I understand that there is a certain role that one should take on when examining thought experiments. However, I find that I’ve begun to worry about the boundary between the personal ethics from which most people will work and the ethics that comes to be used to decide how a government and its laws should operate.

I also find a great temptation to fudge when questions start using words like “should”. Of course, this is a traditional word for discussing ethics, but it doesn’t seem to make obvious the legal obligations that this word might imply.

In particular, this questionnaire first asks (among other things) whether one should act if they can prevent harm. Well, how legally obligated should a person be to act to prevent harm when they have no authority or expertise appropriate to the situation. Well, thought experiments often throw in some given condition of what is known about a situation, but such givens are generally omitted from the general case and are often well outside the scope of a real situation.

For example, in the first of the thought experiments, the driver of a trolley faces such a choice, but in the later thought experiment the actor is a bystander. These are clearly different with regard to both authority and expertise.

In the third and final example, the case of torture is presented, and we can see that we are no longer discussing an action that should be taken by an individual. Here we have clearly left the realm of personal ethics and entered into law and government policy (not to mention politics and diplomacy). The manner in which the case is presented provides a strong temptation to allow a large gray area of latitude. However, where we might allow an individual with a small circle of influence (and a very brief time for making a decision) a fair amount of latitude, the rules and boundaries for a government should be much more clearly established and enforced.

But then, it seems that thought experiments are much better at introducing a dilemma rather than presenting much in the way of concrete solutions.

I wonder if you would find different results to the problem if the fat man were replaced by
a small child or by a beautiful youth (you fill in the sex according to your preference).

My Moral consistency was 100%. I feel strongly that in a real life situation as opposed to sitting in my comfortable chair before the computer I may well have acted otherwise and most likely exhibited moral inconsistency. I was rightly or wrongly, for the purposes of the exercise, trying to be consistent, and I suppose in theory I was, but faced with all the brute facts of any situation and the fact that so often there is little or no time to think one cannot really predict what one would do. Would I hurl my self on top of the grenade due to explode in 3 seconds in order to shield my men? I really don’t know. Maybe I would hurl one of them on top. I hope not, but again I cannot say.

I’m with Mr. Bird @ 100%. I also agree that if confronted with the actual situation, I would have a hard time (morally) pushing the fat man off, but given the time to ponder it, it seems like the best solution to the problem. I would not fault anyone for coming to a different conclusion. I would think that in the given situation, many individuals would react differently given any individual’s multitude of possible moods, recent experiences, etc. on either a conscious or unconscious level. In a real situation, the fat guy could remind one of a dear uncle or of some long forgotten SOB who tortured one in the 3rd grade. These sort of philosophical questions remind me of the adage that a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of weak minds.

Oh yeah…also what TESSERID said…

Why doesn’t the fat guy throw himself onto the tracks to save the people? Is it not his decision in the first place rather than ours?

The analysis totally ignores the “clean hands” argument. If I am the train driver, then I have to act and should act to reduce the number of dead people. If I am standing on the bridge, it is another story. I demand my 100 points!

Thanks guys.

Just quickly:

@Tesserid - Well the activity isn’t asking about public policy, and even though there are clearly public policy concerns with something like the torture example - it is still possible to come to some moral determination.

@Amos - that’s an interesting thought. Less people in favour of torture if the bomber is more sympathetic a character…

@Don and WTP - yes, this is not at all about what people would do. It is about our - reflective - judgement about what it is right do do. Of course we might take thoughts about what people are likely to do into account when we come to that judgement.

@Douglas - I think normally we wouldn’t think there’s a moral requirement to sacrifice our own lives to save the lives of other people (though we would consider such an action admirable - and there are circumstances where we might see it as a requirement).

John E - yeah, I don’t buy the “clean hands” thing at all. But there is another page of analysis which I’m going to add - where I’ll mention it’s the Trolley Problem! - and I’ll talk about that.

I think the whole trolley problem, not just the torture issue, is distorted by the use of a fat man as the one who will die. Let’s try:

1. obese man
2. heavy-set man
3. plump woman
4. beautiful naked 16 year-old girl or boy.
5. 10 year old child
6. new-born baby
7. pregnant woman

My reactions are bit different in each case, and I suspect that most people’s reactions are. There are a lot of people who have negative reactions to “fat” and thus, would be more likely to sacrifice a fat man than a heavy-set one. So, we’re not talking about the value of one life in relation to five lives, but the life of a fat man, instead of the life of a beautiful naked 16 year-old youth.

I might program that variation into it - and see what we get.

I’m not convinced you’re right. Most people don’t think the fat man should be pushed onto the track.

Maybe most people who take your quiz are more capable of seeing the fat man as an abstract human life than I am. I have trouble seeing abstract human beings anywhere. I would push the fat man (not because I hate fat people, but because it would save more lives), but I wouldn’t push a child or a beautiful, naked youth.

There is a difference between killing someone evil in self-defence, or to defend others, and torture. The former is justified and not damaging to the character of the defender. The latter is more ambiguous. If it is a case of approving torture of one individual to save many it appears justified, especially if someone else does it. However, if the choice is: you do it, who would be willing to do it and what affect would that action have on the person who did it, no matter how justified it appeared.

Another variation I would like to see is upping the stakes on the torture question. The bomb-setter is a super-spartan, known to be immune to torture. However he is a devoted family man. Do you torture his wife and children (who are not complicit in his bomb-setting) in front of him, to make him spill the beans?

I know it’s a thought experiment, but…

I have a very hard time believing that someone on a footbridge would know to any degree of certainty that pushing the fat man who’s standing next to him off the bridge would do anything to stop the train.

I have a very hard time accepting that there is a “75% chance” that the fat man will give up the correct location of the bomb if he is tortured, given the general lack of evidence that torture is in any way effective in coercing accurate confessions.

Okay quickly again:

@Anne - Way too dogmatic there. First you can’t be certain that self-defence, etc., won’t be damaging to the character of the defender; and equally, you can’t be sure that torturing somebody will damage the torturer (unless it’s just a definitional point).

@Delmot - Yes that would be interesting, and very Jack Bauerish.

@Ben - Yes, but in a thought experiment the fact that one finds something implausible is only relevant if it in some way undermines the logic of the thing: particularly, if it means that the thought experiment won’t elucidate what we hope it will elucidate. But that isn’t the case here (so, for example, there is no suggestion that torture would ever be acceptalbe in practice - though of course it’s not ruled out either).

And FWIW, I think the “Oh there’s no evidence torture works” is a very bad argument against torture.

Does torture work? I live in Chile. At least half the adult males whom I know were tortured during the Pinochet dictatorship.
By the use of torture, Pinochet’s secret police very successfully got information about and then hunted down the leadership of the MIR (Left Revolutionary Movement) and then that of the Communist Party. Torture works all too well, if those who torture are unscrupulous and brutal enough in its use. How did Stalin get Burkharin and others to confess to crimes that they never committed? Through prolonged physical and psychological torture.

“And FWIW, I think the “Oh there’s no evidence torture works” is a very bad argument against torture.”

Do you agree that torture for no benefit is morally wrong? If so, then a lack of evidence that it’s of any benefit certainly seems like a good argument against it to me. Or do you disagree that there is a lack of said evidence?

Ben - it isn’t as simple as that.

There is some percentage chance that torture will work on any particular occasion. It’s absurd to say there is no chance it will work.

I can construct a “ticking bomb” scenario in such a way that it factors in the percentage chance. It can even factor in the fact that one cannot know the percentage chance with any degree of certainty.

This brings torture onto the table as a morally acceptable possibility. That’s the wedge I need. Once it isn’t ruled out in principle - which it is not - I can do the calculus for any particular occasion.

Of course I’m going to factor in the chance it won’t work. But if the stakes are high enough then probably I’m going to think that a 10% chance that I’m right there’s a 10% chance it’ll work, given that I’ve exhausted all other possibilities, or given that I don’t think the other possibilities will work on this particular occasion, justifies using it.

It’s a much weaker argument than opponents of torture like to think that it is.

I have always tried to live by the philosophy that, faced with a switch and the knowledge that pressing it and not pressing it lead to two divergent futures, then I would not be biased towards choosing the future selected by not pressing it. Whichever future occurs I have chosen it.

I told the experiment that I would never choose to kill someone. The experiment then placed me in the unlikely position that either of the choices I made would result in one or more deaths, and when I chose fewer deaths (even if that involved muscular effort) told me that I had chosen to kill someone. That’s not true, the experiment chose the fact of death, all I chose was the quantity.

As soon as you introduce chances (in the torture experiment) - then I get a choice and choose not to torture.

The “no evidence torture works” argument seems to follow in the tradition of “the end justifies the means”. That is, such thinking would say that justification is lost without meaningful results. Though, this has never been my favorite line or reasoning. In general, utilitarian values seem to have an inherent element of compromise, which always leaves me with a feeling that it is about something other than morals. Note however, that if the results are a beaten down and broken society, then the government that makes widespread use of torture on such a society would seem to have distorted concept of utility.

Dave - I think that’s a quibble. The point is there are times when you think it is morally desirable to kill. Remember, some percentage of people think that the difference between acts and omission means actually that the trolley shouldn’t be turned. You’re not among them.

So you’re saying that if there’s any non-zero probability that torture will work, given high enough stakes, we are obligated to torture? I guess that makes sense from a utilitarian perspective. Since I’m not even remotely utilitarian, I’m very much unswayed by it myself. I find your argument as unpersuasive as you find mine. The maxim that guides my morality is not maximizing happiness, but rather refraining from actively causing harm.

So, as you might guess, I do rule torture out on principle. Even if it was 100% guaranteed to work, I’d still be against it in any situation.

For similar reasons, I don’t consider it at all inconsistent to choose switching tracks, but not pushing or torturing the fat man. The intent in switching the tracks is not to harm the person being hit; that’s just an unfortunate side effect. In the other cases, one is acting with the intent to do harm, which I find morally repugnant.

It’s a bit frustrating that the thought experiment doesn’t seem to take this approach to morality into account. Or perhaps it simply takes it as read that my morality is internally inconsistent, but if so, it has done nothing to demonstrate that it is.

The trouble is Ben your position that morality requires that you refrain from doing harm entails this:

If you know with absolute certainty that if you torture somebody you’ll save a million lives, you’re not going to torture them because you’d rather refrain from actively doing harm to one person than prevent the suffering associated with the death of a million people (which will be the consequence of your doing nothing).

I just think that’s crazy.

Of course, the other point to make is that if you’re against torture in principle, then the argument about whether it is effective is moot. That’s not what’s at stake for you.

The side-effect argument I don’t buy. But you’re right to think that some people consider it to be an effective argument.

No, those people dying will be the consequences of actions taken earlier by the person I’m not torturing. My not torturing him isn’t making them any deader. Personally, I find the idea of doing harm to anyone to be crazy, but YMMV, obviously.

Regarding the side-effect argument, I think it reveals another problem with this thought experiment. It seems to take it as a given that there must be a right choice and a wrong choice in each of these situations. But that’s not how moral choices really work. They work on levels of degree. So when I say that it’s always wrong to kill someone, but I also say that the “right” choice is to divert the track, I’m not being inconsistent. Both choices in that situation are wrong. It’s just that diverting the track is less wrong than not diverting it. In the other cases, pushing/torturing the fat man is the more wrong choice than doing nothing, in my opinion.

Ben: Let’s say a gang of thugs is about to rape your wife or your sister or your mother and you have a gun. What do you do? Talk about the Sermon on the Mount with them? If it were my sister or even any woman, I’d shoot and I’d shoot to kill.

Ben - In counterfactual terms your non-action is part of the story of their suffering.

Two worlds:

1. No action (on your part) - suffering;

2. Action (on your part) - no suffering.

You absolutely need to factor that into your decision making calculus.

This moral stuff is about intuitions. There are no knock-down arguments here. But in this situation, if you were in my way, I would remove you so that I could torture the fella. Happily you wouldn’t use force to prevent me, because you’d want to refrain from harming me, right? :)

Jeremy: I do factor that in, of course. If the action was something I didn’t find morally repugnant, I would certainly take it, as demonstrated in my response to the track-switching scenario. If my action is something I do find morally repugnant, like torture, I will not take it, no matter how much suffering my action might prevent.

But I would not stop you from taking that action.

Amos: I’m curious where you stand on this torture argument, since your own earlier post shows the difficulties in assessing its value. Given its propensity for producing false confessions and for taking a long time to produce them, the odds that it would lead to a true and timely confession in a ticking-time-bomb scenario seem far too low to me to ever justify it in such a situation.

Regarding your scenario, I have to admit that personal stakes change things. I think that’s true for all of us no matter what moral system we adhere to. I would certainly be more likely to violate my pacifism for the sake of people I care about than for the sake of people I don’t know.

Ben: Agreed that the fat man and the ticking bomb is an artificial situation. In general, torture works like this. The police arrest 40 people, looking for someone bigger. Out of those 40 people whom they torture, they know that they’re going to get a lot of false confessions. However, the police have a general sense of where Mr. Big may be or who is the next step who may lead them to Mr.Big (Mr.Big knows where the bomb is.) So the police, who already have a general idea of what kind of information that they’re looking for, are able to rule out most of the false confessions. We can suppose that the police have some informers in the illegal group, who can them an idea how the group functions, thus enabling them to sort out relevant information from irrelevant information and false confessions. Remember that torturers have no scruples. If they find it useful, they’ll rape the guy’s wife in front of him. So in real life it takes a while to get to Mr.Big, the guy who knows where the ticking bomb is, I grant you that. On Jeremy’s online test, I said “yes, that I would torture the fat man”, but it’s a hypothetical situation, to be sure. I’m sure that Jeremy could invent a situation where the police do have time to find Mr.Big (the guy with the bomb) through torture and could not find him without the use of torture. In sum, I can imagine situations in which torture is justified. However, I also, in Jeremy’s test, clicked that torture is always wrong. My point is that at times one is justified in doing wrong, in taking off the gloves, in fighting dirty. My score on Jeremy’s test was that I contradict myself. Perhaps. However, I think that there are forms of justification which are extra-moral or non-moral, that political or strategic reasons at times trump moral reasons.

It’s like I said before. One can espouse a principle like “torture is always wrong” or “killing is always wrong” and also say that torturing or killing is the “right” choice in a given scenario without being inconsistent. You recognize that what you’re doing is still wrong, but that the alternative is worse. I don’t see how that can really be considered inconsistent.

Really, I’m not sure how much sense it makes to approach morality from a logical standpoint. I’m not sure it makes any more sense to expect morality to form some sort of internally consistent system than it does to expect that of taste. There’s too much sub-rational thought going into our moral decisions for any of us to have a truly logically consistent system of morality. We can maybe sort of approach it in theory, but a lot of that goes out the window in practice anyway, so what’s the point?

Ben: I agree with much that you say. Consequentialism rationalizes (as psychologists use the term, “rationalization”) the fact that at times we have to do the wrong thing: as I said, at times other considerations trump moral considerations. I think that instead of rationalizing our non-ethical decisions, we have to live with that dilemma: we are not angels nor saints. At times being a saint is a luxury one cannot allow oneself. Morality, as you say, is far from a coherent or consistent system, and I find it interesting that, in order to express myself, I use religious terminology, for example, “saint”, although I’m an atheist.

I think that’s just a reflection of the influence Christianity has had on our common lexicon. I think it’s interesting that I’m also an atheist, but I’ve never met a Christian whose express moral ideas come as close to lining up with those of the figure they claim to revere the most as mine do.

Some alternatives:

1. Suppose you could evacuate all but one person. Would you deliberately leave the bomber at ground zero, saving everybody else, or would you insist on some lottery or other means of selection? Perhaps, you’d choose to leave yourself.

2. Suppose the bomber was the only person that could be saved and only if you acted. Would you feel morally obligated to do so?

3. And, then let’s consider an alternative method of torture. You transport the bomber just far enough from ground zero that, instead of being instantly obliterated by the blast, the bomber would receive profoundly horrific radiation sickness (which you would explain to the bomber with graphic images of those who have suffered and died from radiation sickness in the past). In such a case, the bomber would be a victim of his own bomb–with a bit of help from you. Note that the only torture here–prior to the detonation of the bomb–is the threat of a horrific lingering death. As twilight zone-ish as this might seem, how extreme is it? If the bomber fails to confess, would you feel obligated to stay with the bomber to suffer the radiation sickness yourself?

4. Suppose you’ve set up the above scenario, and the bomber clearly has no fear of a horrific lingering death or any other manner of pain–with plenty of time to modify the plan. Would you then threaten to bring his loved ones to join him in the lingering horror? …his sons and daughters? Would you actually bring them. Remember: as long as the bomber confesses, the only torture is the trauma of threatened suffering–and the loved ones wouldn’t have to know anything about it.

Is this overly rationalized, or is it down right twisted?

Tesserid: Both.

Amos: I’ve thought about the gangrape scenario some more, because it’s the closest thing to a situation I might actually ever find myself in that’s yet been proposed. I think it’s safe to assume that I’m never going to be in the position to have to decide whether or not to torture anyone, but I might find myself in the wrong part of town with my sister someday. Of course, I almost certainly wouldn’t be carrying a gun, but if for some reason I was…I have no idea what I would do, really. I can only say what my ideals would have me do. They’d have me look for a non-violent solution first. I might not quote from the Sermon on the Mount (though if I saw a cross around their necks, I might), but I probably would appeal to their humanity. If that didn’t work, I’d probably first threaten them with the gun. If that didn’t work, then I would fire the gun, but aim to wound rather than kill (I’d consider aiming to miss, but I’m afraid that seeing me miss might embolden them). Chances are, they would probably leave at that point (if not as soon as I pulled out the gun). Only if that failed would I shoot to kill. Ideally anyway. In real life, who knows? I have a feeling that what people say they would do in these hypothetical “what would you do scenarios” bears very little resemblance to what they would actually do in real life.

Re:- Ben T. B. March 5th.

“So, as you might guess, I do rule torture out on principle. Even if it was 100% guaranteed to work, I’d still be against it in any situation.”

I read this with some interest, Remember you said “in any situation “
So here is a situation:- Your wife and child will meet a very grisly death but you know if you can find them you can save them. The man who has arranged and is responsible for all this, knows where they are, and he is held captive by you but will divulge nothing. You know that torture is guaranteed to work, and an expert in this terrible practice is on hand and he guarantees his victim will not even play for time by lying. Time is short, and additionally you can hear your wife and child over a secure telephone link both terrified at what is to happen to them unless you get a move on. Does your principle withstand such an onslaught? You will have to account accurately to all friends and family for whatever action you did, or did not take in this matter.

The only principle I hold to, is to try to do what seems best and fair minded in any situation in which I become involved. In this exercise set By Jeremy Stangroom, answering in the affirmative to question 2 I found my self acting as a Utilitarian, and as such became involved in the well known problems which strict adherence to this rule or principle generates.

I think Douglas Bader may have identified the problem when he said “Rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men.”

Ben: From what little I know about such things, the idea is not so much to shoot to kill or to shoot to wound, as to shoot to leave the other out of the game, immediately. That is, a deadly wound (he will slowly bleed to death, but has time to cut your sister’s throat before he dies) may help our sisters less than a wound which leaves him unable to move, but with the possibility of survival. However, from my point of view, the object is not so much to save lives as to prevent your sister or mine from being attacked. By the way, remember that a revolver contains only 6 bullets and a pistol generally 9 bullets and that reloading takes time and leaves you unprotected. So warning shots may be wasted bullets.

Looks like this issue has taken a few tacks since I last checked in. While I had stated earlier that I would not fault anyone for either acting or not acting in this specific instance, I would also assert that in general I respect people who over time and numerous opportunities choose to act, even if their actions are wrong (from my perspective), than those who so fear acting wrongly that they err on the side of passivity. Especially if those passive types wish to later cast judgment on those who act.

“Your moral consistency score is 67% (higher is better) Unfortunately this score suggests that you lack consistency in your moral framework. Indeed, 78% of the people who have completed this activity demonstrate greater moral consistency in their responses than you manage. You might want to spend some time examining how you think about morality! ”

Jeez Jeremy, this is a bit condescending isn’t it?! Particulary given the inconsistency could be a function of your forced choice design!

And you assume consistency is a good thing - ignoring the possibility that 78% of people are biting the bullet and committing themselves to statements they don’t actually agree with!

Don’t blame me Paul, blame the test!

How did you manage to come out so… errr… reasonably inconsistent?! :)

Ha! By the simple virtue of changing my mind halfway through!

Ok, you’re right - maybe I do need to go and think about morality some more. Sniff.

Quite reasonable to change your mind half way through. Don’t want to be throwing people to their death on a whim! :)

The test *is* a little “cheeky” in places. But I don’t think the forced-choice aspect is particularly a problem.

I was 100% consistent though it, unsurprisingly, doesn’t make me feel any happier with my choices (never act to harm someone even if that inaction results in greater harm to more people).

I guess my main rule is the idea that human life doesn’t have a quantifiable value, so to suggest that the lives of five (or a million) people are worth more than one is absurd: if the value is null (unquantifiable), or infinite, then one could argue that the value of one person’s life (1 x 0, or 1 x ∞) is the same as that of five people (ie 5 x 0 or 5 x ∞), which, in the initial train scenario, means the two options are equal, in which case I’d opt for not doing anything and killing people (the fact that the train was unstoppable not being my fault) rather than doing something to kill someone.

Factoring in the responsibility of people for the potential deaths of others seems to make the morality clearer, but once one defines a situation where it is deemed ok to torture/kill someone, one instantly creates the quandary of where the line is drawn in any hypothetical scenario: better to avoid being put in this position in the first place and protect any future victims of more ambiguous circumstances.

Perhaps inaction is in its own way an action, and it obviously gets a bit more complicated further on, but that’s my basic rule of thumb anyway,

While I would agree that “a human life”, which is something completely imaginary, has no quantifiable value, individual human lives each have some relative value to each other. If the fat man also happens to be a neurosurgeon and the people on the tracks are tattooed and pierced, fat man stays right where he is. That isn’t to say that a person with multiple facial tattoos can’t be a neurosurgeon, but as I see it making choices is what life is about.

In the problem, I notice the sentence “If bomb disposal experts get to the bomb before it explodes, there’s a chance it could be diffused.”

Now, it seems to me in the context of the question that a diffused nuclear device would spread radiation over a populated area. Probably better to do something else with it.

Ha! Good spot! I’ll change that. Thanks.

The original question about it being ‘always’ wrong to kill people says ‘if avoidable’.The first death by turning the train isnt avoidable so its the quiz thats inconsistent there not the two answers..

Yeah when I took the test via e-mail link, I was pretty disappointed with the torture vs trolley comparison.

I scored perfectly consistent on the consistency quiz…

A consequentialist can take into account probabilities or likely futures. Its not terribly likely that torture would work in the scenario described in the quiz. However, it is absolutely certain to work in the trolley scenatio (killing the fat man).

I think I could answer all the questions perfectly consistently and say no to the torture question, and yes to the fat man question.

I might need to take the quiz again, since its been awhile since the original e-mail was sent out. But I remember I was irked about it, and had no place to vent my frustrations.

Wayne

Hmmmm!

I think you need to run through it again.

There’s no contradiction between the trolley and torture responses unless you’ve previously stated that you’re a strict utilitarian.

If you’re a strict utilitarian then you just should respond that torture is justified in the scenario as described.

The fact that such a scenario is unlikely in real life is neither here nor there. It’s logically coherent - that’s all that matters. (Or at least that’s all that matters to make the question permissible.)

To sum up, the choice is to kill or torture one person to save more than one. In a culture morality can be absolute in theory while relative in practice. A person conditioned by culture may choose to be reactive and go with the relative choice. To choose to be proactive would be to put theory into practice.

The question could be asked what would an Avatar do. The Avatar, viewing individuals and cultures as mere blips in time, would likely choose absolute morality and be proactive rather than reactive.

Don: I already conceded that personal stakes would change things for me, and that what I would actually do in real life may well be very different from what my principles would have me do (as I imagine it would be for most people), so your scenario is redundant. Although I have to say that a scenario where torture is guaranteed efficient and effective is about as relevant as a scenario where the sun orbits the earth.

Just out of curiosity, what would you strict utilitarians do in a scenario where you could only save the lives of, say, 4,000,000,000 people by torturing 3,999,999,999 other people? And what if you could only save 4,000,000,000 people by killing 3,999,999,999 other people? Is there any point where it’s not just about sheer numbers for you?

Amos: Obviously, the main goal in the situation is to save my sister from harm. But, by my principles, the less harm I cause in accomplishing that goal, the better. As I said, in real life, I really don’t know what I’d do. It may be that I’d simply pick whatever option seemed most likely to save my sister from harm, but ideally, the amount of harm I’d be causing would also be a factor in deciding my course of action. Perhaps not as important a factor, but still a factor. Ideally.

Ben, You start from the position that torture is always wrong and then build your argument against it, in any conceivable scenario, from that point. Your mind seems made up before even entering the discussion, so why bother? As for “strict” utilitarians, those who have supported and those who opposed dumping the fat man have all expressed some degree of weighing the consequences of acting or not acting.

To me the crux of this argument has to do with the relative value of different human lives. The “experiment” attempts to abstract this out. Someone here stated that they had a problem viewing human beings abstractly. The more one takes this experiment seriously, the harder it is to view the people involved abstractly. It’s all nice and touchy-feely to say that all human life is equal, but when forced to make the decisions that many people in this world have to make, such a position is really just a moral cop-out. To compare 4M people vs. 4M-1 is beyond any human’s capacity to even consider, but compare the life of one neurosurgeon vs. the life of one heroin addict.

How’s this for a thought experiment…You’re in an alley and you see a famous doctor go in one door and a heroin addict who has just shot up in front of you go in another door. Now some enraged mobster, gun in hand, tells you he’s going to kill someone behind one of those two doors, either you pick the door or he opens one at random and fires away. Do you point him to the drug addict’s door or do you just leave it up to the random chance of the mobster’s decision?

WTP,

I assume you expect the “enraged mobster” to act rationally and respond predictably to your answer.

Assuming you one were willing to give an answer–rather then abstain, I would say that one should consider how the potential targets would expect you to answer. Specifically, how would a doctor, having taken the Hippocratic oath, want you to respond? And, if the addict had really lost the will to live, how would that addict want you to answer?

Does that take us to the subject of assisted suicide?

WTP, what on earth do you have against (1) people with multiple facial tattoo’s and (2) heroin addicts?

By comparing these groups of people with neurosurgeons or doctors you seem to think you are making an obvious point about the value of different human lives.

It’s not at all obvious to me and, without invoking Godwin’s Law, a but worrying.

That’s true, Paul. In any case, a partial list of heroin addicts who have made important contributions to the arts include jazz greats like Charlie Parker, John Coltrane, Billie Holiday and Miles Davis; the rock guitarist Eric Clapton; the Chilean novelist Roberto Bolaño; the beatnik writer Williams Burroughs, among others.

TESSERID- OK, so make it a robot not a mobster…you’re stalling. The point of the experiment is that you have to make the decision. While you could consider what the doctor MIGHT want you to do(maybe it’s dr. ghandi)I’m not sure the hippocratic oath really applies here. But since I’m not a doctor, one could chime in here and let us know. As for the herion addict…does it really matter?

Mr. Hutton - Facial tatoos and heroin addiction are an indication (to me) that someone is throwning their life away anyway. It’s not a issue of “having something against” such people, though your breathless inability to see what on earth one would have “against” them is precious. My reasoning is if they are throwing their lives away anyway why does it matter if society continues to benifit from the value it alread has in the existing neurosurgeon. I would understand your response if I was in some way advocating rounding up such pitiful people and pouring them into some machine in order to “manufacture” a neurosurgeon. And Godwin’s Law is a cute way of saying something without feeling responsible for saying something. What, do you fear I’ll advocate invading Poland next? Really.

Amos - Let me ask you this question, would you rather live in a world without the best jazz muscians or a world without the best neurosurgeons?

More to the point of this general issue, are you afraid to address my question and if so why is it so much more difficult than the trolley question? Is it because it is framed in the context of more human characters as opposed to the abstract ones of the original post? Which of us truly views people as individuals, with flaws and positives, and which of us views them as just abstract utilizable creatures?

WTP: It may surprise you, but music is such a priority in my life that I would prefer to live in a world without top neurosurgeons than in a world without good jazz musicians, especially since my son is a jazz musician. By the way, I was the one who brought up the difficulty of imagining abstract individuals, so I share your criticism: our difference is that I value music and musicians more than you do.

WTP: Torture is always wrong. The point of the discussion is whether it is more wrong or less wrong than the alternative in any given situation. I can’t think of any remotely plausible scenario where it’s less wrong, though I admit that there are plenty of extremely implausible, though still theoretically possible, examples. Let me put it this way. In the magical Jack Bauer fantasy world where torture gets you fast and accurate results, I would still find it wrong, but I would be more likely to violate my principles and commit horrible atrocities for the sake of a few people I care about than for the sake of a multitude of faceless randoms. In fact, that maxim is probably part of my moral system in any conceivable world. So in a sense, I agree that the relative value of different human lives enters into it. Though I think I probably weigh those values in a much more self-centered way than you seem to.

As for your thought experiment, it’s interesting, because it’s forced me to admit that there is probably another component to my desire not to push or torture the fat man in addition to simply abhorring the act. I also really hate being coerced, whether by people or by circumstances, into doing something I don’t want to do. That reason alone is enough for me to simply tell the mobster to go screw himself.

Facial tattoos indicate someone is throwing their life away?

Good grief - are you serious?

Your point about lives having different values might have more weight if you restricted considerations to morally relevant factors, rather than cosmetic concerns or health problems.

WTP, I really hope I never end up in a situation where you have to judge the worth of my life versus some other.

For all I know, I may be wearing the wrong colour trousers or something.

Guys - Be nice!

WTP’s thought experiment has merit. If his particular examples don’t appeal, just abstract it:

Person A causes X amount of happiness/good in the world.

Person B causes X + 1 amount of happiness/good in the world.

No grounds for thinking that this situation will change.

etc.

Jeremy, there are sometimes good reasons for indignation. You’ll note I expressed it without attacking this person’s character.

I don’t think you’d be as forgiving of WTP’s examples if it was about some other irrelevant feature - sexuality, choice of football team, hair colour, make-up, dress, skin colour etc.

Paul - Is your claim that if you took a random sample of neurosurgeons and a random sample of the tatooed and pierced, and then picked out some feature of the world that was analysable in utilitarian terms - e.g., lives saved - that one would expect both groups to have contributed equally to general happiness?

Because if so, I don’t buy it.

I think that’s all WTP is really getting at.

Of course I understand that one can’t do that sort of calculus in reality, and also that there are aspects of people’s lives other than their saving of the lives of other people that are analysable in utilitarian terms. But if one brackets that stuff then I think WTP’s stuff isn’t particularly offensive.

That’s a lot of bracketing to defend your point Jeremy.

Actually I don’t think it is much bracketing.

If I had to choose between saving a surgeon’s life and saving the life of someone dressed in leather, pierced and tatooed, then I’d choose the surgeon’s life.

And I think that would be the right thing to do (if I had to choose - and assuming that I know nothing else about either of them).

Of course that’s not to say that it might not turn out to have been the wrong decision. Of course that’s a possibility.

I don’t find the idea that some people have lives that are more worthwhile in strictly utilitarian terms than other people particularly offensive. I don’t think my own life has particular merit in utilitarian terms…

Jeremy,
That’s really just the half of what I would really like to get at. My main point has been reenforced (to me anyway) by the sidetrack discussion here about the kind of person I am. That point being, the passivity in what I see of “philosphy”. In the real world people have to make decisions somewhat similar to these. I note that while there were several objections to my experiment, only Ben even chose to address my question and did so in the most passive manner possible. This is what I was saying in my post on March 5, re:
“While I had stated earlier that I would not fault anyone for either acting or not acting in this specific instance, I would also assert that in general I respect people who over time and numerous opportunities choose to act, even if their actions are wrong (from my perspective), than those who so fear acting wrongly that they err on the side of passivity”

Of what use is philosphy that refuses to engage even an abstraction of the real world? Do philosphers see themselves as some kind of gods for whom the rest of us were put here to amuse?

Oh, and I think Paul would prefer that I speak to the robot if it were a choice between himself and the heroin addict. Between himself and the doctor would be a much tougher call, but rest assured the decision would have no dependency on the color of his trousers, which would likely change shortly anyway iykwim. Though Amos didn’t respond either, I would guess he would take Paul over the doctor for his amusement factor, if nothing else. But that’s just my guess…Amos?

You’re right, WTP, I would pick Paul over the doctor, because I’ve learned a lot from Paul over the years. I’d even pick Jeremy over the doctor, although I hesitate there. Music doesn’t amuse me: so there’s no amusement factor. Didn’t Nietzsche say something about music making life worth living? I don’t think that he was speaking of amusement. We have different values: maybe you value a long life without music, while I value a shorter one with music. Life would be a lot poorer without Bach, Beethoven, Miles Davis, Coltrane, etc. My life would not be poorer if I die at age 65 (I’m 64) rather than at age 85.

Amos, don’t play semantics…

Amuse - 1. To occupy in an agreeable, pleasing, or entertaining fashion.

As for Neitzsche, I didn’t get that far in Also Sprach Zarathustra becaus I had to go back to work. Maybe he said it somplace else? Also, I didn’t know Bach was a heroin addict…hmm. Seriously, is this to be a discussion of philosophical questions or do we want to play smart alec? I can do either one, and I suspect I’m little better at the latter, but I’ve been trying to contain myself here in respect to the subject matter. As you can probably see, I’m beginning to run out of patience. Jeremy, care to discuss my point about philosophy’s (recent, I presume) penchant for inaction?

Jeremy, if you qualify WTP’s case for him to the extent that you have, then of course it sounds more reasonable.

If you read his comments, however, there’s a breezy assumption implied that OF COURSE they have less value.

It’s this I object to and it’s this I find offensive.

Paul - I just think on the internet things go more smoothly if one addresses the strongest version of the argument of one’s interlocutor.

Otherwise… well there’s normally a lot of heat, and not much light.

I get that there’s something to be said for pulling people up about their (unjustified) assumptions. But unfortunately this is often destructive in terms of a blog or discussion board thread staying either on topic or civilised (and I’m not suggesting that you’ve engaged in ad hominems, etc., just that things tend to go bad very quickly on the internet).

Anyway, I think I’m going to close comments here. The conversation seems to have run its course