Hi Jean,
First, it’s nice to know that women in Iran have at least some rights.
You say “some moral standards” are unconditional. Is there one that covers this situation? I’d like to know what it is. Wouldn’t one be able to come up with some moral standard, for example “an eye for an eye” which would nullify this unconditional moral standard, if it exists?
Of course, since we’re dealing with Iran where a woman’s rights is minimal, the man might have thought he was acting reasonably. It would be nice if this case helps that country consider how their culture perhaps encourages men to think that way.

In ‘Moral Constraint and Complaint‘, I respond by breaking the link between unconditional moral standards and unconditional rights to complain.

I think the man has a right to complain, since how he treated the woman was immoral. I reject (N). The woman was just in complaining about his actions, and he is just in complaining about the court’s actions.

I’m also quite willing to reject (U). I’m not entirely sure there are unconditional moral standards. Thats what makes me a pluralist.

I certain reject N. For example, someone who does not respect human rights still has a right to have his or her human rights respected. Would you say that because Pinochet tortured and did not respect due process, he should have been tried without due process and forced to confess by the use of torture? As to U, I would agree that some moral standards apply unconditionally, but not that all moral standards do, and that’s precisely what we’re trying to ascertain: what standards apply in this case.

It seems like the issues here are ambiguous. Certainly Majid (the criminal) can’t complain–in the sense that he would seem ridiculous if he did. We would laugh at him. We wouldn’t take him seriously. But then there’s the question whether the sentence he uttered, if he complained, would be true. I think that’s what Saul is really talking about here…or I assume so.

Well, what would Majid say? If he says (with philosophical rigor!) “It’s prima facie wrong to throw acid in people’s eyes” then It doesn’t seem as if his past actions could possibly affect the truth of this assertion.

But what if he says “Society owes it to me to spare me this punishment”? Well, not too plausible. What society owes you has a connection to what you’ve done in the past.

Suggestion: perhaps it’s because Saul is thinking of moral claims as claims to be owed something that (N) strikes him as true. If you don’t think of them that way, then (N) is pretty clearly false.

Personally, I don’t think of morality entirely in those terms, so (N) strikes me as false…at least when you get rid of all the irrelevant overtones having to do with what people “can” say without looking ridiculous.

Within the closed world of sharia law it’s a done deal. It’s a matter of compensation. An imbalance has been created and it must be rectified. He has brought this on himself.

About the manner of the carrying out of the sentence. Amputations are done surgically with due regard to asepsis. It is a matter of arriving at an end state without the agent of the law being tainted by cruelty in its achievement. Once the principle of mutilation has been accepted the caitiff can have no complaint about it but the manner in which it is wrought should be in accordance with the general regime which is surgical and aseptic. This he can demand in justice.

[...] Previous posts on 10 Moral Paradoxes: Paradox 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9. [...]

In order to understand the Paradox of Moral Complaint I think that it is important to get some distance between (1) the notions about what it is right and wrong to do to people, and the related concept of people’s rights, and (2) the issue of complaint. There is a huge literature on (1), but very little on (2). And when hearing that someone was wronged, and his or her rights not respected, it is natural to take this very seriously (as indeed we should), and assume that then of course they can complain. But I think that the questions are distinct, and that perhaps the person can not complain. It often matters a great deal that the complainer has been freely doing the sort of things that are now being done to him, and that he now wants to complain about. It is not only that the car thief appears rediculous when he complains as his own car is taken. There is (I claim) a very real moral question whether there is a moral basis for his complaint: whether HE has a “right” to expect not to be treated in this way, and hence whether he can feel moral indignation and resentment about it. After all, he is (in Kantian terms) being treated in the very same way that he has “legislated” to be o.k. through his own actions. How can he complain when others do to him as he has freely done to them?

This does not mean that it becomes o.k. to wrong people. But the dubiousness of complaining over something one has been regularly and freely doing to others creates a paradox, for it is also natural to assume (almost conceptually) that if one is wronged, then one may clearly morally complain about it. So we seem to have an antinomy.

Perhaps (I consder this at the end of Chapter 9) we should say both that it is wrong to do things to people (such as torture them), AND that, if we go on to wrong them, then they still cannot complain (if, say, they themselves are habitual torturers). This seems to me a real possibility, but it is also very odd: typically, we assume that if one is wronged, then one can complain. The idea that there are forbidden things but that if one becomes a victim and those things are done to one, one nevertheless cannot morally complain about this, seems unacceptable. But perhaps it is the best we can do.

Anyway, this paradox seems to me one of the most important ones (both theoretically and practically), and I hope that someone would help to make further progress on solving it.

There is a good discussion of this paradox in an interview about the book, here:

http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/14400?in=56:21&out=65:35

Saul, Expressing this as a question about the “right” to complain helps identify the problem. It would be interesting though if it could be true that blinding people is wrong, but the blinder in my example didn’t have the right to say so as he was about to be blinded. (Intuition: if X is true, anyone has the right to say X.) Or maybe a complaint has to take another form–like “I am entitled to be spared this blinding”? It seems like a relevant question here is about the sentences that express complaint–and what exactly they must say.

“An eye for an eye leave everyone blind.” There seems to be a great deal of wisdom and truth to this statement, but it really doesn’t seem to provide much direction on how to handle the situation where someone really does take someone’s eye. There might come a time in the future where we can realistically say that we don’t need capital punishment or even punishment that’s just equal to the crime, such as that mentioned above, but on our planet of 6.5 billion people it has not been made clear to me that this time is now. I would like to think that I believe in universal human rights. But it also seems reasonable to me that when a person takes one or more of those rights away from someone, they’ve also forfeited their own. This train of thought leads to conclusions that I myself even get squeemish in considering, so if someone can provide me with a good argument as to why a universal right can’t be forfeited, please let me know.

Does the man have the right to complain? Yes. But need his complaint have any merit in the eyes of the court? No. Everyone has the right to do whatever they want, but they are forced to accept the consequences. Can I complain that I get wet when it rains? Yes. But does that mean I deserve to have the laws of physics changed so that water is not wet? No, if I do not want to get wet, I won’t go outside when it rains.

The reason that I do not deserve to have physics changed is because then I would be abdicating my responsability of self. I walked out in the rain, so I really caused myself to get wet. To not get wet, I would have to change my own behavior. It is the same with this man. He can complain, but to not punish him would be an abdication of his responsability as a member of society. In order to be a productive member of society and have a productive society, everyone has their own responsabilities. When someone does not do what they are supposed to, the government is supposed to step in then and take the appropriate action to make sure society is productive.

I also will not say that the man got what he deserved by being blinded in return. The only reason I say this is that I do not believe in the concept of “deserving”. In a simplified way, things happen or they don’t. I win or lose. I get or do not get. If either happens, I don’t think it’s because I deserved it, good or bad. It happens because it happens.

But I digress. My simplest answer is yes, the man can complain.

(I wouldn’t complain and would rather he didn’t, but then I wouldn’t have thrown acid in a woman’s face for rejecting me. I would rather do unto others as I would want them do unto me. Unfortunately, the world is not so golden.)

Jean, I don’t think that the question is about this or that formulation, but rather that there is an antinomy at the heart of the general moral point of view:

1. X was wronged, therefore X may complain.

2. X did those wrong things himself, therefore if wronged X cannot complain.

There is, as it were, a contradiction within the notion of moral complaint, which at once (and, it seems, rightly) pulls in opposite directions - it does not matter what X did, and it matters greatly what X did, to the question of his moral standing to complain.

This is perhaps comparable to moral luck, where are at once pushed towards taking and not taking luck into consideration.

What do you think?

Saul

P.S.: I’ll turn to your last Paradoxophobia post later, but just thought it is still worthwhile to clarify this, before everyone heads to holiday hibernation.

So the paradox is about complaining itself–the act of it, however expressed. Hmm. I’m about to go into hibernation myself, but will be back before too long.

I think the emphasis should be on the fact that morality is relative to the society that implements its rules, it is not an absolute concept. Thus, some societies choose that the eye-for-eye principle applies, therefore holding (N) true, while other societies choose to uphold (U).

So in a western democracy for example, the acid-thrower is right to complain, and he has a right to a jail sentence rather than being blinded. However, in a sharia-law society, he would not have a right to complain and he would justly be blinded.

Both resolutions are undisputably “right” by the standards of each respective society, and that will remain so until the two societies clash somehow (in cases of international criminals for example). In this latter case, we would have to discuss how to determine which view is right: should a global organisation agree with a majority principle that one or the other is right? Who says that the global organisation should funcion as a democracy?

Filippo

Dear All

In order to make a better judgement , I leave the link of the this girls trial , there are photos of the girl before and after her injury , included .

Please let me know if you are changing your opinion :

http://www.iran-world.com/article.php?id=33120

While I personally feel truly sorry for the girl, and also very angry at the acid-thrower and would experience great pleasure in punishing him eye for eye, this does not change my ming as to how he should be treated by society as a whole, or about the meaning and function of morality in that same society. I firmly believe one shoud distinguish between the initial instinctive response to a crime by an individual, and the way society as a whole should treat the offender. I often find myself wanting to beat the hell out of people who cut in front of me on the motorway risking my life, before realising that that is not the way society should punish them for their offence, lest half the population of drivers in my country would bear numerous scars and injuries at any one time. This is why I choose to live in the society I live in, otherwise I would go and live elsewhere. But this does not mean that in absolute the eye for eye rule is wrong. It is just the preferred means of punishment by other societies, that’s all. as I said before, the problem arises when the different societies clash, and in that case who decides what’s the best rule to adopt?

The bad guy can not complain but the bystander can.

It wouldn’t hurt to clarify which meaning is to be given to ‘right’ in each case. There’s a big difference, for example, between the sort of legal rights involved with acid throwing, and whatever rights we may have to complain. Perhaps there’d be less confusion were we to distinguish between what we see as legal rights, and what we may believe to be moral rights, however ‘moral’ is to be prescribed.

I just hope no one tries to legislate against my right to complain about complainers. Those wanting to try to use their prejudices to restrict my moral rights, however, are much less of a worry — in fact they might even be fun?

- “…if someone can provide me with a good argument as to why a universal right can’t be forfeited, please let me know.” -

Well, Michael F., a universal right can’t be forfeited by criminals (or anyone else) because that’s the nature of them: they’re universal.

Filippo wrote:
“I think the emphasis should be on the fact that morality is relative to the society that implements its rules, it is not an absolute concept. ” -

I don’t think of morallity as absolute as such, but it is far from a “fact” that morality is purely relative to society. Aparteid was “right” from the point of view of the South African society of the time. Same with various societies re: slavery, torture, Nazism, homophobia, human sacrifice etc.

- [Filippo wrote:] “Both resolutions are undisputably “right” by the standards of each respective society, ” -

Not at all. Death penalties (for example) are highly disputed in western societies, and this sentence has been disputed in Iran.

Stephen, your response to Michael doesn’t help a great deal, as you simply make a circular assertion that “a universal right can’t be forfeited by criminals (or anyone else) because that’s the nature of them: they’re universal.”

This approach avoids having to deal with the issue of HOW precisely do we establish that something we (currently) present as being “universal”, is in fact able to be granted this sacred status. Your (U.S.) Constitution’s draughters faced a similar problem when they decided to include certain “rights” in their document. They avoided the problem by simply asserting their current views to be “self-evident”, thus removing any need to show HOW they justified the belief. In terms of the problems there’d have been for anyone trying to come up with a logically constructed justification, it was a wise decision indeed. What’s more, clearly it has worked, because more than two centuries on, few of those taught about the Constitution in their classrooms notice what an enormous leap of blind faith is involved — and still fewer risk saying anything if they do notice it.

Surely the wide and varied meanings assigned (both between one group and another, and within individual groups from one era to another) to the term “ rights” (be they ‘universal’ of not) warns us to be extremely careful when dealing with this heart-warming but fuzzy concept? So before any of us is carried away with the certainty (sic) that OUR definition is the correct one, we need to grapple with this problem of why so many other well meaning but “misled” groups have been (and still are) just as certain that theirs is the one and only true interpretation.

Before leaving I have to suggest, Stephen, that you also misunderstood what Filippo was getting at when he wrote, “I think the emphasis should be on the fact that morality is relative to the society that implements its rules, it is not an absolute concept. ” He wasn’t insisting, as you claim, “that morality is PURELY relative to society.” There may be a problem arising from the fact that Filippo didn’t distinguish clearly among the varied meanings attributed to the word “right” — but as someone once (more or less) once said, “Let he who is without guilt among Filippo’s critics cast the first syllogism.”

And do it I’d hope without using non-sequiturs, Stephen, such as your attempted ‘refutation’ of Filippo’s thoughts re the relative nature of human rights, when you said (if I may quote you) “Not at all. Death penalties (for example) are highly disputed in western societies, and this sentence has been disputed in Iran.” I’m (reasonably) sure that, on reflection Stephen, you’ll concede that the fact a right is contested in both the societies you mention isn’t particularly relevant to anything in Filippo’s contribution? Of course there are people, be they majorities or minorities, who disagree with their society’s current norms. Surely we’d be surprised to learn of ANY significant right (however defined) that wasn’t disputed by SOMEONE in all large societies?

In the meantime, if we take philosophical analysis seriously (although I’m inclined to believe it will never replace sport as a popular pastime) why not try enjoying the (possibly painful) experience of attempting to come up with a sound logical basis for whatever our own inalienable (sic) human rights are supposed to be — for the time being anyway.

Phew… Well, I’ll give you an ‘A’ for effort, Norman.

With regards to your first question, I was being flippant. I’m not saying I necessarily believe in universal rights, but that was the question: Michael asked for an argument as to why a *universal* right cannot be forfeited. I just pointed out that a universal right, by definition, cannot be forfeited. (I suspect he meant to ask why *are* any rights universal, but that’s not what he actually wrote, and I was in a facetious mood.)

Your other points are more interesting (all be it the latter one being entirely baffling), so I’ll give them a response when I have a bit more time. I have to head into town to watch some sport.

Shame on you, Stephen. It’s one thing for untrained amateur observers like Michael and me to be flippant but for a pro? Even I try to not treat fellow amateurs’ genuine questions flippantly — although perhaps I sometimes might lapse when responding to a real philosopher’s statements.

Please, by the way, try to refrain from giving “A”s for effort. There’s far too much of that in our postmodern world as it is, and I feel guilty about it even IF there’d been enough effort to deserve a “phew”, which there wasn’t. You simply remind me what a dull period it is at the moment, with Australia being beaten in cricket by the South Africans, and the television programmes being too terrible to contemplate watching.

Putting that aside for the moment, and getting back to your statement that “universal” rights are unable to be forfeited, since you’re talking about universal rights and not universal human rights, does that mean they extend to animals as well? And plants? Not to mention those poor viruses some of our less responsible scientists seem Hell bent (in its metaphorical sense, of course) on destroying?

Oh what a complex world it is, even before we start using language loosely.

- “…since you’re talking about universal rights…” -

Norman, It was Michael who used the phrase “universal rights”.
(And South Africa beating Australia at cricket just made cricket more interesting, in my view.)

Back to your earlier points:

- “…you also misunderstood what Filippo was getting at when he wrote, “I think the emphasis should be on the fact that morality is relative to the society that implements its rules, it is not an absolute concept. ” He wasn’t insisting, as you claim, “that morality is PURELY relative to society.” -

Filippo’s statement, as written, makes a categorical claim: morality is relative to society. At the very least, it is fair to assume from the way he wrote it that he thinks morality is mostly, if not totally, relative to society. Otherwise, why would he make the case that that’s where the emphasis should be?

- [Norman wrote:] “Of course there are people, be they majorities or minorities, who disagree with their society’s current norms.” -

You’re begging the question: If a majority disagrees with a “current norm”, is it actually the norm?

- “I’m (reasonably) sure that, on reflection Stephen, you’ll concede that the fact a right is contested in both the societies you mention isn’t particularly relevant to anything in Filippo’s contribution?” -

Huh? If a purported right is contested (especially by a majority) in a given society, it’s clearly relevant to Filippo’s point. “Undisputably” was Filippo’s own word. How can something be indisputably right, if there’s a dispute?

Stephen, methinks the lad doth protest too much. Of course Michael used the phrase “universal rights”; but surely this doesn’t debar me from commenting on YOUR post (and I quote) “ that a universal right, by definition, cannot be forfeited.” I’m unsure, by the way, how whatever pleasure you apparently derive from telling us, “South Africa beating Australia at cricket just made cricket more interesting, in my view.” Is relevant to the debate. Perhaps it’s some obscure philosophical point a mere bystander like myself is unable to grasp?
When (having moved on from cricket) you get “Back to (my) earlier points, I suspect you’re still not being completely fair to Filippo. Let’s look at how you responded to my concern that you hadn’t presented Filippo’s position fairly when you alleged he was saying, “that morality is purely relative to society.” You tell us that:
“At the very least, it is fair to assume from the way he wrote it that he thinks morality is MOSTLY, if not totally, relative to society.” [my added emphasis there]
Eureka!!!! You’ve made an appropriate concession, Stephen, even if I did need to highlight that one word, “mostly”. Let’s assume Filippo does believe the major determinant of the final form a particular society’s moral codes take derives from something other than an absolute force, one common to all societies. This still wouldn’t mean he believe they were purely relative.
Perhaps I should have spelt out more clearly what I meant by “Of course there are people, be they majorities or minorities, who disagree with their society’s current norms.” I was thinking here in terms of the ‘legal norms’ prevailing elites have bestowed on their society, regardless of what the majority thought. That was unforgivable of me, so mea culpa. In case you need an example of what I had in mind, think of the death penalty. There are societies where the majority may support it, but it’s effectively taken off the Statute Books. Then, when ‘progressives’ speak out against the death penalty, they commonly talk about its abolition as having become the norm in ‘civilised’ society; but I should have known better than to follow their sloppy approach.
Finally, Stephen, You dashed my dreams with your reaction to my unduly optimistic suggestion that, “I’m (reasonably) sure that, on reflection Stephen, you’ll concede that the fact a right is contested in both the societies you mention isn’t particularly relevant to anything in Filippo’s contribution?” I deeply regret this having caused you to respond with a ”Huh?” I feel bad about that.

On the other hand, I’m now relieved to find you then drew the discussion back to something which may well have led to me thinking about the role of what I referred to above as “legal norms”. When you ask, “How can something be indisputably right, if there’s a dispute?” you’re overlooking the fact that what Filippo said was NOT that something was “indisputably right” as you imply, but rather that something was indisputably “right”. I’m appalled that you, as a practising philosopher, would try to take advantage of amateurish dabblers such as Filippo and me. You know Filippo’s use of quotes when he spoke of something being indisputably “right” means he did NOT say what you claimed he said, and the poor lad deserves an apology. To do less is not cricket — with apologies to readers less interested in wielding the willow than Stephen apparently is.

Come to think of it, I’ll withdraw my mea culpa, and hope that next time you’ll remember to adopt a more sympathetic and helpful approach when dealing with already nervous contributors such as Filippo and me. Wishing everyone an appropriately analytical New Year

Here’s a moral dilemma for me: As amusing as Norman’s rants are, they make no real contribution to the discussion Jean Kazez would have been hoping for. Is it worth making counterarguments? Ah well, it’s the holidays…

- “I’m unsure, by the way, how whatever pleasure you apparently derive from telling us, “South Africa beating Australia at cricket just made cricket more interesting, in my view.” Is relevant to the debate.” -

It’s relevant to your comment, “You simply remind me what a dull period it is at the moment, with Australia being beaten in cricket by the South Africans”. Why did my off hand reference to cricket bother you, in light of your prior off hand reference to cricket? Or did you honestly forget your own comment?

[Norman wrote:] “Stephen, methinks the lad doth protest too much. Of course Michael used the phrase “universal rights”; but surely this doesn’t debar me from commenting on YOUR post (and I quote) “ that a universal right, by definition, cannot be forfeited.”” -

My one line matter-of-fact statement was protesting too much?
The point is, I used the phrase “universal rights” because that’s the phrase I was commenting on. I don’t know whether Michael meant “universal human rights” or whether he really did just meant “universal rights”. I suspect the former, but you would have to ask him. It makes no difference to my point: if one believes that universal rights apply to a given set of entities, those rights can’t be forfeited.

- “Perhaps I should have spelt out more clearly what I meant by “Of course there are people, be they majorities or minorities, who disagree with their society’s current norms.” I was thinking here in terms of the ‘legal norms’ prevailing elites have bestowed on their society, regardless of what the majority thought. That was unforgivable of me, so mea culpa.” -

It’s not unforgivable, but it is a bit hypocritical of you, given your tsk tsking of people in other discussions for not using language precisely and not defining their terms carefully. (Still, it could be worse, you could disingenuously back out of your mea culpa later.)
Anyway, neither Saul’s original paradox, nor the comment of mine that you’re responding to, specifically related to legal norms, so I don’t know why you went on that tangent.

Your point about Filippo’s relativism is ridiculously pedantic. Firstly, his statement was categorical and contained no qualifiers, so it is legitimate to take it that way. Secondly, even if we grant he meant ‘mostly relative’ rather than ‘purely,’ it makes no difference to my counterpoint.

As for your point about the quote marks around “right”, this is a straw man. He used quotes for that word because he was distancing himself from its absoluteness; he was making a relativist case and therefore not attaching himself to the purported “rightness” either way. The key is that he did not put quotes around the word ‘undisputedly’. Go back and read the sentence again; his point is the issue is indisputably resolved in western democracy by an ‘N’ approach, and resolved in Iran because, as proponents of sharia law, they indisputably accept a ‘U’ approach. He’s wrong. It’s not undisputed within those societies; and morality isn’t that relative; and an appeal to relativism doesn’t resolve Saul’s paradox.

By the way, if you dropped the unnecessarily pompous attitude you affect when you disagree with people online, you would probably find people you debate with seem more sympathetic and helpful.

Ladies, ladies, much though as it is flattering to see handbags being thrown over my comments, it may not be so productive to adopt a confrontational attitude on the matter.

May I just clarify - and in doing so I’ll reluctantly prove right the labels I have now been given of “amateurish dabbler” and “nervous contributor” - the meaning of my “undisputably ‘right’ “, and please forgive my spelling, English not being my first language:

“by undisputably ‘right’ by the standards of each respective society” I meant that those societies as a whole have determined each of their solutions to be the right punishment (ignoring certain dictatorships as temporary states in which the majority dissents), even allowing for dissenting minorities. And noone can dispute this, hence the “undisputably”. I did not mean that those punishments are not disputed within those societies, that would really have been too amateurish a mistake, even for a nervous contributor.

Incidentally, I do believe that my appeal to relativism resolves the paradox: this paradox is a paradox because it is founded on a principle of exclusivity, i.e. either N or U can be accepted at any point in time. My relativism resolves this conflict by making both N and U acceptable, depending on which society implements/adopts which principle.

Have a great debating year!

Alright, so far the only direct response to my question was that by definition universal rights can’t be forfeited. At the very most I understood the term “universal” to mean that these right are afforded to ALL humans across the board, I assume from birth. This was the definition I was working off of, and I’m cool with the idea that maybe my definition was wrong. If I am wrong, and the definition includes the idea that they can’t be given up by an individual, this just seems silly. What could this “right” be that I couldn’t give it up? Especially if I’m living in a society that’s operating under a social contract which explicitly states that if I commit a crime against my fellow man, then equal action will be dealt to me….well, I guess it seems to me that, through contract, I can give up anything that I can lay claim to.

Hey, Filippo, please stop calling us handbag throwing ladies - how confrontational of you. (I kid, I kid; call me a lady all you like. But a true lady never throws her handbag.)

Thanks for the clarification anyway, but I still see it as begging the question.

- “I meant that those societies as a whole have determined each of their solutions to be the right punishment (ignoring certain dictatorships as temporary states in which the majority dissents), even allowing for dissenting minorities. And noone can dispute this, hence the “undisputably”. “ -

This isn’t much better than Norman’s “legal rights” approach. Now, if you don’t just mean the legal/official status, what do you mean by “those societies as a whole”? If a state has the death penalty on the books, but no longer applies it, and the majority of the populace oppose it, what is that society’s view as a whole? The only thing that’s indisputable is that it remains a legal fact that the death penalty is an option - beyond that, it isn’t at all indisputable.

The real problem with your appeal to relativism is that it would only work (if it works at all) for those who take the (societal) relative nature of morality as a given. If it’s morally wrong for a society to punish someone by gouging their eyes, or stoning them to death etc, then that is the (U) that is being referred to. It makes no difference to the moral paradox that a court in a given jurisdiction applies the punishment anyway. This goes nicely back to my original criticism of your point: You’re resolution is gained by saying “according to that other society’s standards, N applies, but not U, so no contradiction.” But what if we don’t agree with that society? You would say it doesn’t matter; what matters is that society’s “on the whole” view according to their own standards (moral relativism, at the societal level). As that kind of moral relativism is wrong, you have provided no solution.

- “…this paradox is a paradox because it is founded on a principle of exclusivity, i.e. either N or U can be accepted at any point in time.” -

Not quite: Jean is saying in her opening that both N and U can plausibly be held by someone. The dilemma is for those that accept both principles, not for the state that at an official level ops for one or the other.

Michael:

Maybe you can give up anything you can lay claim to. I was assuming you meant forfeit the right in the sense of lose it through wrong doing. As amos said above, would you say that because Pinochet tortured and did not respect due process, he should have been tried without due process and forced to confess by the use of torture?

(Remember, you asked why ‘universal’ rights could not be forfeited. I think by definition they can’t be, but that doesn’t mean one may not hold to a view that humans have rights that aren’t universal, say, by being contingent on a social contract.)

The idea here, for the purposes of this paradox, is that some moral standards might apply universally. If that standard was “we should never torture a helpless prisoner”, this could be conceptualized as “everyone has the unconditional right not to be tortured in prison.” Now, On this view, even the person in prison because he tortured people doesn’t lose this right. Does someone who holds this view have to admit that such a prisoner has a *moral* right to complain at any such possible treatment?

Note also, Saul isn’t asking if they have a ‘free speech’ right to complain (as I think someone suggested earlier), but whether he can express valid moral indignation.

Don’t worry about it too much, Michael. The whole notion of universal rights (sic) tends to be thrown about with all the abandon seen with lollies at a Greek wedding; and without much careful thought being given to the inconsistencies which have plagued the term throughout its kaleidoscopic history.

If something IS universal, it applies in all places at all times; but universal rights has been assumed (quite sincerely I’m sure) to mean so many different things at different times, and places, that we risk becoming giddy trying to keep up with its ever-changing multiple meanings.

I accept our species shares innate drives which provide a basis for our diverse notions re morality. Some of them result in positive behaviour towards (some) fellow creatures; others lead to more negative behaviours. Much of the confusion about what is to be deemed moral arises from the inevitable conflict among these many (often contradictory) propensities.

When you add to the mix the fact that our species’ genetic endowments seem to vary enormously in strength from one individual to another (whether of not they follow a “normal” sort of curve) it would be surprising if we didn’t end up with disagreement — and confusion — about our alleged universal (sic) rights, or anything else for that matter, were supposed to be.

All this variation, and we haven’t yet mentioned the important role of environmental factors in moulding the final form of whatever the beliefs to which we ascribe — and ascribe so enthusiastically — happen to be. The fascinating variations to be found among so many enthusiastically supported world religions is a case in point.

As if this wasn’t enough, we then need to take into account the effects of cognitive dissonance, and its role in helping us continue supporting whatever it is that we do support, while (unconsciously) carefully examining only those ideas which don’t confirm our current personal ‘true beliefs’. Is it any wonder it all too often end up seeming that we’re wandering through multiple intellectual versions of the Tower of Babel?

I’d suggest the main concern then is not so much how/if we can give up these incredibly elusive rights, but rather how/where we have established their existence — including, naturally, what specifically they are.

First Filippo, self-confessed nervous dabbler that I am, I meant no offence when I lumped us all together. Don’t resile from adopting a relativist position, especially on the grounds Stephen presents. I’d suggest my preceding comments to Michael provide grounds for examining Stephen’s absolutism carefully before agreeing to swallow his particular quick fix pill.

There may absolutes out there, of course, but simply stating what you claim they are does nothing other than tell us what your prejudices are — even IF you had miraculously stumbled upon the one true answer. In the meantime, as long as absolutes cannot be firmly established, the only way we can describe another society’s practices as wrong, is in terms of wrong by OUR standards. This applies equally to what is to be deemed wrong within our own society. This may not be the sort of basis one wishes, but the alternative anarchic chaos isn’t especially appealing, so in general, we’re usually well served by simply going along with local custom and practice.

You ask, Stephen, if “(your) one line matter-of-fact statement was protesting too much?” Stephen, I’m sure you know the answer to that question doesn’t depend on a mere word count? You’re a tad harsh re my comments not being spelt out carefully. When I referred yesterday to my comments being written in terms of legal rights as possibly not having been written carefully enough, I assumed I must have completely misunderstood the original writer’s intent. That seemed quite possible because as I type, I know I really should look back more often at what others have actually written —in my declining years I’ve lost the sort of memory I once took for granted, but we poor old-timers don’t enjoy facing up to problems like that. When, however, I found the poster’s original wording was much more in line with what I’d written, than with how you’d presented it, it would have been unkind of me to not point this out to you — but to call this “hypocritical”? Not to mention then labelling it as being done “disingenuously”? If I may adopt your approach, Stephen, “Tsk! Tsk!”
I’m surprised to hear you still “don’t know why” I went on that legal tangent. Surely it doesn’t have to be ALL about you, Stephen? I was responding in relation to what someone else (was it Filippo, I don’t want to have to check back again) had to say. Even dabblers like us (nervous or otherwise) may be responded to.
It’s fascinating that MY point about Filippo’s relativism is deemed “ridiculously pedantic”, then you proceed immediately to proclaim “(Filippo’s) statement was categorical and contained no qualifiers, so it is legitimate to take it that way.” Let’s not try to consider what we think his [admittedly “non-professional”] intention may have been — a tad harsh of you perhaps? But wait, there’s more. You go on to announce, “Secondly, even if we grant he meant ‘mostly relative’ rather than ‘purely,’ it makes no difference to my counterpoint.” What an impressive counterpoint! It does its job perfectly, even if it’s not responding to what Filippo was trying to say. If you can say, “Tsk”, hopefully I may say “Wow!!!!!” I hope the number of exclamation marks isn’t deemed excessive?
I’m too excited about earning a “straw man” to spend time checking it, Stephen. I may never catch you on that score, but it’s a start.

Stephen,

the point I’m nervously and admittedly amateurishly trying to make, is that the moral paradox is wrongly posed in the first place, becasue it is posed as an absolute choice, while in fact it is a relative choice: i.e. one society will choose U and another society will choose N. Each society will have made the right choice in its own eyes (again allowing for dissenting minorities), and the wrong choice in the eyes of the other society, which implies that neither society is right or wrong in absolute.

As I said before, a conflict may arise when you put those conflicting views / societies in the same room. Then the global society contained in that room should decide which principle to adopt, and again it would be a case of using some system (whether majority rule or any other system accepted by the “room society”) to make the decision. It is never possible to say which principle is absolutely right or wrong. Each of those two principles is only ever right or wrong within a particular society.

Which links me to the other clarification now needed from me:
“…this paradox is a paradox because it is founded on a principle of exclusivity, i.e. either N or U can be accepted at any point in time.” -

I should have phrased the comment better: “…can be accepted by the same person / society at any one point in time”.

-”As that kind of moral relativism is wrong”
In general, I don’t see what’s wrong with moral relativism. Not being a professional in philosophy, I don’t know whether there’s a generally accepted view in the philosophical circles that moral relativism is wrong, but if that’s the case I’d like to know why it is wrong.

Filippo

I have to admit that I’m with Filippo on this one, and like him, I wouldn’t mind being directed to some decent literature on the subject of why relativism is wrong. This seems to mirror one of the major complaints atheists pose towards apologists of any given religion: The onus of proof is on the one making claim to some universal truth.

At the end of the original posting, Jean asks, “Is there any way out?” Well, a relativistic approach is one way out. Why should reasonable people accept “U” as intuitively true? Maybe my intuition is defunct, which would explain more than just my problem with this paradox, but that being said, it seems like anyone intuition is a little to fallible to lead anyone to universal truths.

Michael/Filippo, think of it this way, there’s no problem STATING a moral principle is absolute. You can do so as an act of faith — as, for example, religious groups do. The problem lies with convincing others YOUR act of faith absolute is somehow better than theirs.

This act of faith process often passes moticed. In the US Constitution, for example, certain “truths’ are said to be established on the basis of them being declared “self evident”, which does zilch other than showing the writers held that belief — or at least SAID they hold it, which isn’t always the same thing.

There’s no doubt members of our species tend to have extremely strong predispositions concerning notions of right/wrong actions, etc; but many of these beliefs conflict with one another when dealing with a particular situation, and what can one do (if he has deemed certain rights to be absolute) in situations where opposing rights clash?

The notion of absolute rights is emotionally appealing to our species, and we’re often prepared to defend them to someone else’s death; but apart from blind faith, there’s no way of establishing them — unless of course you’re a religion, in which case you’re not bound by as strong a set of rules as philosophers (hopefully?) are.

There are interesting arguments that the manner in which we classify actions as moral/immoral depends ultimately upon human biological predispositions which had major evolutionary advantages in earlier stages of our species’ development. A positive feature of this approach is that it fits in well with not only how different societies/groups/religions/whatever end up with different moral codes, but also why members of different groups can be so certain they and they alone are right — not to mention honestly believing they have discovered ‘absolutes’.

A less popular aspect of this approach is that although it answers many questions better than the efforts of most professional philosophers, it could result in academics from other disciplines examining a topic professional philosophers want to retain their professional bailiwick.

In a time when jobs in philosophy aren’t seen to be plentiful, who can blame them?

p.s. — Have fun, but be careful not to stray across the relative/absolute border in the one argument, without acknowledging it, or the philosophical border patrol will be after you.

Filippo asked “I don’t know whether there’s a generally accepted view in the philosophical circles that moral relativism is wrong, but if that’s the case I’d like to know why it is wrong.”

There is no generally accepted view one way or the other - it’s still a matter of contention. That’s basically my point, though. It’s certainly not considered a “fact” (as Filippo originally characterised it) that moral relativism is a given (and there are different forms of moral relativism in any case).

My guess (and it really is just a guess) from my reading is that most philosophers these days are neither absolutists nor complete relativists, because both positions are troublesome. (Even the late great Pragmatist Richard Rorty apparently claimed not to be a relativist, although I don’t see how he avoided relativism given his other views.)

Norman wrote:

- “You ask, Stephen, if “(your) one line matter-of-fact statement was protesting too much?” Stephen, I’m sure you know the answer to that question doesn’t depend on a mere word count?”

It doesn’t just depend on word count; it mostly depends on the fact that it was a matter-of-fact statement on my part. This should be obvious, and is just one of the points you have contorted to justify your unnecessarily snarky approach. I can’t be bothered addressing all the others, so I’ll be positive and focus on where we find agreement, such as when you wrote: “If something IS universal, it applies in all places at all times”. Good point, Norman. I made the same point to Michael F earlier (which seemed to get your goat up).

You also wrote: “What an impressive counterpoint!“ Thanks Norman. I’m quite happy with it too.

Also, I largely agree with your summation of how we are the product of varying genetic endowments and environmental factors. But I do not see how this leads to the sort of moral relativism expressed by Filippo here, which leads me a couple of points of order, so to speak:

1) I’m not a moral absolutist. I actually fall somewhere between the moral relativist stance and the objectivists. (I’ve seen my position referred to as “objective relativism”, which sounds about right, even though that title seems a little oxymoronic.) It’s objective in that moral truths can come from objective reality: our actual biological, social, and psychological interactions (not from God or arbitrarily declared universal rights). It’s relative in that moral principles are contingent on changeable factors (including, but not limited to, social situations and cultural context). Morals are relative, but not arbitrary; real, but not absolute.

2) The relativism I’m critical of here is the social or cultural variety. That is, whereby the culture or society is considered to be THE defining factor in a moral question, Such that society A says ‘X’ is true, therefore ‘X’ IS true - for them. There is no separate, independent or objective test about the truth of ‘X’. There is no sense in which anything (including racism, sexism etc) is *actually* wrong, it is just wrong from the view of our society. It is an appeal to this kind of view that Filippo’s response to Saul’s paradox relies. I disagree with that kind of relativism, because it is full of contradictions and flaws (more on this later).

A couple more points aimed mainly at Filippo (although I welcome other comments), before I respond to the question of what is wrong with the kind of relativism Filippo raises.

Filippo,
You wrote originally: “Thus, some societies choose that the eye-for-eye principle applies, therefore holding (N) true, while other societies choose to uphold (U).” You say this resolves the paradox. However, look at Jean’s original statement of N and U (by way of Saul):

“(U) The unconditional nature of some moral standards. Some moral standards apply unconditionally. These standards allow anyone to hold others to them, and to complain if those others do not act in accordance with those standards.”

Note, *Hold others to them*. The society that holds U to be true by definition believes that they can hold others to that standard. This includes holding the other society to the standard. As Norman said: if a right is universal, it applies in all places at all times. It applies to everyone.

Remember, this paradox isn’t specifically about this Iran situation - it’s just an example. It might be best for you, if you are so committed to societal relativism, to forget this particular example of Saul’s paradox. This example just happens to be cross-societal.

For example: you wrote of how “a conflict may arise when you put those conflicting views / societies in the same room. Then the global society contained in that room should decide which principle to adopt…”

If you really have a resolution to this particular paradox, you will be able to explain it in terms of the same room situation you describe here.

Stephen, I’d suggest your comment that, “Morals are relative, but not arbitrary” is a little like being half pregnant. If they are relative (and thus without an absolute basis) the moral code each group believes it has unearthed arose from choices made by those devising that particular code. There are innumerable possible core premises on which our species has built a host of moral codes; but no matter how it’s dressed up by a code’s defenders, the choice of premisses (not to mention important decisions re when/how some premisses over-ride others) has to be arbitrary. Nor does it make sense to talk about, “real, but not absolute.” If by ‘real’ we mean it exists, it’s trite. If, however, by ‘real’ we mean it has some special quality of REALLY being true in a philosophical sense, then we’re making it an absolute. Our extremely strong innate sense of there “having to be” something which is moral causes us to gloss over this problem; and plays an important role in helping societies to function a little better than might otherwise be the case.

You go on to criticise the “social or cultural variety” of relativism in which “society A says ‘X’ is true, therefore ‘X’ IS true - for them” (because) “There is no separate, independent or objective test about the truth of ‘X’ ”. You’re correct that this would mean, “There is no sense in which anything (including racism, sexism etc) is *actually* wrong, it is just wrong from the view of our society.” While this is true, however — painfully true for some of us — unless we can establish that there ARE moral absolutes, and precisely WHAT these absolutes are, how do we avoid the consequent problem that without absolutes we have no way (apart from our visceral feelings?) of saying why the code we endorse is superior/inferior to another? We mightn’t like being in this quandary. In fact I find it psychologically quite distasteful — but where is the logical key to solving the dilemma?

That’s why I believe we’d do well to build on suggestions made a half century back by Ayers, that we look for a possible emotive {NOT emotional) base for establishing an explanation of morality.

In the meantime, philosophers do NOT seem to have been able to reach agreement on, “The unconditional nature of some moral standards.” Ditto establishing that, “Some moral standards apply unconditionally.” Throughout the ages there have been ‘true believers’ of all stipes who were convinced, “These standards allow anyone to hold others to them, and to complain if those others do not act in accordance with those standards.” Unfortunately, however, this is simply a sociological fact, a fact about beliefs, but NOT a fact about the logical status of those beliefs, no matter how much cognitive dissonance helps us feel more comfotable by blurring the lines.
As someone with whom I often agree said earlier, “if a right is universal, it applies in all places at all times. It applies to everyone.” He ought to have known better, and added; but of course the use of “if” shouldn’t let us obscure the sad fact that (as is the case with dragons) “if” statements in no way support the belief that what we’re talking about really exists.

Perhaps (for the sake of clarity) I should have said flying dragons there, so that I wasn’t misunderstood. I do, after all, have water dragons on my property, but they definitely don’t fly.

Norman, as an analogy, the speed of light is relative, but not arbitrary. Relative and arbitrary don’t mean the same thing.

- “In the meantime, philosophers do NOT seem to have been able to reach agreement on, “The unconditional nature of some moral standards.””

I didn’t say they had. However, “The unconditional nature of some moral standards” is a supposition made for the purposes of this paradox, as described above.

- “That’s why I believe we’d do well to build on suggestions made a half century back by Ayers, that we look for a possible emotive {NOT emotional) base for establishing an explanation of morality.”

I’d prefer a rational basis, thanks.

Michael,

You asked for some literature on this subject (of relativism). I just read this review, which covers two books relating to this sort of thing. (I don’t know if I can create a link, so you may have to copy and paste the url.)

http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2003/03/crowder.html

You may or may not be interested in the books themselves, but even the review itself covers the issues pretty well.

I’m more or less in agreement with some of the views expressed by Seyla Benhabib. In particular, her views on “the strong incommensurability thesis” mirror some of my comments to Filippo.

[From the review] “cultures are not internally univocal but subject to dissent and contestation by their members as well as by outsiders. People do not form their identities by realising some pre-existing cultural essence. Rather identities emerge through continuing dialogue among many different individuals and groups bearing different and often conflicting descriptions of, and prescriptions for, themselves and others. This identity-forming dialogue is carried on across cultures and within them. The boundaries between cultures are not as sharp, nor their internal elements as harmonious, as the strong incommensurability thesis supposes.”

Here’ my own blog entry on the matter (written quickly, I may need to edit it, but that will have to wait).

http://www.parkesweb.com/2009/01/relatively-wrong.html.

(Finally, a clarification to my opening line in the above post: I mean that light varies in speed depending on the medium it is traveling through.I probably could have come up with a better analogy, but there you go.)

Norman,

re your point “Note, *Hold others to them*. The society that holds U to be true by definition believes that they can hold others to that standard. This includes holding the other society to the standard.”

I respectfully reject it: of course if a society has elected to uphold a moral principle it will want in theory to hold other societies to it. However, it may not do so unless in practice they are in the same room with other societies and has somehow been given the right to uphold the other societies to its standard. But then we would be back to determining which principle prevails in the “conflicting room” situation (or global society), i.e. who gives the right to one society to hold other societies to its standard? But if you think about it, it’s exactly the same situation as for the single society, just on a larger scale. The issue is clearly fractal, which means that the solution to the paradox applies always, whatever society we consider, whether the room/global society or the individual society. In any society there will never be a paradox between N and U, just a conflict in principle between the prevailing group (ruling majority? assuming a majority rule is adopted) and the ruled group (dissenting minnority?). But the ruled group will have to just submit themselves to the rule of the other group, fullstop.

The paradox arises only if you state that the U and N principles are accepted by the same person/society at one particular point in time. The two principles are clearly incompatible, hence the paradox, and cannot be accepted together by the same person/society.

Filippo

Filippo, IF a society has (somehow) deemed that something is true, it’s to be expected that its members would be held to it. When (if?) they decided to hold non-members to it, however, additional problems arise. With persons visiting their country it’s one thing; but how is it to be applied to persons residing outside their country? It opens a can of worms trying to justify why certain actions ‘should’ be taken in each situation —- and of course there are additional questions re whether effective actions could be taken anyway.

Absolutes work reasonably well perhaps, apart from two small problems. One, convincing others yours are ‘right’, and two, enforcing them in places where they’re not assumed ‘correct’ as an act of faith in groups possessing different worldviews.

I’d suggest there are three main reasons that despite any evidence to the contrary, the notion of absolute ethical norms remains so popular:
1. We do have an innate sense that there MUST be moral absolutes. This had important survival value (in evolutionary terms) for a species such as ours, with its highly developed cognitive powers.
2. We seem also to need to feel ‘better’ than microbes et al.
3. Even those who’ve rejected moral absolutes as a fantasy, still often believe it’s important to maintain the fantasy, in order to help keep society operating (more or less?) smoothly.

When I was in junior high school (which admittedly was a long time ago) a paradox meant simply that accepted premisses led to seemingly unacceptable conclusions. Assuming the logical structure of your argument was correct, you did such things as checking to ensure you weren’t using a word which had different meanings in different premisses. I’d suggest that much of the ‘discussion’ of this topic has arisen from the same word being used with very different meanings.

You next checked to ensure you hadn’t made a mistake in any of your premisses. Only then did you start wondering whether what you saw as ‘wrong’ in the conclusion could be somehow reconciled.

They weren’t teaching us logic, per se, but I believe the emphasis placed on high-level language skills was worth more to us than anything else in our education. Sadly, later generations weren’t so fortunate, as ‘progressive’ theories led to the emasculation of the more demanding aspects of language. Aspects which once laid such strong foundations for anyone interested in analysing ideas.

Then again, maybe I’m suffering from a bad case of old timers’ disease, and high-level English skills don’t really matter any more, as long as we come to ‘correct’ conclusions?

Filippo,

“But the ruled group will have to just submit themselves to the rule of the other group, fullstop.”
That sounds pretty absolute. That’s part of the problem. Your resolution is still dependent on highly suspect notions. Morality is effectively absolute within the society (you described the society’s position as undisputable) yet relative between societies. As per Benhabib above, that’s just bad sociology. And if you grant that societies aren’t internally univocal, and that their boarders are blurred and overlaping, then your resolution is lost.

- “… if a society has elected to uphold a moral principle it will want in theory to hold other societies to it. However, it may not do so…”

This is a normative statement on your part, which you are applying to another society. What standard are you using to justify this statement?

I don’t know whether it’s me who’s not expressing himself very well, or whether all philosophers deliberately argue over every word even if their meaning is clear as black on white, but I don’t seem to be getting through here. I’ll try expressing the same idea again, hopefully providing a better explanation:

- a principle is an absolute within a society because that society made a formal decision engraved in a system of law to adopt that principle. It is relative between societies because any one society cannot hold other societies to its own standards, unless - and here we go again - they are forced into the same room, i.e. the global society and hence the fractal problem which I have already enunciated.

I hope this clarifies.

Filippo

It’s not a matter of merely playing with words, Filippo. There’s an important difference, for example, between the existence of a law and the notion of there being some sort of moral absolute behind it. Where a law exists, there’s usually (not always) a genuine expectation it will be carried out; but even then it’s quite possible the legislators who voted for that law saw it as no more than an unsatisfactory compromise to help society function (however minimally) better.

Even IF the moral absolutes in which many people believe did exist, and IF there was some way they could be dicovered, and IF legislators were determined to introduce laws based on them, would the ‘absolute’ Nirvana have arrived? Only IF either the alleged absolutes were such that in real life situations there was no conflict whatever among what these ‘absolutes’ happened to be, or there was some agreed formula for overcoming the confusion which otherwise would result from situations where supposed ‘absolutes’ required different actions.

One way of looking at ‘absolutes’ in relation to legislated laws is that the word refers to beliefs endorsed by true believers as a matter of faith, while laws are mere guidelines for enforcing particular behaviour patterns it has been decided are best for that society. Whether the legislators saw a law as being based on some “absolute’ principle, its utility, or something else isn’t particularly important.

In the highly improbable event of a particular law being enforced 100 % of the time, you might decide to say it has been enforced absolutely, but that wouldn’t mean it was an absolute in the same sense as believing something was a moral absolute. As with much ‘philosophical’ discussion, we simply be creating confusion by using the same word in completely different senses, without acknowledging the very different meanings present in each of our uses.

That’s why the starting point in any philosophical discussion should be the clear definition of our terms.

Well, you didn’t answer my question about what standards you are using to make the judgment “any one society cannot hold other societies to its own standards [unless yada yada yada…]”. You state that first part as if it is a self-evident truth, yet you don’t believe in those. Is this view derived from your own cultural or social viewpoint? If so, you shouldn’t be applying it to other societies. But if you still don’t see the inherent contradiction, I’ll just drop this angle.

But yes, it clarifies, in that you answered a question I asked awhile ago: What do you mean by “those societies as a whole”? You now confirmed that you mean: the society’s formal “engraved” system of law. This goes back to Norman’s “legal norms” approach, and has the same flaw: this isn’t a legal question. I’ll grant one can make an indisputable observation that society X holds principle P to be true *according to its law*, but that’s a truism. Is it morally right to do so is a separate question. Unless you think a nation-state’s legal system is synonymous with morality, then you can’t just appeal to said legal system for an answer to a moral dilemma. And as soon as you widen your view from the legalistic, you can no longer maintain that there is this simple, easily identifiable, separate entity called a society that has an undisputed moral position.

Another way this loops back to what I said awhile ago, is that both slavery and aparthied were principles that a “society [had] made a formal decision engraved in a system of law to adopt”. Now, remembering that “any one society cannot hold other societies to its own standards”, I assume, Filippo, that you don’t approve of other countries’ direct attempts to end apartheid, for example?

I believe the paradox is originally posed as a question of principle, therefore it should be considered in the ideal conditions, i.e. in a free-choosing society and not one where rules are imposed by means of force against the will of the many (I had already made this point in one of my previous posts).

This being the case, I cannot find any other way of expressing my resolution to the paradox more clearly. After all, I am an accountant and can only manage 2+2=4 …

Filippo

With that sum, you’re already at the limit of MY maths ability, Filippo.

Anyway, your statement: “i.e. in a free-choosing society and not one where rules are imposed by means of force against the will of the many” is contradicted by your earlier: “But the ruled group will have to just submit themselves to the rule of the other group, fullstop.

I assume you brought up “the free choosing society” as your counter to the Apartheid example. There are plenty of examples of societies using force. The Taliban imposse their views by force. All societies do, to a degree. I guess we’ll just have to agree to disagree on this one.

I agree that we have to agree to disagree, however, just to dot the i’s and cross the t’s, in a free-choosing democracy (for example like the UK) “the ruled group will have to just submit themselves to the rule of the other group, fullstop”, save having the chance to change things at the next elections, and the chance to protest civilly. This is very different from a society in which things are “imposed by force” (e.g Taleban), i.e. not just the force of fair democratic elections but the force of physical threat to personal safety. So my two statements do not contradict one another at all, save having to be clarified a bit.

Filippo

Sure, but then… you’re not really being a relativist anymore, are you?

You’re saying that what you have argued above applies to *democratic* societies, but not necessarily authoritarian ones. Therefore, you’ve expressed a NON-society (or “extra-society”) standard, with which to make a judgment about other societies. That’s not what a moral relativist is meant to do. (Well, not ones who say: “I think the emphasis should be on the fact that morality is relative to the society that implements its rules”.)

Back after a long break, there’s much which has paswed on this topic; but could it be, Stephen/Filippo that the cause of any decision you have to ‘agree to disagree’ lies primarily with your initial failure to clarify the terms used in your premises right f4rom the start? Good luck.

I think I’ll stick to Finance, but thanks to all for your contributions, you made me realise just how important it is to express concepts in such a way as to be logically/philosophically unassailable, despite what I thought was my clarity of thought, and all my best intentions.

Happy New Debating Year!
Filippo

Norman,

You miss the point this time. The very crux of my criticism of moral relativism is the difficulty in defining it in a way that’s not self-defeating. My challenge to the relativist is to explain what groups of people they think morality is relative to, and how they define said groups*, without falling into one of two traps: begging the question (using their own group standards to define the groups), or resorting to standards independent of the supposed groups (thus undermining their relativist outlook).

(* It could be that those who argue morality is relative to each individual, and not to any particular social or cultural group, escape this criticism.)

Filippo,

Thanks for the debate. If I’ve only impressed one point on you, I hope it’s that moral relativism is still a contentious issue!

Stephen, the starting “point” is very simple. IF one claims there are absolute ethical ‘laws’ out there, which apply to everyone, what precisely are they and (more importantly) HOW do we establish them? Unless initially there are ethical absolutes, which somehow lay down what is/isn’t moral, then whatever an individual/group/whatever proclaims to be the “law”, is relative to the assumed premisses with which they began the process of formulating (their version of) a moral code.

This is NOT merely a circular argument. If ‘A’ believes ‘X’, and ‘B’ believes ‘Y’, and ‘C’ believes ‘Z’, unless somehow we could establish that one of those three beliefs was an absolute moral rule, no matter how sincerely, how strongly, each of the three entities believed they had unearthed an absolute, each and every one of their beliefs is best seen in terms of its ‘truth’ being relative to the personal views of the entity by which it is espoused.

This remains true regardless of how a group defines itself, or is defined bu someone else. As for “resorting to standards independent of the supposed groups” why on Earth would one do that, UNLESS he believed there were an absolute out there somewhere? The suggested “problem” re whether “morality is relative to each individual, and not to any particular social or cultural group” arises ONLY if one argues the patently clear fact that in the real world, everyone has the freedom to develop his/her own code, even if there isn’t an equivalent freedom to espouse it or act it out.

Filippo, ALL discussions re ethics are contentious. They might be less so if our species wasn’t genetically programmed as we are, but that’s how we evolved and, to quote an ancient gnostic’s lament — despite all that seems to happen with ‘Dr Who’, not even God (if he existed) can change the past.

Norman,

1. I wasn’t advancing a case for absolutism, I was pointing out the flaws in societal moral relativism, or any form of relativism that holds morality as relative to a group.

2. [You wrote] “…each and every one of their beliefs is best seen in terms of its ‘truth’ being relative to the personal views of the entity by which it is espoused.”

Which helps not at all when dealing with conflicts of those purported truths. The (group) relativist says the answer is to see morality as relative TO the group (e.g. “I think the emphasis should be on the fact that morality is relative to the society that implements its rules”). Or others say we develop morals from our customs and cultural traditions, so morality is relative to “culture”. This falls victim to the objection outlined by Seyla Benhabib, that is mentioned in the article I linked to earlier.

http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2003/03/crowder.html

3. [Norman] “As for “resorting to standards independent of the supposed groups” why on Earth would one do that, UNLESS he believed there were an absolute out there somewhere?“

Exactly. So the relativist has to use his or her own cultural values/standards/world view etc, to make the assessment of what another cultural group is, which results in begging the question.

4. [Norman] “The suggested “problem” re whether “morality is relative to each individual, and not to any particular social or cultural group” arises ONLY if one argues the patently clear fact that in the real world, everyone has the freedom to develop his/her own code, even if there isn’t an equivalent freedom to espouse it or act it out.”

Not sure what you’re getting at. Are you saying individualistic moral relativism is a self-evident truth? Anyway, my point re this was just that I don’t object to individual relativism. Of course, an individual relativist wouldn’t resolve this paradox by emphasizing the societal relativity of morality.

Away for a while, Stephen, but I can only try again
1. When an ‘ethical’ claim is made, it’s based on the assumptions of whoever makes it (individual, group, nation, whatever) and thus is relative to those assumptions. The fact that some of those making claims BELIEVE they’re in possession of absolute truths doesn’t change this.
2. You say my approach helps not at all when dealing with conflicting ethical systems; but in the philosophical analysis of conflicting conclusions, surely one useful step is to examine the premisses on which the conflicting conclusions are said to rest? The parties may not deign to acknowledge ‘their’ perspective could possibly be ‘merely’ relativist, but that shouldn’t deter us from analysing how they reached their respective conclusions?
3. I don’t dispute there are people who believe there are absolutes out there. Just as there are people who believe fluoridation is a Communist plot, and the Earth is flat. WHAT they believe, however, does NOT change the fact that the code they promulgate is relative to whatever assumptions have been made (however imperfectly) by yhose drafting that code. I don’t suggest this is an especially important point — except, of course, when examining the perceptions of the MANY ‘out there’ who genuinely believe ‘their’ code above all others, is based upon some sort of discovered absolutes.
4. I should have typed “argues AGAINST” the existence of a smorgasbord of moralities in modern societies

1. - “When an ‘ethical’ claim is made, it’s based on the assumptions of whoever makes it (individual, group, nation, whatever) and thus is relative to those assumptions.”

Well, this is a digression, but that is the point of contention between relativists and objectivists: The objectivist says that not all those assumptions are equally valid, and that some assumptions may even be objectively true or false, and they can be examined and rationally discussed much like other claims about the world.

But again, I’m am not trying to make a case FOR objectivism or absolutism here. I am simply refuting a *particular* conception of relativism - the kind whereby the claim is that morality should be seen primarily as relative to a particular way of grouping people (whether that be by “culture”, “society”, nation-state, “community”; I’ve even heard “cognative group” suggested). It is that form of relativism which was brought up, and which I am criticising.

Have to go out for dinner, may come back to your other points later.

Norman,

1. See above, and I point out again, I wasn’t criticising *all* conceptions of moral relativism, nor (in this discussion) advancing a case for objectivism. I wasn’t offering answers to these difficult questions, just pointing out the flaws in one type of answer. So most of the below is a digression again, but oh well…

2. Sure, it is a start (but only a first step) to “examine the premises on which the conflicting conclusions are said to rest”, but it seems to me you would have to leave it there, because of your attachment to “a smorgasbord of moralities”. You seem determined not to admit to any possible objectivity in moral discourse, and equally you don’t seem to see morality as primarily relative to any particular way of grouping people, or even principally to individuals. I’m not sure where you would go next, once you’re done examining conflicting ethical systems.

3. – [Norman wrote] “I don’t dispute there are people who believe there are absolutes out there. Just as there are people who believe fluoridation is a Communist plot, and the Earth is flat. - “WHAT they believe, however, does NOT change the fact that the code they promulgate is relative to whatever assumptions have been made”

Would you say of a society that believed the Earth was flat that they were “right for them, but wrong for me” (the relativist approach to truth), or would you say that they are just wrong - actually wrong, objectively wrong?

Now consider: what do you say to the society that believes it’s okay to throw children into the volcano to appease the gods, so that they will get better crop next year? That they were “right for them, but wrong for me”, or would you say that they are just wrong - actually wrong, objectively wrong? Surely the assumption underlying their moral view is just as flawed as the assertion that the Earth is flat?

Also, “… the fact that …” ? So, a society of absolutists are *objectively* wrong about their absolutism?