m religious (Christian) and you’re not, funny eh?

“Although I believe most people in this group would meet normative standards of rationality, (especially given most people are pretty religious!) I do not think they are as rational (if we accept being rational involves not believing things that are false)”

Here: Even if I grant you for a moment that religion is way irrational on all levels, it doesn’t follow that atheists are any more rational just because they’ve dumped religion. In fact, some research suggests they are more likely to hold superstitious beliefs and practice alternative “medicine”. My opinion: get rid of religion, and it just pops up somewhere else. I’d love to see research confirming that atheists are on average more rational, because I see no indication that they are, even about their own atheism.

Also,

“Perhaps we do need some new terms to describe judgements made on evidence and reason and judgements made on evidence, reason and Faith. Surely there is a difference, for better or worse, between the reasoning of those who refuse to let Faith enter their judgements and those who base their lives on it?”

Who doesn’t have some sort of faith in their judgements? Where will we draw the line on faith, at religious belief, statements to one’s spouse, the soccer player who doesn’t do the straight physics on paper before kicking the ball?

Why purge judgement of faith-commitments? Is such a thing even possible?

Amos,

“I’m an atheist and I do not considered myself oppressed.”

I’m very glad for this

“atheists are only oppressed in those societies, generally Muslim societies, which oppress all non in-group beliefs, that is not only atheists, but also Jews, agnostics, pantheists, deists, Buddhists, neo-pagans, etc”

Do you research that confirms your perception? To be fair, you do begin the sentence with a qualifier indicating that it may just be your intuitive perception, but for me to buy it, I need to see something firmer.

“However, are the four big guns of oppressed atheism really “old”, as you claim? Oldish or mature, I would say.”

When I said old, I was mostly thinking about the age of 3 of its members. Their cries of oppression are tacky, obvious, and irrational. The new atheists seem more interested in generating propaganda than providing any intellectual contribution to the discussion of religion that the rest of us are having.

Re Tom 3rd Jan
“Survey the literature and you’ll see, the theory is a joke and has been largely discarded by science and the humanities.”

It seems to me that Meme theory is just a method of categorising certain Human, and maybe Animal, behaviour patterns. Additionally it makes some attempt to suggest how such patterns became installed. It is an interesting theory but I am not convinced that it is of great value scientifically. I seem to have missed out on the Literature suggesting it is a joke and is now discarded by the science and the Humanities. Perhaps you would be kind enough to provide your sources in this connection.

Don,

Check out Sperber, Boyer, Atran, Deacon. There are others. No one, aside from Dawkins and Dennet, bother with the theory any more and it has mostly fallen out of favor due to it’s inability to offer any explanatory insight, or even any definition of what a meme is.

“Additionally it makes some attempt to suggest how such patterns became installed”

I don’t think anything is installed in the brain.

Tom: I’m not an expert on the status of atheists worldwhile. From reading the media, I see that atheists, as well as other non-Muslims and gays, are persecuted in at least some Muslim societies. My experience in the U.S. is mostly limited to the New York metropolitan area, so I have little information on the situation of atheists in the so-called Bible belt. In my personal life, I have never felt persecuted as an atheist, although I don’t go around announcing my lack of religious belief to everyone I run into. However, I have many beliefs and opinions that might not win me friends in mainstream society, and I have no problem keeping those beliefs and opinions as well as my atheism to myself: I don’t see the fact that it would not be prudent to announce my lack of religious belief as a form of persecution. I imagine that most thinking or thoughtful people, be they religious or not, have beliefs and opinions which differ from those of the masses and which they reserve for close friends or keep to themselves.

My remark about the age of the top-guns of atheism is an unsuccessful attempt at humor, since I am in my 60’s myself.

Tom: One more point. Give that atheism is the official ideology in China and Cuba and was that of the Soviet Union, it is difficult to sustain that atheism per se is a sign of rational thought.

As I see it Consciousness confers survival value and is a product of the evolutionary process. There is however a great problem in that it is a late starter to the behaviour with which it is associated. Most proposals as to the function of consciousness ignore the fact that the bodily actions are discharged before consciousness comes into play. These two functions, action and consciousness, are separated by a few hundreds of milliseconds with action leading.
This of course ramifies into the question of free will which will not be elaborated on here. So if we are in fact acting before we consciously decide so to do what is the value at all of consciousness? It has been suggested that it is something in the nature of a late error detector. In the simulated real world of perceptual experience there is a constant input of data resulting in the comparison of variables gathered in from the different unconscious neural mechanisms and from all the sensory modalities. The neural processing for all this exceeds that needed to complete a bodily action, which could explain why action and consciousness are not quite simultaneous.

We might now consider a tennis player who has just received a service at say 130 MPH. He just gets his racquet to the ball but it is wide and he miss hits it. A few hundred milliseconds after this action the neural processing for consciousness is complete and he realises that when his opponent stands in a certain way to serve it is likely the ball will be say wide to the forehand. He is then alerted that on seeing this he should be ready to move further out when the ball is served in a certain way. It seems that consciousness allows us to evaluate rapidly what has already happened at the unconscious level and to make some sort of preparation to deal with future similar events.

I have scarcely done this subject justice no more than scratched the surface in fact, and maybe not as accurately as I would wish to do elsewhere. However it does seem to be one view concerning the purpose of consciousness and how it might work in certain circumstances.

I am not sure how the problems with Dawkins has generated all this but here it is for what it is worth.

@Andy

Still waiting for that concise summary of your argument for us hard of thinking types.

Tom Re: “I don’t think anything is installed in the brain”.

I am not sure what you mean by this statement Could you clarify please. Thanks also for the sources.

You don’t have to be an atheist to see that Dawkins’ central argument fails miserably. I’m an atheist and I regularly rebut Dawkins on my blog. See, for example, my article Richard Dawkins and Naive Atheism.

I guess I shouldn’t be surprised that a Dawkins-themed post has received so many responses but still…!

Nothing I can add except (and someone else may well have said this but I can’t be bothered scrolling through to check, frankly):

@ Tom post no. 9

‘Can we please stop talking about memes: Dawkins and Dennett are about the last pseudoscientists to take the theory seriously at any level.’

Dennett is a philosopher who argues from a philosophical position. Dawkins, regardless of what people think about his forays into philosophy in TGD (and though I do agree there are plenty more insightful philosophical introductions to atheism, I do also think TGD is a great, and clearly effective, debate-stimulus and introduction to a subject, as well as being an engaging read), he is hardly a ‘pseudo-scientist’: he’s one of the world’s foremost evolutionary biologists for God’s sake, having published many highly-regarded popular books over decades as well as being a highly-respected Oxford Professor of the subject.

Question his knowledge of philosophy, theology (and the relevance of the latter), or his approach to the atheism fine, but don’t resort to clearly ridiculous name-calling.

Incidentally I wasn’t aware memes were a full-blown theory: are they not useful analogies between biological evolution and the transmission and mutation of cultural ideas (and how they can persist and change by being useful without necessarily being true)?

I disagree w Dawkins on a number of (mostly minor) points, but I very much agree w him on t issue of theists having gone a thought too far w their God hypothisis.

Honestly I did not understand much of what you were stating Andy but I am pretty sure you stated that Dawkins was wrong on this.

It is reasonably posible ( tho by no means probable or likely) that belief in t God hypothisis leads to a more fulfilling life or that it causes one to behave better towards his fellow man. That does nothing tho to make any belief in any supernatural anything (t God hypothosis) any more true or likely.

It is posible (and imposible to disprove) that t reason we don’t all fly into space is because of undetectable magical fairies holding us down. I donot tho believe it to be at all likely and so I think it rational to be an afairiest as well as an atheist. I think it is irational to think otherwise.

Questions involving consiosness aside, I think it realy is as simple as that.

@babrock

We can agree that there is, in our universe, no such thing as “magical fairies”. Another way of putting this is: there is some possible world in which magical fairies exist but that world is not this one.

Now: you want to treat the God hypothesis in exactly this way (otherwise you wouldn’t have introduced the analogy). So, presumably, you therefore want to say that there is some possible world in which God exists: just not this one.

But this makes no sense, since if God exists in one possible world then he must exist in all of them.

Do you wish to commit to all that? If not, then you might want to rethink the God/magical fairies analogy.

Or perhaps I’ve misunderstood you?

Dave JL,

if your still around:

What I meant was that Dawkins and Dennett are pseudoscientists in regards to memetics. The theory is total BS, but Dawkins and Dennett insist on it; I’m not totally sure why they are so in love with it.

Memetics is an analogy and a very poor and misleading one at that, it offers no explanatory insight and has been discarded by just about everyone, except those ol’ propagandists Dawkins and Dennett.

@Andy: “We can agree that there is, in our universe, no such thing as “magical fairies”. Another way of putting this is: there is some possible world in which magical fairies exist but that world is not this one.”

How do you know there is some possible world where fairies exist? I see no relation at all between the two statements.

@Tony

I was expecting that.

Contemporary modal logic exploits what they call “possible world semantics” in order to make sense of the concepts of possibility and necessity. To be possible is to be true in some possible world; to be necessary is to be true in all possible worlds. This is the current state of play when it comes to making sense of those concepts. David Lewis has argued (very persuasively in my view) that the debate carries with it a commitment to realism with respect to those worlds.

I am happy to concede that my previous post buys into the above.

@Andy: “I was expecting that.”

Getting predictable, am I?

You could turn the argument around and say that, since your omnipresent god does not exist in this world, it also cannot exist in any possible world. Which makes sense.

Well obviously I’m not going to grant you your major premise Tony.

For your argument to succeedd you need to do more than simply assert His non-existence. What you need is a demonstration that the concept of God (as necessary etc) is not a well formed one (as if it is, given the assumptions of modal logic as set out above then I can happily assert He exists in some possible world: and hence in all of them).

I’m more than happy to return the burden of proof here..:-)

@Andy

I get the idea that your concept of god-stuff is little more than wordplay to you. You define it in such a way that it has to exist but shy away from giving it any relation to the physical world or any relevance to human existence. What is the point in believing in something like that?

You’re quite right in that there would be no point in believing something like that. But that’s not the position I find myself in. I suspect that if I were to have, for example, affirmed my belief that divine command morality was preferable to its alternatives you might (rightly) have taken me to task for straying off topic.

For the record, though, I assent to the following: that (i) the God as tradionally described who is the object of the Five Ways is real; that (ii) His existence is discoverable, if not demonstrable, via the use of reason; that (iii) the physical world exists but that the essence of its existence is that it is perceived and that the concept of matter stripped of sensible qualities is incoherent; that (iv) science is the best distillation of human reason we have at any given time but that scientific explanation is only one form, and not THE form, of explanation; and that (v) contemporary modal reconstructions of Anselm’s proof are subtle, arresting and difficult to resist.

It’s tricky, however, to condense all that into a single blogpost. Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must leave it to the common sense of the reader….

Actualy, I am not conceeding that fairies donot exist in this world, only that I think it to be extreemly unlikely and imposible to disprove. I see t situation w “god” to be t same.

I can imagine this sounds like I am splitting hairs in an intentionaly argumentive manner, but that is not at all my intention.

I readily admit that it is posible that there is some type of god. Apearently this god wants to be undetectable as it would be so easy to have provided some evidence that it exists or effects things somehow, but instead we percieve a universe that acts as it would if it were just t naturalistic materialistic one not effected by anything supernateral.

I believe t exact same thing can be said about undetectable supernatural fairies. I think both are about as likely in this world or another.

I think that Dawkins is corect in maintaning that theists are if not wrong then guilty of a thought too far, as you put so well. I know that there are theists who focus on that they do not know god. Almost invariably tho all t theists I encounter insist that they are confident and certain that god (their god, at that) does exist. These theists, as are most theists, are guilty of unfounded asumptions.

@Andy

Wow! No wonder you dismiss Dawkins. But Dawkins is not aiming his book at you and other philosophers and theologians. He is aiming it at people who believe in a god-thing that created the world (universe? galaxy?) in six days only 6000 years ago, created all species exactly as they are now, created homo sapiens and gave us dominion over all animals etc.

All these simple beliefs are easily disprovable and it is this that Dawkins sets out to do. It is all the silly stuff in the Bible that he wants to demonstrate as silly. If people stopped believing in all the supernatural mumbo-jumbo that occurs in all the holy books, religion would probably wither away within a couple of generations. This, I think, is Dawkins’ aim.

Another point; If one defines “god” in a certain way then it is more likely to exist. I have heard definitions of god that sound to me to basicly just amount to t concept of god.

If god is defined as such then sure this god exists. Generaly tho when god is mentioned it is meant to refer to a powerful supernateral entity.

Except as a mere concept again, I donot think that anything exists that is above or outside of nature. T universe or multiverse, whatever is aleady beyond or abilty to comprehend except only very partialy. I donot necessarily have suporting evidence for this. I am just aserting it. Anyway, this is t “god”. That almost everyone believes in. And this is precisly what there is insuficient evidence to believe in.

There is a word for people, unlike theists and atheist, who maintain that not only can we not know, but that we connot even understand t question. Ignotheists might be it.

Re: Posted by Andy Walsh | January 9, 2010, 7:29 am

Can this matter be considered if we attend to which Universe of Discourse we inhabit in a discussion? For instance,in a discussion within the universe if Fairies it is the case that these creatures are diminutive live among plants and can do magic. I do not think there is much dispute about that. Similarly in the Universe of discourse which embraces Sherlock Holmes we would agree that it is the case he was unmarried had a brother called Mycroft, and kept bees in his retirement. In the Universes of Discourse embracing on the one hand fairies, and Holmes on the other, it seems possible that these creatures could also exist in the universe of Discourse which is the current appreciation of what Humans call reality. However we now have to consider what is the probability that fairies do in fact inhabit this latter Universe and this I would estimate, boarders on 0 The same goes in my opinion for God. 0 here, stands for complete disbelief and as such this stance surely closes all doors to any consideration of a contrary viewpoint which in my opinion is unscientific. It is for this reason I feel unable to declare my self as no more than bordering on atheism. I am not familiar with Davis Lewis’ argument concerning the commitment to realism in other worlds. Can it be found in his ‘On the Plurality of Worlds’, which I regret to confess has stood on my bookcase for a considerable time unread?

I may well be missing something, but my primary, if not only, intention in bringing up t fairy comparison is that they are supernatural and therefor imposible to disprove. Every bit of evidence presented for them being unecesary or not there or whatever can be explained by them being supernaturaly undetectable.

I accept that t concept of fairies and god exists, but I think neither is at all neccesary or at all probable.

And I think that theists, in maintaining that a supernatural god does exist, have no more right to do so, than for one to maintain t existence of fairies.

And while I donot think that Dawkins is inerently infailable, I concur w him that theists have gone “a thought too far” in maintaining that they have suficient reason to maintain that this god exists. Any god, other than a god defined simple as a mere concept, doesnot have much evidence backing up its existence.

Theists, often, at least, hold this as a virtue, in fact. They take pride in t fact that their belifs are based on faith rather than evidence. Maybe I am being narrow minded, but I have trouble in not seeing any rational person to see faith as irational exept in certain instances.

@babcock

Thanks for the clarification. I think the difference with the concept of God is that it includes the attribute of “necessity”. If He exists then He does so necessarily. If fairies exist they do so merely as a matter of contingent fact. Therefore existential claims about God and similar claims about fairies have different, I don’t know, “grammars” I suppose. The argument is “a priori”: the theist who buys into it will not be looking to evidential features of the world to back up his belief.

@Don.

yes it’s all in there. It’s also to be found in his book on counterfactuals.

Hope you all have a good evening

I came to this magazine thru t Dawkins site and t Blackford artical and I have enjoyed and apreciated everytthing here quite a lot, including our exchang here, so I thank you.

I cannot say tho that I understood much of your last post. And to t extent that I did, I donot see much difference between what you are saying and what I said about theists taking pride and seeing t virtue in how they come to their positions thru faith rather than rationality.

Faith is belief w/o suficient evidence and reason and so as someone who values reason and rationality I do not value this type of faith at all. I see it as wrong in a number of ways as a matter of fact.

Again, quite likely I misunderstood you. I have read most of t works of t “new atheists” but it has been decades since I was involved in academia. And so plenty of t ideas and concepts you mention, I am unfamiliar w. I apreciate you introducing me to them none t less.

Are you saying that a god defined more broadly and loosly is more likely than an entity defined more precisly and specificly? I am ok w that, but otherwise I donot see t distinction. Other people, in fact, from other cultures in other times, acualy belived in fairies and animist spirits and such rather than what we would call a god, I think.

Andy: Back at 12:20 Tony suggests that your concept of God is only “word-play”. I’m sure that God means more than up-dated versions of the ontological argument to you, but you never answered Tony. What does God mean to you in real life, outside of modal logic? As others have said, the ontological argument is hard to counter, but it is doubtful that it has ever convinced anyone of God’s existence or non-existence.

God, defined as a concept, a concept of perfection to be strived for, or whatever, is not what most of us anti theists are struggling against particularly. I think,t major problem w a concept of god as a mere concept is that it provides cover for a more literal concept of god and is often used to obfuscate literalists position.

In t real world. this literalist take on god is t position that has t most influece, that impede progress, and that causes wars and intolerence of variose types. I live and work w theists. That they use scripture as an excuse for homaphobia is just one small example of it causing bad behavior.

Theists only charctorize their god as anyting other than a literal entity, that regularly performs miracles, when they are engaged in a conversation w skeptics. Imediatly afterwards they return to charactorising him (and it is always a him) as their miracal working sky daddy. This is wrong in ways too numorous to mention.

This is t god that most theists believe in and this is t god that most of us antitheist are arguing against.

I came to this particular blog later and the participants have all said their pieces and moved on. Having attempted to read all the contributions I cannot come to any grand overarching view of it all. I do have a view which may contribute to a slightly different stance on what has been said.
Darwin’s beautiful book on The origin of Species, is packed with facts and we are led to the conclusions of change variety and adaptation. Taken together they lead us to a view on the origins of species that does not point to them being created.
Dawkins in his books prior to the badly concocted anti religion outburst has presented his case for Natural Selection. Obviously to many the undermining of the work of the divine creator cannot be allowed to stand. Genetics as the working out of the machinery that God “set” up and the biochemistry of the processes can lead one to a reverence for the very complexity of how it all works. I feel as moved by its complexity and machinery as I do listening to a piece of music like Bach’s mass, or listening to and being transported by the peace and tranquility of a Cistercian monastry. One might argue that awe and reverence are not part of biological facts - yet they surely are. Whether one wants to follow those like Teilhard De chardin is perhaps another matter. There is order in the world around and how one wants to orientate to it is part of that order (we can assume here consciousness as a form of mechanism and this compatible with free will,( having slipped all that in, we can proceed)). God is one way and science as a point of orientation is another and for me there is no real substantial difference, so that I have to exclusively choose one as opposed to another. Some would call that Pantheism Unfortunately Dawkins does ,draw a sharp line between God and the findings of science and does so, in order to proceed with the mechanistic enquiry as if rationality is identified with scientific enquiry as opposed to looking at and seeking a way of orientating ourselves in the world and to what we find there - which can involve a different level or sort of rationality (how many types are there anyone)?
Scientific enquiry is enquiry in the workings of the world that we may ascribe to a creator of an order through processes that reason, (as scientific procedure), can discern. A creator is then involved in a causal process. I recall it being said we do not understand causation, apart from some Humean constant conjunction, ( J.L Mackie came up with a useful characterisation of causation). But we do get beyond constant conjunction into mechanism and at one level we all understand causation ,otherwise we end up in the sort of world that people with dementia end up in - a fall apart jumble, world, where something like how to make a cup of tea becomes a goal that has associations rather than a causal structure.
If we want to turn the causal type of enquiry onto God then things change and God becomes a Rylean ghost in the machine. We fall into a hole straight away if God is to be an entity in the same causal chain that we want to attribute to his powers - we are forced to ask - “Which bit of the world is he in”? If we want a Deity then Dawkins is on firmer ground because he only wants mechanism of the world. We can then ask of the Deity how can “he” do X Y Z. and also transcend the causal order he was thought to be behind? He needs to be in the world but not of it.
Yet perhaps it is the seemingly silly questions that question his very possibility that (perhaps), carry us into a different enquiry. Particular things crop up, such as how can he read the thoughts of literally billions of people at the same time in order to be in touch with us and we with him - we may associate this with a massive computer. Or - “How can thought and identity be maintained in independence of a physical instantiation? God starts to get a bit Star Treck like, but these are questions which have almost a pedestrian nature when we peer into the realms of cosmology. We are told that much of the universe is incomprehensible as dark matter and energy - “we” (?), might find some sort of answer there. However we may not understand it at all in terms of the causal mechanism that Dawkins believes are the only sort of answers there are to be had, such that God vanishes.

Jonathan

thank you for the thought provoking post. Are you familiar with John Foster’s The Divine Lawmaker? In that he argues from a view of causation as necessarily instantiating the regularites that Hume describes to the conclusion that these regularities must be imposed by a God whose character is personal and in keeping with the Judeo-Christian tradition.

I wonder if Foster and Dawkins move in overlapping Oxford circles: that’d be a match up worth watching….

Thank you for your reply. I have not read the work you mention. I am however intrigued as to how he connects an impersonal natural order with a personal God. The phrase “a personal God”, can be taken at least two ways - one, that each person has his own personal God - another is that of a God as an entity with characteristics that are akin (whatever that might be) to human beings? The latter makes him a something other than what the former seems to make “him”, namely a personal construct. Must read the book.

Jonathan.

Personal in the second sense: it is our status as reasoning beings that we owe to His character.

Of course, for a Berkleian like Foster the universe we share is not “impersonal”: though I think it fair to say that this is a conclusion, rather than a premise, of his argument.

Andy
Any reintroduction of Idealism sounds good to me. Cosmologists reach for a theory of everything and hence (?) everything must be connected - or a manifestation of the functioning of the basic principles and elements.and (more ‘hences’) So - why not philosophy again? Come back Hegel and Bradley. Empiricism ‘dropped’ the difficulties that an absolute philosophy embraced as its necessary task - of showing the connectedness of things and our necessary transcendence. All we see is our effects on material objects we do not “see” our effects on matter. A God could be composed of matter and not be a material object? Am I on the right lines, or completely off the track. Will read the book and cease this blog henceforth. Thank you for your patience Andy.

So much talk of causation. What if it is only a human construct, and not part of the natural world outside of the human mind? Is it merely a human device, a prerequisite to perception, a condition of the mind, as Hume suggested, the best way our limited cognitive processes have of making sense of the environment and serving our survival? Additionally we see the world as a deterministic process i.e. there are beginnings and ends. The reason being that our dull routines of daily life and the tacit assumptions we make, i.e. there are starts and stops, are unjustifiably extended to ultimate explanations. If this has any plausibility at all the problem still remains that causation unjustifiably constantly singles out two events from what is a continuous dynamic non-deterministic process. We can as human beings only abstract and observe bits of The world at any one time. Out of this we judge that abstraction A causes abstraction B. This is OK within limits, and works reasonably satisfactorily in science. How ever to assume that what we observe in these small interactions is what happens in the whole vastness or reality is to commit the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness (Refer Wiki here if necessary); it is like reading the menu and thinking that it is the meal. All of this ramifies into the problem of Induction, Which A. N. Whitehead described as the despair of philosophy-and yet all our activities are based upon it, Science and The Modern World p.23.

So where does God fit in to all this if it is the case that appearance and reality are so different? Is he again a human construct with no existence in reality or at best something we can never do more than hopefully anticipate? On the assumption that there is some overarching power behind all this the only aspect I am inclined to dispute is that it would be concerned with the actions of human beings. The anthropocentric viewpoint is a fallacy we are of no importance, we evolved and doubtless will in time change radically or cease to exist, especially if by our own stupidity, we wipe ourselves from the face of the planet.

Thanks Andy, this has been a fun ride. I would like to pick up a question presented by Tony and followed up on by Amos. Is your argument against Dawkins and the like an ontological one? I’ve always thought the ontological argument was “fun”, but it does seem like wordplay to me as well. You’ve presented arguments for a number of things that seem to credit you with a deep understanding of those things, and I would really like to hear an ontological argument that doesn’t come off as just an antiquated word game. I have faith that you could provide something of interest here.

Also, (and this might go a long way in explaining my lack of understanding of a lot of the arguments presented here), but this is the first time I’ve ever read such lambasting of Dennett. I thought his book on Consciousness was a rather satisfying read. Granted, I’ve not studied any of this at the university level, but I was under the impression that he garnered a decent amount of respect in the philosophic community. Anyways, that’s just a point of curiosity on my part and would like to be referred to literature that might be “anti”-Dennett (whatever that might mean) that’s also accessible to a layperson.

An interesting article and debate, but you are using an escape that is not really open to you. Davidson’s anomalous monism, although still clinging gamely on in academic philosophy of mind, does so almost entirely through the complexity of the problem of consciousness, rather than because of any inherent explanatory power that the explanation itself posesses. More and more and more the evidence suggests that we cannot have our cake and eat it, and that there is no independence of our subjective consciousness from brain events (as there was never really going to be). Anomalous monism is to dualism what Intelligent Design is to creationism, an attempt to formulate the same old ideas in greater complexity to deal with increasing swathes of negative evidence. It will not be a valid position to take for much longer (if it even is now), and therefore neither will your attacks on Dawkins.

On January 1 Andy Walsh said, “I am interested to know which theological claim would count as ‘demonstrably’ false…” I taught Sunday School and I found that saying something “very probably” false (like that Jesus rose from the dead) was so problematic that logical demonstration didn’t matter. I was still taking advantage of seventh-graders’ readiness to believe without testing, putting my authority behind their credulousness. I was teaching credulousness. This was in the Midwest, the Heartland, where the electorate’s readiness to believe President Bush’s statements about threats from Iraq had such dire consequences. I had to ask whether it was a coincidence that the region labeled by some British periodical (I think it was The Economist) “Jesus Land” after the election was also the region that carried Bush to victory for a second term.
I’m not sure about the transfer of credulousness from one sphere to another but I think that what would have saved us was what Dawkins essentially stands for, careful testing to determine if claims are reliable. Can we build on what they provide, calling it knowledge? I hear him speaking for all scientists. And I can’t help carrying what he says back into religion, into assessment of statements made in Scripture, or, perforce, by a congregation, whether you call them “theological” or not.

Posted by H. R. Swardson

Andy,

Why do you think Plantinga’s argument works when it comes to proving God, but not when it comes to, say, proving that there’s a six-foot tall rabbit standing right in front of me? Please tell me where I go wrong here…

1. It is proposed that a being has maximal awesomeness in a given possible world W if and only if it is a rabbit, six feet tall and standing right in front of me in W; and
2. It is proposed that a being has maximal superawesomeness if it has maximal awesomeness in every possible world.
3. Maximal superawesomeness is possibly exemplified. That is, it is possible that there be a being that has maximal superawesomeness. (Premise)
4. Therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that a six-foot tall rabbit is standing right in front of me.
5. Therefore, it is necessarily true that a six-foot tall rabbit is standing right in front of me. (By S5)
6. Therefore, a six-foot tall rabbit is standing right in front of me.

I would suggest to the believer, particularly the Christian believer, that she read Kierkegaard, ponder the leap of faith, and eschew dependence on rationality.

Thus armed, she might profit by soldiering through Nietzsche’s take on the historical development of monotheism.

If this works for her, no argument for or against belief will matter.

Personally, I’m opposed to proselytizing by either side. What you believe is a matter of indifference unless you try to convert me or unless you pose a danger to society—which the militant, fundamentalist monotheist certainly does.

And the militant atheist doesn’t.

[...] Here, it seems to me, is a particularly odd variation on this rhetorical strategy, kind of slurring Dawkins as a positivist, and enlisting philosopher Donald Davidson’s theory of anomalous monism to do some coloring on this idea. [...]

Dawkins’ use of the word delusion is, in its most charitable light, idiomatic. Any person who believes they can construct a meaningful Argument for the truth using idioms is, by definition, delusional.
I believe it is listed in the DSM as “Grandiose Delusion Disorder”.

I know however for a fact, apparently unlike Dawkins, that I am not a psychiatrist, and I am therefore unqualified to make any such diagnosis.

Dawkins is, simply put, the Jimmi Swaggert of Science.

Only his Belief is different. The unthinking argumentation of That Which Must Be and That Which Cannot Possibly Be are just as embarrassing as JS, only on the opposite side..

Other than that they both have positions they are arguing in favor of I donot see much similarity.

Swagert argues that his position should be accepted on faith. Not only is this practice allowed but it is encouraged. Usually it is considered virtuous to believe things on mere faith.

Dawkins is arguing for scientfic materialism. Things happen because they have a physical cause. We can gain knowledge of this cause and effect relationship thru investigation and the scientific method. Using this method knowledge is gained thru using evidence rationality and reason.

If for no other reason coming to know of things via Swagarts faith based methods has been shown to be inferior to t scientific method from their prospective track records and their ability to predict outcomes.

Swaggert is arguing that we should believe a number of things on faith. Dawkins is arguing that we should believe what reason indicates.

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